【英语财经】中国股市暴跌：不是危机却是预警 The Chinese Stock Free Fall: Not a Crisis, but a Scary Fire Drill

For most economies in the world, a 30 per cent drop in the stock index within a span of three weeks would certainly be considered a crisis. Certainly, the Chinese stock free fall (32 per cent at its peak) is a significant concern in China.

In fact, I was told the occupants of China’s Zongnanhai (the equivalent of the U.S. White House) endured the ensuing weekend with no rest, relentlessly laboring over rescue measures. In the final analysis, however, this was not a real “crisis” but a scary and revealing fire drill. Most likely, the stock market will be stabilized before long.

Why is the 30 per cent drop in the Chinese equity market not a real crisis, compared with the chaotic trading days on Wall Street in the fall of 2008, and the financial panic in Thailand in 1997? First and foremost, the Chinese stock market is much less connected with China’s overall financial system, where commercial banks still remain at the center.

Neither is it closely linked with the real economy. In the first five months of this year, despite the hectic pace of IPOs, capital raised in the stock market accounted for only around 4 per cent of the total amount raised by bond markets and bank loans. As for the impact on private consumption, which accounts for 45 per cent of GDP (compared with 70 per cent in the U.S. case), the drop is equivalent to 3-to-5 per cent of household wealth, and this is a high-ball estimate.

It is also imperative to remember that the Chinese the stock market had risen by 80 per cent in the 10 months prior to the recent 30 per cent decline. Thus, for many investors, this would be akin to going to Las Vegas and winning $800 at blackjack and then quickly losing $300. The gamblers would still have $500 on the table. It is unlikely that they would change their minds about dining at a steakhouse where they already have a reservation and go to a McDonald’s instead.

Surely, contagion is a concern, but this impact is limited. Commercial banks, trust companies, and securities firms are exposed to the risk of a rapid decline in stock prices due to their lending to stock investors. By my calculation, at maximum, the total loss to the commercial banks, assuming the stock index will fall another 20%, will amount to Rmb700bn, about 0.5 per cent of the total assets of commercial banks, and a few months’ worth of profits for the commercial banks.

America’s situation during the 2008 crisis was totally different. Many U.S. companies faced the dangerous prospect of not being able to pay their workers on time. The Ford Motor Company was one example: It could not go to Wall Street and buy commercial paper, as it normally did, to facilitate its cash flow. This is not the case in China, since companies aren’t nearly as sophisticated as Ford in relying upon the financial markets to manage their accounts.

What about capital flight and exchange rate depreciation? Let us not forget that the Chinese capital account is still not fully open. That is, investors from China cannot easily move money out of the country. If this were not the case, there would have been tremendous pressure on China’s foreign currency reserves.

China’s $4tn reserves might appear to be a formidable amount – indeed it is the largest in the world — but it pales when compared to the $11tn market capitalization of the stock market at its peak. A 30 per cent stock sell-off would have easily drained most of the reserves and produced a dramatic depreciation of the renminbi. In reality, Chinese investors do have, so far, the luxury to freely convert their RMB into the USD or Euro and move to other markets.

Thus, unlike the Greek crisis, the Chinese stock falloff is not causing a lasting and significant impact on the global economy.

Does this imply that the Chinese stock falloff should be taken lightly? Not in regard to the Chinese. On the contrary, it serves as an urgent wakeup call to Chinese policy makers that the financial markets must be carefully regulated. Especially dangerous is the overly generous margin-lending to inexperienced investors. This must be categorically eliminated. In addition, it is also a wakeup call signaling that China’s capital account convertibility must be advanced carefully, and when it is ultimately opened up, emergency measures must be in place to prevent a rapid outflow of capital.

It is clear that China’s top leadership was misled by those technocrats and interest groups who have been arguing that a booming stock market is essential to the success of economic reform. Such logic did not hold true for the past three decades and it is still not valid today. As illustrated above, the Chinese stock markets are still vastly disconnected from the real economy. Propping up share prices by providing easy money to inexperienced investors, many of whom only have high school diplomas, is an extremely dangerous game.

What will happen next to Chinese stock prices? Will Chinese policy makers be able to contain the risk factors? There are already positive signs that the situation is under control. In the weekend following the 30 per cent free fall, China’s top decision makers worked intensely with technocrats to generate rescue plans. In the first three trading sessions, the plan proved unsuccessful, since it relied upon frantically buying blue chips and leaving the small cap shares to fall to the 10% decline limit and drying up market liquidity.

Later, a new plan resorted to the trick adopted by the Hong Kong government in 1998, when it was battling George Soros and his cohorts, who were shorting stocks and the Hong Kong Dollar at the same time. The “trick” was to inject massive liquidity into the index futures, eventually resulting in the stability of the expectations for the market.

The Hong Kong government eventually won over Soros and made a profit of almost 100 per cent, which it refunded to its residents through the IPO of the Tracker Fund. This time around, whether the Chinese central government can make a profit remains unclear. But with the support of the central bank and existing capital control, there is no reason for the Chinese government to fail in its efforts to stabilize the stock market before long.

What is the most fundamental lesson to be learned from the Chinese stock market decline? It has to be that in order to maintain a stable stock market, it is essential for the listed shares to be of high quality. The reason for the rapid drop is that many shares are in companies that are either barely profitable or losing money. Other companies are making money but pay little cash dividends. Many Chinese investors are accustomed to this and are treating the stock market as a casino.

How can the foundation of Chinese stock markets be strengthened? Rule of law is the key. That is to say, rule-violating firms and traders should be subject to punishment by law. Unfortunately, the Chinese court system is nowhere near being capable of dealing with securities fraud.

I have long proposed that China should establish a high-level and centralized securities court and prosecution office in Shanghai, specializing in prosecuting cases involving securities violations. The Chinese court system is very much regionalized and local courts have their specific preferences; they tend to protect locally listed companies at the expense of shareholders. Without potent judicial mechanisms, China’s stock markets will never be as effective and robust as Chinese investors and policy makers would wish.

The stock falloff is a scary fire drill for the Chinese financial system. It is not only testing the Chinese government’s capacity to stabilise the market, but it is also clearly exposing the fundamental weakness of the Chinese stock markets. China obviously has a long way to go before it will see well functioning stock markets.

在全球大多数经济体里，股指在短短三周里下跌30%无疑都会被视为是一场危机，当然，近期中国股市暴跌（从高点下跌32%）也在中国国内引起了极大担忧。

实际上，我获悉中南海（相当于美国白宫）的当家人在股市暴跌后那个周末顾不上休息，马不停蹄地研究救市策略。然而，归根结底，这并不是一场真正的“危机”，而是一次引起恐慌、具有启示意义的消防演习。中国股市在短期内企稳的可能性非常大。

与2008年秋季华尔街的交易混乱时期和1997年泰国的金融恐慌相比，本次中国股市下跌30%算不上一场真正的危机。为什么呢？首先，与美国和泰国相比，中国股市与国内整体金融体系的联系要弱得多——这个体系中居于核心地位的仍然是商业银行。

中国股市与实体经济的联系也并不紧密。在今年头5个月，尽管新股发行密集，但股市融资总额大约只相当于通过债券市场和银行贷款筹集的资金总额的4%。至于对私人消费的影响（私人消费占到中国GDP的45%，美国的这一比例是70%），这次股市下跌只相当于蒸发了家庭财富的3%-5%——这还是比较高的估计。

另外我们也有必要记住，中国股市先是在10个月里上涨了80%，接着才下跌了30%。因此，对许多投资者来说，这就像是去拉斯维加斯玩21点，先是赢了800美元，接着又快速输掉300美元。最后算下来玩家仍然赚了500美元，他们不太可能取消事先在牛排餐馆订好的位置，改去吃麦当劳。

当然，人们担心股市下跌会波及其他经济领域，但这种影响是有限的。向股票投资者提供贷款的商业银行、信托公司和证券公司会因为股价快速下跌而受到冲击。但据我估算，假设股指继续下行20%，商业银行总的来说最多损失7000亿元人民币，大约占到商业银行资产总额的0.5%，相当于商业银行几个月的利润。

美国在2008年危机期间的情况就完全不同了，当时许多美国公司面临无法按时发薪水的危险。福特汽车公司(Ford Motor Company)就是一个例子：它无法像平常那样去华尔街购买商业票据用来改善现金流。中国的情况并非如此，因为中国公司在依赖金融市场管理公司账目方面不像福特那么复杂。

那么股市暴跌是否导致了资本外逃和汇率贬值？别忘了，中国资本账户仍没有完全开放，也就是说，中国投资者不能轻易地将资金转移出境。若非如此，中国外汇储备必将承受巨大压力。

中国的4万亿美元外汇储备看起来数目庞大——实际上也是全球最多的——但与中国股市在近期高点时的11万亿美元市值还是没法比。股市跌去30%按说会很容易消耗掉大部分外汇储备，并导致人民币大幅贬值。在现实中，中国投资者迄今仍难以自由地将人民币兑换为美元或欧元并将资金转移到其他市场。

因此，与希腊危机不同，中国股市下跌不会对全球经济造成持久而重大的影响。

这是否意味着可以对本轮中国股市暴跌安然处之？对中国人来说，不应如此。相反，这次暴跌向中国政策制定者敲响了警钟，说明金融市场需要小心谨慎的监管。向缺乏经验的投资者提供过分慷慨的保证金贷款这种行为尤其危险，必须坚决杜绝。此外，它还表明，推进中国资本账户可兑换必须谨慎行事。最终开放资本账户的时候，必须制定好应急措施以防出现资本快速外流。

显然，中国最高领导层受到了技术官僚及利益集团的误导，他们一直主张股市繁荣对经济改革的成功至关重要。这一逻辑不适用于过去30年，现在仍然不适用。正如上文所言，中国股市大体上仍与实体经济脱钩。通过向缺乏经验的投资者提供廉价资金来支撑股市是一种极其危险的游戏，其中很多投资者只有高中学历。

中国股市接下来会怎么走？中国政策制定者能否控制住各种风险因素？目前已有积极迹象表明，跌势已得到控制。在股市暴跌30%后那个周末，中国最高决策者与技术官员密切合作，拿出了救市计划。在头3个交易日，救市没有成功，因为该计划主要依靠大举买入蓝筹股，而任凭小盘股跌停并耗尽市场流动性。

后来，一个类似于香港政府1998年所采用方法的方案出炉了——即向指数期货注入大量流动性，以最终稳定市场预期——当时港府与同时做空港股和港元的乔治?索罗斯(George Soros)及其同伙展开斗争。

香港政府最终击败了索罗斯，并获利近100%，后来通过将盈富基金(Tracker Fund)上市把这部分收益返还给了香港居民。这一次还不清楚中国中央政府能否获利，但在中国央行的支持以及现有的资本管制下，中国政府稳定股市的努力没有理由很快就失败。

我们从中国股市暴跌中能够学到什么最根本的教训？这个教训是：为了确保股市稳定，上市股票必须具备高质量。股市快速下跌的原因是，很多上市公司要么勉强盈利，要么处于亏损状态。还有些公司虽然有盈利，但几乎不派发现金股息。很多中国投资者习惯了这点，他们把股市当成赌场。

如何强化中国股市的基础设施？关键是法治。也就是说，违规的公司和交易员应当受到法律的惩罚。遗憾的是，中国法院系统还远远不具备处理证券欺诈行为的能力。

我一直提议在上海设立一个高级证券法院和检察办公室，专门处理证券违规相关案件。中国法院系统具有深厚的地域色彩，地方法院会偏袒特定对象；它们往往牺牲股东利益来保护当地上市公司。在司法体系不健全的情况下，中国股市永远不会像中国投资者以及政策制定者希望的那样高效和稳健。

对中国金融体系来说，此次股市暴跌好比一次令人惊慌的消防演习。它不仅考验中国政府稳定股市的能力，显然也暴露出了中国股市的根本缺陷。很明显，中国要将国内股市建设成一个功能完善的市场还有很长的路要走。

本文作者是清华大学苏世民学者项目(Schwarzman Scholars)主任、清华大学中国与世界经济研究中心主任李稻葵

译者/何黎