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2016-3-16 23:36
On Leap Year day China National Chemical Corporation put out a brief announcement to say HSBC and China Citic Bank would lead a three-month $15bn bridge loan to finance its $43bn purchase of Swiss-based Syngenta (as well as another $5bn to refinance the debt of its target). China Citic Bank is one of the smaller of the mainland’s listed state owned banks, and was not the obvious candidate for such a huge, high-profile transaction.
Citic people have quietly let it be known that one of its top executives is close to Ren Jianxin, the chairman of ChemChina. The two met over dinner in Beijing in January to agree to underwrite the financing. No matter. The markets had their own interpretation of the transaction. Citic Group had been subject to scrutiny from regulators and the disciplinary committee for possible violations by two of the group’s principal arms, its bank and its securities firm. The fact that Citic is leading the fundraising shows either that the investigation is over, with no negative fallout, or that the group can repent for its possible alleged transgressions by doing a high-risk deal for which it may or may not be lucratively paid. As with so much that transpires in China, there is a political dimension. Moreover, every financial transaction seems to have political and strategic overtones. But it is hard to decipher the significance and determine whether developments in the banking world mark a step forward or backward in financial system reform. ChemChina’s bid for Syngenta, China’s single largest outbound acquisition, was clearly strategic. At the same time, China’s desire for the deal to be seen as commercial rather than government directed was the reason that a policy bank — one operating in support of Beijing’s objectives — did not lead the financing, says a Hong Kong fund manager with close relations with the mainland acquirer. That same February day, by way of contrast, China Development Bank, a policy bank, signed a term sheet for (another) $10bn loan to Brazil’s cash strapped Petrobras. The first loan, agreed in 2009, was backed by future oil exports to Sinopec at market prices. “It is another example of China recycling its foreign reserves to shore up its long-term supply of raw materials. It is possible that Chinese financial institutions become more active across emerging markets in providing cash poor industries with financing in exchange for a secure long-term supply of raw materials,” noted WR Eric Ollom of Citigroup investment research in New York. China’s banks are clearly caught in the crossfire of the party’s desire to support growth in the short term by channelling credit to flagging state-owned enterprises as the latter continue to churn out low quality products that nobody at home particularly wants (or will pay for) and its desire over time to shrink their role in the economy and move to a more services-led consumer economy. The ratio of credit to GDP continues to rise (and is now more than twice the GDP growth rate, Barclays analysts calculate). That expansion in credit brings with it hidden problem debts as the banks roll over their loans to those who cannot repay them in the name of social stability. China’s loosening reserve requirements are part of a general easing of monetary policy (stopping just short of big rate cuts that could put more pressure on the weakening renminbi) that means the problem will only get worse. There will inevitably be more bad loans and more defaults. Yet that sort of national service as policy trumps profitability is only one of the downsides around the banks. To compensate for the lack of profitability of such loans made in the name of national service, many banks are taking a lot more risk with other transactions and other clients. One activity has been to take founders’ equity in their public companies as collateral for loans for other, dicier transactions. When the projects go wrong, the shares that once were safe collateral prove to be far less valuable than the size of the loans. Small wonder many hedge funds consider the banks the best proxy for a negative view on China. It is not a good time to be a bank in China. The government owes the banks for national service — but official gratitude might not go far enough. 2月29日,中国化工集团公司(China National Chemical Corporation,简称中国化工)发出了一份简短的声明,表示汇丰银行(HSBC)和中信银行(China Citic Bank)会牵头发放为期3个月的150亿美元过桥贷款,为该集团以430亿美元收购瑞士先正达(Syngenta)提供资金。此外,它们还会提供另外50亿美元的贷款,为先正达的债务提供再融资。中信银行是中国内地上市国有银行中规模较小的银行之一,对于这样规模巨大、备受关注的交易,该行并不是显而易见的候选银行。
中信银行人士悄悄放出消息称,该行高管之一与中国化工董事长任建新关系密切。今年1月,两人曾在北京一同用餐,就提供融资达成一致。不管怎样。市场自会对这一交易做出解释。 中信集团(Citic Group)已由于旗下两个主要部门——银行和证券公司——可能的违规行为,受到监管机构和中纪委的审查。中信银行正在领衔这轮融资的事实显示,要么调查已经结束,没有造成任何负面影响,要么该集团可以通过承接高风险交易(可能得到高额回报,也可能得不到)为其可能涉嫌的违法行为戴罪立功。 正如诸多在中国上演的事情一样,这其中存在政治上的因素。况且,每一宗金融交易似乎都有政治上和战略上的含义。不过,人们很难解读这其中的意义,也很难确定银行界的动态是金融体制改革的进步还是倒退。 中国化工对先正达的收购是中国最大规模的对外收购,它显然是一次战略性收购。一位与这家内地收购方关系密切的香港基金经理表示,同时,中国希望该交易被认为是商业性的、而不是政府主导的,这是政策性银行(为支持中国政府目标而开展业务)没有牵头相关融资活动的原因。 与此相对照的是,同样在2月29日,中国政策性银行国家开发银行(CDB)签署了一份协议,向资金紧缺的巴西国家石油公司(Petrobras)发放100亿美元(新)贷款。而2009年达成的首笔贷款,则是由未来以市场价对中石化(Sinopec)出口石油做担保的。 花旗集团(Citigroup)纽约投资研究部门的WR?埃里克?奥勒姆(WR Eric Ollom)指出:“这是中国将外汇储备循环利用,以支撑其原材料长期供应的又一个例子。中国金融机构可能将在各新兴市场更积极地向缺乏资金的产业提供融资,以换取可靠的原材料长期供应来源。” 中国各家银行显然正处于中共两方面愿望的夹击之下:一方面希望通过向每况愈下的国有企业注入信贷,在短期内支持经济增长——这些国企依然在大量生产国内乏人问津的低质量产品;另一方面希望逐渐降低这些国企在经济中的作用,向更多由服务业主导的消费型经济转型。 中国信贷规模与国内生产总值(GDP)之比仍在继续攀升,据巴克莱银行(Barclays)分析师计算,信贷增速超过了GDP增速的两倍。随着银行出于社会稳定目的、为不能偿还贷款的借款人滚转贷款,信贷扩张也随之带来了隐藏的不良债务。 中国降低存款准备金要求是一种普遍货币宽松政策的一部分(只是没有大幅降息,因为这可能对正在走弱的人民币带来更大压力),而货币宽松政策意味着上述问题只会愈发严重。将不可避免地出现更多不良贷款和违约。 然而,这种政策压过盈利的为国服务,只是银行面临的不利因素之一。为弥补这种以为国服务名义发放的贷款的盈利不足,许多银行正在其他交易和其他客户身上承担更多风险。 其中一类活动是接受公司创始人在其公开上市公司的股份作为抵押品,为他们开展其他风险更高的交易提供贷款。当项目出问题时,事实证明,曾经是安全抵押品的股份的价值远低于所发放贷款。难怪许多对冲基金会把银行视为对中国采取负面看法的最佳“晴雨表”。目前银行在中国的日子可不好过。中国政府理应因为银行的为国服务而感谢它们,然而政府的感激可能不会有多深。 译者/何黎 |