【英语财经】中国经济转型带来全球挑战 China’s challenge to the world

China’s attempted economic transition has deep implications, not just for the emerging nation, but for the rest of the world. In the short term, the challenge is to manage spill-overs from what might be a sharp slowdown in China’s economic activity. In the long term, it is how to cope with the integration of a financial powerhouse into the world economy. In reality, however, what happens in the short term will shape the longer term as well.

India’s latest Economic Survey provides a thought-provoking taxonomy of crises. The external impact of a crisis depends, it argues, on whether it occurs in systemically important countries, it is the result of fiscal or private borrowing and whether currencies of affected countries appreciate or depreciate. What might this analysis have to do with China? The answer is that it is a systemically important country that suffers from high and rapidly rising corporate indebtedness. This might lead to a sudden halt in investment and a rapid depreciation.

Such a sharp slowdown is not at all impossible. The combination of an ultimately unsustainable rise in corporate debt with the dependence of demand on ultra-high rates of investment creates the vulnerability. As the economy slows to growth below 7 per cent a year, investment rates of close to 45 per cent of gross domestic product no longer make economic sense. The private sector is also responsible for close to two-thirds of investment. So market forces might impose a painful adjustment.

One might envisage two government responses: a huge increase in fiscal deficits, as in the western financial crises, and a more aggressive monetary policy. But a weaker exchange rate might also be welcome, as a way to offset domestic deflationary pressures. At the China Development Forum held in Beijing this month, Zhou Xiaochuan, the People’s Bank of China governor, indicated that it was reasonable to run down foreign currency reserves built up on a massive (and unplanned) scale. But there must be some limit to that. Controls on capital outflows could also be tightened, even though that would go against China’s plans for opening up the capital account. (See charts.)

While the Chinese economy has been weakening, monetary and credit policy loosening and the exchange rate falling, no such crisis is to be seen as yet. The main drivers of the capital outflows also seem to be prepayment of foreign-currency loans and the unwinding of “carry trades”, partly triggered by perceptions of a greater risk of a depreciation of the renminbi. Again, while weakening, the growth of demand has certainly not collapsed. So far, so good then. But this story is not over.

The world economy is in no position to absorb another big deflationary shock. The possibility of such a shock from China over the next several years is real. But a longer-term issue also arises: how to integrate China into the global financial system. Experience suggests that simultaneous liberalisation and opening up of fragile financial systems often ends in vast crises. If the country concerned is systemically important, such crises will be global. Floating exchange rates may weaken the impact. Even so, a crisis in a systemically important economy will have huge effects.

For this reason, the opening up of China’s financial system to the world must be regarded as a matter of global concern. A recent paper from the Reserve Bank of Australia illustrates some risks. A significant aspect is the potential for a vast increase in two-way flows of portfolio capital, which are still modest from and to China.

At present, controls on outflows remain tight. But consider some relevant magnitudes: China’s gross annual savings were about $5.2tn in 2015, against $3.4tn in the US; its stock of “broad money”, the widest measure of the money supply, was $15.3tn at the end of last year; and the total gross stock of credit in the economy was about $30tn. China is the savings superpower. It is not hard to envisage a huge gross outflow, due to portfolio diversification and capital flight, should controls be lifted. Against such vast potential outflows, foreign-currency reserves as large as $3.2tn would be swiftly exhausted. While there would also be foreign portfolio demand for Chinese assets, the domestic policy and institutional changes needed to make that a reality are likely to be impossibly demanding.

It is probable, then, that the impact of capital account liberalisation would be a large net capital outflow from China, a weaker exchange rate and a bigger current account surplus. Weaker investment would reinforce this. It is hard to imagine how such a shift could be accommodated. One needs only to think of possible impacts on asset markets, exchange rates and current account balances in the rest of the world economy.

In her speech at the China Development Forum this month, Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, noted rightly that “increased global integration brings with it greater potential for spillovers — through trade, finance or confidence effects. As integration continues, effective co-operation is critical to the functioning of the international monetary system. This requires collective action from all countries.” Right now, nothing is more important than the co-operative management of the immediate stresses in the Chinese economy and the longer-term challenges of China’s financial integration.

If either were to be mishandled, it could put unbearable pressure upon our integrated global economic system. The world economy is still struggling to handle the aftermath of the western financial crises. It might fail to cope with a Chinese one altogether. The last time a hegemonic financial power emerged, the world suffered the Great Depression. It has to do better this time.

中国正在尝试进行的经济转型对新兴国家乃至整个世界都将产生深远影响。短期内，挑战在于管控好中国经济活动可能出现的大幅放缓带来的溢出效应。长远来看，挑战在于如何让一个金融大国融入全球经济。然而，实际上，短期的发展变化同样将影响长期。

印度最新的经济调查(Economic Survey)提供了一个发人深思的危机分类法。该调查认为，一场危机造成的外部冲击取决于危机是否发生在具有系统重要性的国家、是否是财政或私人借债的结果，以及受影响国家的货币是升值还是贬值。这种分析方法与中国有什么关系呢？答案是，中国是一个具有系统重要性的国家，而且企业债务水平高、上升迅速。这有可能导致投资骤停和货币快速贬值。

这种急剧放缓的前景并非完全不可能出现。企业债务最终不可持续的增长，加上需求依赖于超高投资率，共同造成了中国经济的脆弱性。随着经济增速放缓至7%以下，接近国内生产总值(GDP) 45%的投资率不再具有经济合理性。由于接近三分之二的投资由私营部门完成，市场力量或将强行推进一轮痛苦的调整。

人们或许可以设想中国政府的两种反应：像西方遭遇金融危机时那样大幅增加财政赤字，或者采取更激进的货币政策。但人民币走弱或许也会受到欢迎，这样可以抵消国内的通缩压力。在本月北京举行的中国发展高层论坛(China Development Forum)上，中国央行(PBoC)行长周小川暗示，中国过去大规模（无计划）积累起来的外汇储备出现下降是合情合理的。但这肯定有一定的限度。对资本外流的管控也可能收紧，即便这样做有悖于中国开放资本账户的计划（见图表）。

虽然中国经济一直在放缓，货币和信贷政策不断放松，汇率下跌，但到目前为止还看不到发生此种危机的迹象。而且，资本外流的主要推动力似乎是外币贷款提前还款和“套利交易”平仓——在一定程度上由对人民币贬值风险上升的预期引发。另外，需求增长虽然放缓，但肯定没有崩溃。目前看起来还不错。但故事并未结束。



世界经济绝不可能再吸收一次巨大的通缩冲击。未来几年，中国带来这种冲击的可能性是真实存在的。但一个更长期的问题也出现了：如何让中国融入全球金融体系。经验表明，脆弱的金融系统同时进行自由化与开放通常都会以陷入巨大的危机而告终。如果这个国家具有系统重要性，那造成的危机将是全球性的。浮动汇率或许可以减轻世界经济遭受的冲击。即便如此，一个具有系统重要性的经济体发生危机将带来巨大影响。

为此，中国金融体系对世界的开放必须被视为一个具有全球重要性的问题。澳大利亚央行(Reserve Bank of Australia)近期的一份报告分析了一些风险。一个重要方面是投资组合资金双向流动大幅增加的潜力，目前中国的这种双向流动水平仍然不高。



就目前而言，中国依然严格控制资本外流。但想想一些相关数字的规模：2015年中国年度储蓄总额大约为5.2万亿美元，而美国是3.4万亿美元；去年年末“广义货币”（最广泛的货币供应衡量指标）存量是15.3万亿美元；经济中的信贷总存量大约是30万亿美元。中国是超级储蓄大国。不难想象，如果取消控制措施，由投资组合多元化和资本外逃而产生的资本外流将是巨大的。面对如此庞大的潜在外流，即便是高达3.2万亿美元的外汇储备也会很快消耗殆尽。尽管外国投资组合也有对中国资产的需求，但满足这种需求所必需的中国国内政策和制度的变化可能极为苛刻。



那么资本账户自由化的影响将可能是中国资本大量净外流、人民币贬值以及经常账户盈余扩大。投资下降将会强化这种影响。很难想象世界如何适应这种变化。人们只要想想全球其他经济体的资产市场、汇率和经常账户余额可能遭受的影响就会明白这一点。

国际货币基金组织(IMF)总裁克里斯蒂娜?拉加德(Christine Lagarde)本月在中国发展高层论坛上发表演讲时正确地指出，“全球一体化程度的加深提高了产生溢出效应的可能性——通过贸易、金融或者信心的影响。随着一体化继续推进，有效合作对国际货币体系的运转至关重要。这要求所有国家集体行动”。就现在而言，各国合作管理好中国经济迫在眉睫的压力以及中国融入全球金融体系的更长期挑战，比任何事情都重要。

如果搞砸任何一项，就可能对我们的一体化全球经济体系造成无法承受的压力。如今世界经济仍在艰难应对西方金融危机的余波。它可能彻底无法应付一场中国的金融危机。上次一个金融霸主出现的时候，世界遭遇了“大萧条”(Great Depression)。这一次世界必须做得更好。

译者/何黎