【英语财经】人民币的“谋”与“势” China’s renminbi designs combine geopolitical and financial aims

China took two key lessons from the great financial crisis. It realised that the US could be an unreliable economic partner, so that remaining inside the “US dollar zone” would always risk turbulence. It also understood, as a crisis-ridden US had no difficulty in selling its debt to the world, that in financial terms the possession of a global reserve currency meant never having to say you are sorry.

Thus, since its elevation to a national policy in 2009, China’s campaign to “internationalise” the renminbi was an endeavour that appealed to two of the most basic priorities of Communist party power – self-reliance and security. Subsequently, the cause has also become imbued with other objectives such as the opening of the country’s capital account and the induction of foreign money into China’s bond and equity markets.

Such a broad agglomeration of aims has made the goal of winning a global role for China’s currency revealing of Beijing’s long-term geopolitical strategy. In the words of Michael Power, strategist for Investec Asset Management, Beijing hopes to spur the “transformation of Shanghai into one of the principal fountainheads of global capital”.

“[The] vision initially seeks to make China a leading player in the world of capital and one which, in the fullness of time, could even see Wall Street migrate to ‘Great Wall Street’,” Mr Power said.

The advantages of creating a wellspring for global capital are manifold, as the experience of New York and London show. Not only do broad and deep financial markets attract talent and create jobs, they also allow the countries that host them to raise capital at relatively cheap rates – a key attraction for China as it chafes under a debt load estimated by McKinsey, the management consultancy, to amount to 282 per cent of GDP.

Similarly, a dynamic financial market with greater international participation would facilitate the funding of China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, a central government programme led by Mr Xi that envisages the building of large infrastructure and transport projects by Chinese contractors in 65 countries with a total population of 4.4bn.

OBOR is one of the defining visions of the administration of Xi Jinping, the president, and ranks high in his “China Dream”, a hankering to recapture atavistic glories and restore China to a position of economic centrality and moral superiority in world affairs.

But without an internationally respected currency, these interconnected ambitions will be hard to realise. Its economic sovereignty will continue to be circumscribed unless it can extricate itself from the “US dollar zone”, which it occupies by dint of conducting its merchandise trade primarily in the greenback and then recycling its US dollar surpluses into the American debt markets.

Beijing sees clearly that its endeavour to separate itself from the influence of the US dollar will be stillborn unless it can nurture a viable “renminbi zone” to replace it. This means opening its renminbi capital markets to foreign investment inflows, so that companies that trade in the red-back, central banks that hold it on reserve and fund managers around the world can hope to be rewarded.

Yet this takes time. Three feet of ice does not come from one night of frost, as the Chinese saying goes. Nevertheless, some analysts expect Beijing to move rapidly in opening its domestic debt markets.

“This is going to be the largest change in capital markets in anyone’s lifetime,” said Hayden Briscoe, senior vice-president at AllianceBernstein, the fund company.

Mr Briscoe notes that China’s domestic bond market is already more than $5tn in size, making it the third largest bond market in the world after the US and Japan. However, foreign ownership of onshore Chinese corporate and government bonds remain tiny because of Beijing’s restrictions on inflows.

While these restrictions are being relaxed, Beijing’s willingness to accelerate the process has come into question over the past month following wild share price gyrations on domestic stock markets and the criticism levelled at supposed foreign “manipulators” of stock trading.

Such outbursts describe China’s Achilles heel. Internationalising the renminbi requires opening domestic capital markets, but doing so cedes influence to foreign capital and invites foreigners to pick over issues such as Chinese corporate governance, sovereign creditworthiness, the administrative probity of local governments and a host of other issues that Beijing regards either as its own business or outright “internal affairs”.

For this reason, the aspiration towards greater global influence that China seeks through internationalising its currency may require a corresponding relaxing of control over financial markets at home. Although this trade off may prove uncomfortable at times, it should not derail the grand design while Beijing believes it can gain more in international clout than it loses in internal control.

【编者按】2005年7月21日，中国宣布放弃人民币与美元挂钩，转而启动更加灵活的汇率机制。2015年，人民币汇改已满十年，逐渐向世界舞台迈进的人民币也被赋予了更多的使命与目标。在全球与中国经济都在发生巨变的今天，人民币战略的将会如何发展？对于全球经济版图又会产生何样的影响？FT中文网推出“聚焦人民币”专题，探讨中国人民币战略的使命与挑战，现实与未来。



中国从大金融危机中学到了两个重要教训。中国认识到，美国可能是一个不可靠的经济伙伴，留在“美元区”可能总是要冒遭遇动荡的风险。中国还认识到，深陷危机的美国却能毫无困难地向全世界发债，从金融的角度来说，就是拥有全球储备货币意味着永远不必说对不起。

【音频】人民币国际化：时机恰当吗？

因此，自从人民币“国际化”2009年上升为一项国策以来，就成了满足中共两个最根本优先事项的运动，这两个优先事项就是自力更生和安全。再后来，这项事业还加入了其他目标，比如开放中国资本项目，以及将外资引入中国的债市和股市。

这种多个目标的广泛结合，使得中国为人民币赢得全球地位的目标暴露出中国政府的长期地缘政治战略。按照天达资产管理公司(Investec Asset Management)策略师迈克尔?鲍尔(Michael Power)的说法，中国政府希望促进“上海向全球资本主要发源地之一转型”。

鲍尔表示：“其初步构想是，努力让中国成为资本世界的主要参与者，假以时日，甚至有可能把华尔街搬到‘长城街’(Great Wall Street)。”

正如纽约和伦敦的经验所显示的，建立全球资本源头的好处是多重的。广而深的金融市场不仅能吸引人才、创造就业，还令其所在国能以相对低的利率募集资金。对于中国来说，在债务负担令其不堪重负之际，后者是一个重要的吸引因素。根据管理咨询公司麦肯锡(McKinsey)的估计，中国的债务负担相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的2.82倍。

【音频】人民币国际化：影响外汇储备吗？

同样地，国际参与程度更高的有活力的金融市场，会有助于中国“一带一路”(One Belt, One Road)计划的筹资。“一带一路”是中国国家主席习近平领导下的一个中央政府计划，按照该计划勾勒的图景，中国承包商将在涵盖65个国家、总人口44亿的地区内，开展大型基础设施项目和交通运输项目的建设。

“一带一路”是习近平政府的明确蓝图之一，在其“中国梦”战略中拥有很高地位。“中国梦”是一种强烈的渴望，追求令中国重获祖先荣耀、恢复在全球事务中的经济中心地位和道德优势地位。

然而，如果没有受到国际认可的货币，这些相互关联的抱负将很难实现。中国若不能脱离“美元区”，其经济主权会继续受限。目前，中国主要以美元开展商品贸易，再将盈余的美元回流到美国债市，因此在“美元区”占有一席之地。

中国政府明确认识到，如果不能培育切实可行的“人民币区”代替“美元区”，中国摆脱美元影响的努力将胎死腹中。这意味着要将中国的人民币资本市场向流入的外国投资开放，这样的话，以人民币交易的企业、将人民币作为储备货币持有的各国央行、以及全球各地的基金经理就能够期待回报。

然而，这需要时间。正如中国一句老话所说，冰冻三尺非一日之寒。不过，部分分析师预计，中国政府会迅速开放国内债市。

基金公司联博(AllianceBernstein)的资深副总裁海登?布里斯科(Hayden Briscoe)表示：“这将是任何人一生难遇的资本市场最大变革。”

【音频】人民币国际化：借道“一带一路”？

布里斯科指出，中国国内债市的规模已在5万亿美元以上，是仅次于美国和日本的全球第三大债市。不过，由于中国政府对流入资金的限制，外国投资者持有的中国国内公司债和政府债券依然很少。

尽管这种限制正在放宽，过去一个月内，中国政府加速这一进程的意愿却遭到了质疑。此前，中国国内股市遭遇股价暴跌，而中国政府却将批评对准了所谓外国股市交易“操纵者”。

这样的突发事件凸显出中国的阿喀琉斯之踵。人民币的国际化要求开放中国国内资本市场，然而这么做却会把影响力交给外国资本，并引来外国投资者指摘中国的诸多问题，比如中国的企业治理、主权信用的可靠性、地方政府的廉洁、以及其他许多被中国政府视为自己的事务或纯属“内政”的问题。

出于这个原因，通过人民币国际化寻求全球更大影响力的理想，可能要求中国相应放开对国内金融市场的控制。虽然有时候这种交换也许不那么让人舒服，但既然中国政府相信自己能够让赢得的国际影响力超过失去的对内控制，就不应该让自己的宏伟蓝图偏离轨道。

译者/简易

本专题英文链接：http://www.ft.com/intl/reports/global-currencies-renminbi