【英语财经】中国需要的不是又一场投资热潮 China needs reform not another investment splurge

The falling value of China’s yuan has once again become a trigger for state intervention. Fueled by a whopping $1tn in capital outflows last year, downward pressures on the renminbi have prompted the Chinese government to defend the currency by burning $700bn of its foreign-exchange reserves and rolling out a barrage of administrative measures. The latest reserves plunge shows that the government is losing the fight.

While capital flight is a headache for Chinese officials long fixated on managing the renminbi’s value, it may be good news for the rest of the world. As we explain later, it could well mean that the serious economic reforms outlined in China’s new five-year plan, such as deregulations, tax cuts, and other pro-market policies, might become a reality.

Economic reforms are crucial if China is to transform from an investment-led growth model to a consumption-driven economy. The goal — as stated by Xi Jinping, China’s president — is to grow the economy at an average 6.5 per cent rate over the next five years. This daunting target is not a suggestion; it’s an order from the president to his subordinates. In the past decades, setting and reaching a growth target has become a political tradition in China’s five-year plans. If Mr. Xi’s administration fails to deliver, it will be the first time in the Chinese Communist Party’s history that a five-year growth target has not been met. The Chinese government, whose authority strongly depends on economic prosperity, cannot afford such a failure.

Nevertheless, the status quo — a growth model of expansive credit easing and massive public investment — has history and inertia on its side. Having worked wonders in the past few decades, the old model has become the “go-to” manual for Chinese policymakers. Just last month, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Fang Xinghai, a senior adviser to the Chinese president, clung to the old approach, pledging that China’s monetary and fiscal policies would remain “appropriately supportive.”

But the ongoing capital flight makes it abundantly clear that neither credit easing nor public investment can provide the required impetus to attain Mr. Xi’s ambitious growth target.

The rapid capital outflows are debilitating China’s monetary policy. The government’s credit easing is meant to boost borrowing for domestic investment. Instead, today borrowers are more likely to invest abroad, defeating the very purpose of a liquidity injection. The Chinese government could potentially stop this cross-border leakage by restoring tight capital controls. But doing so — only months after the renminbi won inclusion in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of “reserve currencies” — would shatter the credibility of China’s commitment to internationalise the renminbi and liberalise its capital accounts.

The exodus of Chinese capital also reveals the problems with the old model’s fiscal policy prescriptions. The desire by Chinese investors to invest their money overseas stems from the deteriorating opportunities for domestic investment. The Chinese economy has already seen a glut of “zombie” state firms that no longer make profits, “ghost” towns with blocks of empty apartments, and unused infrastructure. The last thing China needs right now is more government-led investments into those wasteful projects.

Failure is not an option for the Chinese authorities. The political pressure to meet Mr Xi’s growth target and the massive capital flight should convince Chinese policymakers that serious economic reforms are a necessity, not a choice.

Weifeng Zhong is a research fellow in economic policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Zhimin Li is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Berkeley.

人民币的不断贬值再次成为政府干预的诱因。去年，中国资本外流高达1万亿美元，这助长了人民币承受的下行压力，促使中国政府“烧掉”7000亿美元外汇储备并出台一系列行政措施来捍卫汇率。最近的外汇储备大幅下降表明，中国政府正在输掉这场斗争。

尽管对长期执着于管控人民币价值的中国官员来说，资本外逃是一件令人头疼的事，但它对其他人来说可能是个好消息。正如我们稍后解释的那样，它很可能意味着，中国新的五年规划里列出的严肃经济改革，比如去监管化、减税以及其他亲市场政策，可能成为现实。

中国要想将增长模式从投资主导型转变为消费驱动型，经济改革非常关键。正如中国国家主席习近平所说的那样，目标是在今后五年里让经济以年均6.5%的速度增长。这一艰巨的目标不是一种建议，而是中国国家主席向下属发出的指示。过去几十年里，设定并实现增长目标已成为中国五年规划里的一项政治传统。如果以习近平为首的领导层未能实现目标，那将是中共历史上首次未能实现增长目标。中国政府的权威严重依赖于经济繁荣，它承受不起这种失败。

然而，历史和惯性却对现状——即仰仗大范围信贷宽松和大规模公共投资的增长模式——起着支撑作用。过去几十年里创造了奇迹的旧增长模式，已成为中国政策制定者的“首选”操作指南。就在上个月，在达沃斯世界经济论坛(World Economic Forum)上，习近平的高级顾问方星海坚守的仍是原先那套做法，承诺中国的货币和财政政策将继续提供“适度的支持”。

但资本持续外逃充分表明，无论是信贷宽松还是公共投资，都不能为实现习近平的宏大增长目标提供必要的推动力。

资本迅速外流正在削弱中国货币政策的效果。中国政府的信贷宽松政策本意是推动信贷在国内投资。但如今的借贷者却更有可能去海外投资，与注入流动性的本意相悖。中国政府可能会通过恢复严厉的资本管制来阻止这种跨境“泄漏”。但这么做将严重动摇中国人民币国际化和资本账户自由化承诺的可信性——几个月前，国际货币基金组织(IMF)刚刚批准将把人民币纳入其“储备货币”篮子。

中国资本外流还揭示出旧模式的财政政策处方存在的问题。中国投资者之所以希望投资海外，是因为国内投资机遇日益贫乏。中国经济中已出现大量不再盈利的“僵尸”国企、拥有大量空置房屋的“鬼城”，以及从未被使用的基础设施。中国现在最不需要的，就是有更多由政府主导的投资流入那些无用的项目。

失败不是中国当局的选项。实现习近平增长目标的政治压力以及大规模的资本外逃应该能够让中国政策制定者明白，严肃的经济改革是一种必需、而非一种选择。

钟伟锋是美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)从事经济政策研究的研究员，黎志敏是美国加州大学伯克利分校(University of California, Berkeley)博士候选人

译者/邹策