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2015-12-22 07:48
Here's a little-known fact: the Shanghai Composite Index has outperformed the S&P 500 for 2015.
Judging from the apocalyptic tone of much commentary on China’s stock market, few casual observers would guess that the Shanghai Composite Index is up a respectable 12.6 per cent on the year. The benchmark is higher by almost 8 per cent in US dollar terms while the S&P 500 sits in negative territory for the year. Many asset managers would be happy to sign up for such an apocalypse, given the lacklustre performance of other global equity indexes and hedge funds. The world paid more attention to China’s wild stock market this year than before for two main reasons. First, the market is more open to foreign investment. The Shanghai-Hong Kong stock connect programme launched in November 2014 allowed foreign investors to buy mainland shares without prior approval from Chinese regulators. The proliferation of exchange traded funds tracking Chinese A-shares made access even easier. Second, the market rout that began in late June seemed to fit a broader narrative that China’s real economy was much weaker than official data seemed to indicate. That narrative received a further boost in August when the central bank surprised markets by allowing the renminbi to depreciate 3 per cent in three days. When the Shanghai Composite touched a seven-year high of 5,178 points on June 12, it had risen by 1.5 times over the previous year, even as the real economy was on for its slowest growth in a quarter century. A series of interest rate cuts lowered bond yields and flooded the market with cheap cash, while the sluggish property market — traditionally the most popular store of value — sent investors looking for alternative assets. Margin lending helped fuel the rally, with margin loans outstanding on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges peaking at Rmb2.3tn on June 18, up from only Rmb401bn a year earlier. The actual scale of margin lending was probably several trillion renminbi higher as banks and trust companies funnelled loans to punters at higher leverage ratios than those available from the regulated margin lending by securities brokerages. Valuations veered towards the absurd. The Shanghai Composite’s average price-to-earnings ratio peaked at 25, based on 2014 full-year earnings. For the small- and mid-cap weighted Shenzhen Composite index, the ratio was 69. And for ChiNext, the tech-heavy start-up board in Shenzhen, average P/E reached 144. Even at the height of the frenzy, most average Chinese stayed out, with only 6 per cent of households owning stock in the first quarter of 2015, according to the China Household Finance Survey. Similarly, clearing house data showed that the bottom two-thirds of stock investors by portfolio value owned only 5 per cent of the market. Still, retail investors were the most active traders and so drove price gains. Brokerages and fund companies eagerly marketed so-called concept stocks that reflected trendy investment themes. Popular concepts included Internet plus, state-owned enterprise reform, and One Road, One Belt, President Xi Jinping’s ambitious plan to stoke foreign demand for China’s industrial output by financing infrastructure around Asia. But the bubble burst even more quickly than it had inflated. The market fell almost a third from its closing peak of 5,166.35 in mid June through to July 8. The government, fearful of contagion across the financial system, took extraordinary measures to staunch the bleeding. The securities regulator banned stock sales by large shareholders, and state-owned financial institutions — collectively known as the national team — poured money into the market. Goldman Sachs estimated in September that authorities had spent Rmb1.5tn to rescue the market. Listed company filings indicate that the national team owned 6 per cent of the stock market by the end of September. In August, a leading journalist at one of China’s top financial publications confessed on state television to having stoked “panic and disorder”. He had reported that the national team was planning to sell down its holdings. Police and regulators launched a crackdown on insider trading, market manipulation and malicious short selling. At least seven top executives at Citic Securities, China's largest brokerage, have been arrested on suspicion of insider trading, as has the country’s richest hedge fund manager. Authorities also placed new limits on high-frequency trading and decimated the equity futures market by limiting directional bets and raising trading costs. The Shanghai Composite bottomed out on August 26 at an intraday low of 2,850.72, representing a drop of more than 40 per cent from its June peak. Unwilling to keep throwing good money after bad, the securities regulator announced on August 30 that the national team would halt large-scale share purchases, though the agency pledged to maintain its existing holdings indefinitely. A cautious recovery began in October, albeit with trading volume far below its peaks from early in the year. In early November the Shanghai Composite re-entered bull market territory, having risen 20 per cent from its August low. The regulator restarted initial public offerings, which were frozen in July, to avoid siphoning demand from existing shares. Despite the recovery, most analysts remain cautious about 2016, noting that corporate earnings are deteriorating as the economy slows. “There is a ceiling on the market due to high valuation and weak earnings,” CLSA analysts wrote. “We believe the A-share market could see increased volatility and a potential correction in 2016.” 很少有人了解的一个事实是:2015年上证综指(Shanghai Composite Index)的表现优于标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)。
从大量关于中国股市的世界末日般的论调看,业余观察人士没有几个猜得到:上证综指今年取得了相当不俗的12.6%涨幅。 以美元计算,这个基准股指上升近8%,而标普500指数这一年里处于负值区间。鉴于全球其它股指和对冲基金表现平平,许多资产经理会很欢迎中国股市这样的“末日行情”。 今年以来,世界比以往更加关注中国大起大落的股市,主要有两个原因: 首先,中国股市对外资更加开放。2014年11月开通的沪港通(Shanghai-Hong Kong stock connect)允许境外投资者在无需获得中国监管机构事先批准的情况下买入内地股票。追踪中国A股的交易所交易基金(ETF)大量涌现,使得投资中国股市更为便利。 其次,6月下旬开始的股市大幅下跌,与“中国实体经济比官方数据所表明的要疲弱得多”这个整体叙述看上去吻合。这种说法在8月份更加流行,当时中国央行允许人民币在三天内贬值3%,令市场意外。 当上证综指在6月12日触及5178点的7年高点时,它已在一年里上升了1.5倍,即便实体经济看起来将出现四分之一个世纪以来最慢的增长。一连串的降息措施压低了债券收益率,向股市输送大量廉价资金,而低迷的房地产市场(传统上最受欢迎的保值方式)促使投资者寻找替代资产。 保证金贷款帮助推动了这轮涨势,上海和深圳股市的未偿还保证金贷款余额在6月18日达到2.3万亿元人民币的峰值,一年之前仅为4010亿元人民币。 保证金贷款的实际规模可能还要高出几万亿元人民币,因为相比券商提供的受监管的保证金贷款,银行和信托公司以更高的杠杆率向投机者输送贷款。 股票估值接近荒谬水平。上证综指的市盈率达到25倍(以2014年全年盈利为准)。中小企业权重较大的深证综指(Shenzhen Composite index)市盈率高达69倍,而在以科技股为主的深圳创业板(ChiNext),平均市盈率竟然高达144倍。 即使在炒股最狂热的时候,多数普通的中国人也并未参与。中国家庭金融调查(China Household Finance Survey)发现,在2015年第一季度只有6%的家庭持有股票。同样,结算中心的数据显示,按投资组合价值计算位于底部三分之二的股票投资者只拥有5%的市场。话虽如此,散户投资者是最活跃的交易者,正是他们推动价格上涨。 券商和基金公司热切地推销反映时髦投资主题的所谓“概念股”。各种流行的概念包括互联网+、国有企业改革,以及一带一路,后者是中国国家主席习近平提出的雄心勃勃的计划,旨在通过为亚洲各国的基础设施建设提供融资,激发国外对中国工业产品的需求。 但是,泡沫的破裂比它的膨胀速度更快。 从6月中旬5166.35点的收盘高点至7月8日,上海股市下跌几乎三分之一。担心整个金融体系受到波及的中国政府,采取了超常规措施以求遏止股市下跌。证券监管机构禁止大股东售股,同时统称为“国家队”的国有金融机构大举进场。 高盛(Goldman Sachs)在9月估计,当局已支出1.5万亿元人民币救市。上市公司申报文件表明,截至9月底国家队拥有6%的股市市值。 8月份,中国顶尖财经刊物之一的一名骨干记者在国家电视台忏悔,承认自己引起了股市的“混乱和恐慌”。此前他报道称,国家队正计划减持股票。 警方和监管机构发起了打击内幕交易、市场操纵和恶意卖空的行动。中国最大券商中信证券(Citic Securities)至少有7名高管因涉嫌内幕交易被捕。中国最富有的对冲基金经理也已被捕。 当局还对高频交易施加了新的限制,并通过限制定向押注和提高交易成本压制了股票期货市场。 上证综指在8月26日盘中跌至2850.72点的谷底,较6月的峰顶下跌逾40%。由于不愿意无止境地投入资金却只是接手不断下跌的股票,证券监管机构在8月30日宣布,国家队将停止大规模购买股票,尽管该机构承诺将无限期地维持其目前的持股。 一场谨慎的复苏在10月开始,尽管交易量远低于今年早些时候的峰值水平。11月初,上证综指从8月低点上涨20%,重返牛市区间。监管机构重启首次公开发行;此前IPO在7月被冻结,以避免分流现有股票的需求。 尽管有这场复苏,但多数分析师仍对2016年持谨慎态度,指出随着经济放缓,企业盈利正在恶化。 “由于高估值和盈利疲弱,目前市场遭遇天花板,”里昂证券(CLSA)分析师写道。“我们认为,A股市场可能会在2016年出现波动性增加,潜在还可能出现回调。” 译者/和风 |