【英语中国】中国反腐调查剑指石油利益集团

In November of 2009, China's internal security chief visited the Khartoum Refinery, a joint venture between the state-run Chinese oil company he used to run and the Sudanese government. By his side was one of his proteges, the then-head of China National Petroleum Corp., Jiang Jiemin.

At the time, the visit by Zhou Yongkang-then one of China's top nine leaders-seemed to encapsulate the international ambitions of China's oil industry. It also was an illustration of the political clout Mr. Zhou wielded as patron of a powerful network of current and former oilmen in the Communist Party's top ranks.

Four years on, however, that network appears to be under attack. Chinese authorities announced in the last two weeks that Mr. Jiang and four other oil executives-one from CNPC and three from its listed subsidiary PetroChina 601857.SH -0.38% -are under investigation. Three of those executives also have links to Mr. Zhou. Authorities haven't specified what any of the executives are being investigated for. Mr. Zhou hasn't been accused of any wrongdoing.

Among industry insiders and analysts, the consensus seems to be that a key factor behind the probes is Mr. Zhou's political support for Bo Xilai, a former rising star of the party who was tried last month for corruption and abuse of power, a year after his wife was convicted of murdering a British businessman.

The investigations also appear to be designed to weaken the vested interests that have long hindered reforms in China's oil industry, and to send a clear message to the rest of the state sector as Chinese leaders brace for a prolonged slowdown in economic growth, party insiders and analysts say.

The oil industry is the central pillar of China's state sector. Helped by easy access to credit, its three giants-CNPC, China Petrochemical Corp., or Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corp.-have been at the forefront of the country's drive to invest overseas and create domestic industrial giants that can compete with the world's most powerful multinationals.

Dealogic, a market-research company, estimates that Chinese oil companies have invested almost $130 billion overseas since 2002. PetroChina became the world's biggest company by market capitalization in 2007 for a period of time and surpassed Exxon Mobil Corp. as the world's largest producer of crude oil in 2012.

But the oil sector is also regarded as one of the least transparent and accountable in China, allowing oil executives to buy assets overseas on terms that wouldn't be commercially viable for most multinationals, while often lining their pockets through contracts awarded to shadowy agents and service providers, some analysts say.

In recent years, some party insiders have been alarmed by the industry's growing influence on foreign policy, and even military affairs, as oil executives seek to secure reserves and shipping routes far beyond China's own shores.

Long after he had formally left the oil industry, Mr. Zhou retained sway over the sector that surpassed that of more senior leaders. 'The CNPC people only would listen to Zhou Yongkang,' that person said.

By targeting Mr. Zhou's network ahead of a key party meeting in November -when a package of economic reforms is expected to be unveiled-Chinese leaders may also be attempting to remove some of the obstacles to future efforts to tackle corruption and inefficiency, industry and party insiders say.

The question among many of those insiders is whether it will stop at investigating a handful of people in Mr. Zhou's network or follow through with meaningful oil-industry and market reforms-perhaps opening the sector up to more competition from foreign and private companies.

'There's definitely a political struggle going on, but in the longer term this might benefit the industry,' said Li Xiaofei, an expert on China's energy industry at York College of Pennsylvania.

'The current administration faces obstacles because vested interests including the so-called oil clique obstruct reforms. By removing Jiang and other high-level CNPC officials, it might be easier for the new leadership to reform the industry.'

The intersection of oil and political power in China dates back to 1959 and the discovery of the Daqing oil field in the northeast, which, within a few years, had ended the country's dependency on Soviet oil imports. In 1964, Mao Zedong famously declared: 'In industry, learn from Daqing.'

By the 1970s, a group of oil-industry veterans including Vice Premier Yu Qiuli formed a powerful faction in the Chinese leadership-referred to by some historians as the 'petroleum clique'-which argued in favor of prioritizing state-run heavy industry and using oil profits to import Western technology.

After Deng Xiaoping became China's top leader in 1978, the petroleum clique was outmaneuvered by rivals who advocated allowing private enterprise and limited foreign investment. But the oil veterans preserved some of their influence by promoting protégés including Zeng Qinghong, who was hired as Vice Premier Yu's secretary and went on to become vice president and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee-the top decision-making body.

Mr. Zeng, in turn, is thought to have nurtured the career of Zhou Yongkang, who rose to be head of CNPC between 1996 and 1998 and who later took one of the nine seats on the Standing Committee when Mr. Zeng retired in 2007. Since then, Mr. Zhou has been considered the industry's chief political patron, using his powers to install protégés in senior posts and giving them access to the highest level of decision-making, party and industry insiders say.

'He gave the oil industry access to the very top of the heap,' said Philip Andrews-Speed, a professor who worked for BP PLC in China in the 1990s and is now an expert on China's oil industry at the National University of Singapore. 'I don't think this is a homogenous group: It's vertical lines of mutual interest and support.'

Similar informal networks exist throughout the state sector, but the oil network is particularly strong because of its profitability and international dimensions and because many of its senior figures hail from the same specialist schools, in particular China University of Petroleum in Beijing.

The network's political influence is also enhanced because many senior oil executives are chosen by the party to take prominent posts in local or central government based on their exposure to international business.

Mr. Zhou had the additional advantage of overseeing China's police, courts and intelligence services between 2007 and 2012, which gave him additional leverage in the corridors of power, according to party insiders and political analysts.

Mr. Zhou continued role in the industry in the last five years is evident in his public activities, including his 2009 trip to Sudan and his regular attendance of oil-industry events, such as anniversary celebrations. On a visit to Turkmenistan last September, he made a speech at CNPC's new office there. 'Oil is a word that stays in the heart of an oilman his whole life,' he said.

The probes into Mr. Zhou's network are unlikely to directly impact CNPC's business overseas, according to most analysts. This week, Chinese President Xi Jinping and CNPC's latest head Zhou Jiping visited Turkmenistan and signed a deal to increase imports of Turkmen gas to China and to accelerate construction of two new pipelines between the two countries.

Hong Lei, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said Thursday the CNPC investigations 'will not affect China's energy cooperation with other countries.'

Mr. Zhou, who was named chairman of CNPC in April, also played down the impact on the company, according to its website. 'The problems of the people involved are personal problems,' he said.

There could, however, be greater central government scrutiny of future deals overseas, some industry and analysts say. Others foresee a greater emphasis on professionalization among senior oil managers.

'There is now the old guard and new guard at these companies, with the old guard being people that spent most of their careers in China, and the new guard, which has spent a lot of time overseas, with foreign law degrees, MBAs,' said Steven W. Lewis of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.

'Zhou [Yongkang] is very much from the old school.'

The old oil network includes some figures who are still in senior posts throughout the industry, including Fu Chengyu, the chairman of Sinopec, according to analysts and insiders. But they said the probe was unlikely to spread to the other oil companies because that could risk throwing the entire industry into chaos, and antagonizing too many other senior party figures with interests in the business.

2009年11月份，时任中国中央政法委员会书记周永康参观了喀土穆炼油有限公司(Khartoum Refinery)，该公司是他曾执掌的一家中国国有石油企业与苏丹政府组建的合资企业。当时陪同他参观的是他的一位门生──时任中国石油天然气集团公司(China National Petroleum Corp, 简称：中国石油集团)负责人的蒋洁敏。

相关报道石油行业是国有部门的支柱。得益于宽松的信贷渠道，中国三大石油企业──中国石油集团、中国石油化工集团公司 (China Petrochemical Corporation, 简称：中石化集团)以及中国海洋石油总公司(China National Offshore Oil Corp.)一直走在中国海外投资的前沿。在中国致力于缔造出能够与全球最有影响力的跨国公司竞争的工业巨头时，这些公司也一马当先。

市场研究公司Dealogic估计，中国石油企业自2002年以来的海外投资已达到近1,300亿美元。2007年中国石油一度成为全球市值最大的公司，2012年曾超越埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil co.)成为全球最大的原油生产商。

但一些分析师说，石油行业也被视为中国最不透明、最没有责任感的行业之一，中国石油行业高管购买海外资产的条款对多数跨国公司来说都不具有商业可行性，与此同时，他们经常通过授予影子代理和服务提供商合同来中饱私囊。

近几年，在石油行业高管寻求在远离中国本土的海外获得石油储量并确保运输航线的安全之际，一些党内人士开始警惕石油行业对外交政策乃至军事事务的影响力日益上升的情况。

在正式离开石油行业很久以后，周永康对这个行业仍具有影响力，且他的影响力甚至超过了一些级别更高的领导人。一位人士说，中国石油集团的人只听周永康的话。

行业和党内人士说，通过在11月份一个关键中共会议前打击周永康的权力网络，中国领导人可能也试图消除未来解决腐败和低效问题时将面临的一些阻力。预计中国将在此次会议上公布一系列经济改革方案。

这些内部人士中许多人存在这样一个疑问，即中共的行动是否会止于对周永康权力网络中一小部分人的调查，还是会进一步推进具有重要意义的石油行业和市场改革（可能包括开放石油行业，使其面临来自海外和私营企业的更大竞争）。

宾夕法尼亚州约克学院(York College of Pennsylvania)的中国能源行业专家李晓飞（音）说，目前无疑正在进行一场政治斗争，但从长远看，这可能有利于石油行业。

李晓飞说，现任政府面临阻力，因为包括所谓石油利益集团在内的既得利益集团一直是改革的绊脚石，扳倒蒋洁敏和其他中国石油集团高管将减轻新领导层改革石油行业的难度。

石油与政治权利的交集可以追溯到1959年，也就是位于东北的大庆油田被发现那一年。这座油田在几年内就使中国摆脱了对前苏联石油进口的依赖。1964年毛泽东提出了著名的“工业学大庆”的号召。

到上世纪70年代，包括时任副总理余秋里在内的一些石油行业元老在领导层内部形成了一个具有影响力的集团，一些历史学家称之为“石油帮”，这个集团支持优先发展国有重工业，并利用石油利润引进西方技术。

在邓小平于1978年成为中国最高领导人后，这个石油利益集团被倡导允许私营企业和有限外资发挥作用的对手扳倒。但石油元老们通过推动曾庆红等门生进入最高决策层保留了一些影响力。曾庆红曾被任命为时任副总理余秋里的秘书，之后成为副主席和中共中央政治局常委。

曾庆红又被认为是为周永康的事业提供了帮助。周永康在1995年至1998年期间升任中国石油集团负责人，之后在2007年曾庆红退休时成为政治局九常委之一。行业和党内人士说，自那以后，周永康被视为石油行业的主要政治靠山，他利用权力将自己的门生安插到高层职位，并使他们能够进入最高决策层。

上世纪90年代曾在英国石油公司(BP PLC)中国部门工作过的教授斯皮德(Philip Andrews-Speed)说，周永康使石油行业获得了进入最高决策层的通道，我认为这并不是一个同质的集团，而是一个纵向的有着共同利益和支持的集团。斯皮德目前是新加坡国立大学(National University of Singapore)的中国石油行业专家。

类似的非正式关系网遍布于中国国有部门，但石油业的关系网尤其强势，这不仅是因为石油业的盈利能力和国际因素，还因为该行业的许多高管都毕业于相同的专修院校，特别是位于北京的中国石油大学。

很多石油业界高管在国际商界相当知名，因而被中共选中，令其在地方或中央政府担任要职，这个关系网的政治影响力也由此得到提升。

2007年至2012年间，周永康曾负责中国公安、法院和情报部门的工作。党内人士和政治分析人士表示，这一额外优势让他在“权力走廊”里有了更多影响力。

过去五年，周永康在石油业持续发挥作用，这一点从他的公开活动中显而易见，如2009年他访问苏丹以及经常参加周年庆等石油业活动。去年9月出访土库曼斯坦时，他在中国石油集团位于该国的新办公大楼里发表了讲话。他当时说：“石油”是石油人心系一辈子的两个字。

大多数分析人士表示，周永康的关系网受调查不太可能直接影响中国石油集团的海外业务。本周，中国国家主席习近平与中国石油集团最新负责人周吉平访问土库曼斯坦，签署了一项旨在增加土国输华天然气和加速修建连接中土两国两条新管道的协议。

中国外交部发言人洪磊周四说，中国石油集团调查一事将不会影响中国与别国的能源合作。

中国石油集团网站显示，今年4月被任命为中国石油集团董事长的周吉平也淡化了调查对公司的影响。他说，涉事人员的问题属于私人问题。

不过一些业内人士和分析人士说，未来中央政府也许会对海外交易展开更严格的审查。还有人预测，将更注重石油业高管的职业化。

莱斯大学詹姆斯贝克公共政策研究院(James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy)的刘易斯(Steven W. Lewis)说，这些公司现在有老派和新派两帮人，老派是那些在中国度过了大部分职业生涯的人，新派则在海外生活良久，并且拿到了国外的法学学位。

他说，周永康无疑属于老派。

分析人士和业内人士表示，石油业老派人士包括一些目前仍在业内身居要职的人，如中石化(Sinopec)董事长傅成玉等。但他们说，调查不太可能蔓延至其它石油公司，因为那样做有让整个石油业陷入混乱的风险，且会引发太多其他在石油业有相关利益的党内高官的敌意。