【英语财经】中国企业海外投资：追求现金流 China Inc: The quest for cash flow

Anyone seeking to learn more about Anbang, the little-known Chinese insurer that has announced $32bn in overseas deals in just 18 months, can visit the company’s website. There they will find a corporate “vision” that manages to be at once cryptic and assertive.

Alongside the heading “Business Strategy”, the vision statement reads “win-win”. By “Organisation Chart”, it says “flat”. The elaboration on “Human Resources” is “professional”, while the one-word explainer for “Process and Systems” is “simple”.

Those after further enlightenment may scroll down to a section on corporate culture. “We learn our way of living from water: being natural as water to link with clients, (the) market and society; being flexible, modest, open and inclusive as water to meet clients’ diversified demands,” it says in Chinese and four other languages.

But while its corporate message is whimsical, Anbang’s actions reveal a wholly different character. In just over a year, it has gone from an international unknown to become one of the most aggressive of a wave of Chinese companies that have taken to heart Beijing’s directive to “go out”. Like others that have been active in overseas markets, Anbang moves swiftly on a target company, making a cash offer that often blows rival suitors away.

Since 2014, Anbang has outbid competitors to snap up the Waldorf Astoria hotel, a US landmark, for $1.95bn; paid $1.6bn for US insurer Fidelity and Guaranty Life; $1bn for a controlling stake in Korean insurer Tongyang Life; and scooped up trophy properties in London and companies in Europe.

“The surge in Chinese spending in the past few months is extraordinary and unprecedented,” says Arthur Kroeber at Gavekal Dragonomics, a research group focused on China.

But within this surge of Chinese deals — which have totalled $102bn since January compared with the record $106bn for all of last year, according to Dealogic — lies a paradox for target companies. While the cash offers can seem too big to refuse, they may also appear to come from the corporate equivalent of deep space, so sparse is the information available on the bidder.

Anbang is a case in point. The group company, which launched a $13.2bn bid for US hotel operator Starwood Hotels this week, quickly following its offer of $6.5bn for Strategic Hotels & Resorts, has never published an audited financial statement. Neither does it divulge the identity of its ultimate owners, give a full list of its executives or explain how its growing roster of foreign subsidiaries fit within 10 business divisions listed on its website.

The company’s enigmatic chairman, Wu Xiaohui, 49, is thought to enjoy strong connections within the Communist party elite, partly through his marriage to the granddaughter of Deng Xiaoping, the architect of modern China. But Mr Wu has never given a press interview, according to a Financial Times review of Chinese and international media.

At times the desire to shrink from the limelight borders on the obsessive. When Caixin, a respected Chinese magazine, ran an investigative story titled “Dark Horse Anbang” in 2014, the company dispatched staff on to the streets to buy up all the print copies they could get their hands on, according to Southern Weekend, a Chinese newspaper. Requests for comment from Anbang were met with a “no comment” to questions on the company’s financial situation, the identity of the company’s shareholders and how it was able to grow so quickly after 2014.

Anbang, which is just 12 years old, astounded the Chinese insurance world in 2014 with successive fundraising rounds that expanded registered capital from Rmb12bn ($1.8bn) to Rmb62bn in less than a year, introducing 31 new investors. This propelled it to first place among insurers, outstripping the likes of China Life and the People’s Insurance Co of China, even though they far eclipse it in terms of premiums.

The lack of transparency, analysts say, may be linked to the preference among many Chinese bidders for all-cash offers. An offer made in shares and cash, a common feature of deals in the west, would require the Chinese company to divulge significant shareholder information and give a thorough account of its assets.

“The serious flaws in Chinese corporate disclosure are why all-cash offers are often required,” says Derek Scissors, China analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, a right-leaning think-tank. “The cash is less to make the bid more attractive than to compensate for the fact that these companies either don’t have a desirable level of assets or can’t properly document the assets.”

A broader concern about China Inc’s acquisition spree stems from questions about why it is happening. Is it being driven by strength, or is it a reflection of the waning vigour of heavily indebted corporations in a slowing domestic market? To a significant degree, analysts say, the exodus of Chinese investment capital is in fact a “quest for cash flow”.

“Some of the big Chinese acquirers start by telling us they are interested in buying anything — anything with a cash flow,” says a deal adviser in London.

Hong Hao, chief strategist at Bocom International Holding, a Chinese investment bank, says the ample cheap credit available under Beijing’s loose monetary policies allows companies with good banking relationships to spend heavily overseas as a way to diversify away from their dwindling earnings at home. “It’s a strategy to move away from yuan [renminbi]-based assets,” Mr Hong said. “If there is a way to get liquidity on the cheap to buy assets abroad, I would expect them to take it.”

Data from the 1,627 domestically listed companies, or 58 per cent of the total, that have reported their 2015 earnings show a clear deterioration in fortunes. Average operating revenues per share fell to their lowest level so far this decade, sliding to Rmb5.4 from Rmb6.55 in 2014, according to Wind Information, a data provider.

In addition, just over one-fifth of listed Chinese companies reported negative cash flows during 2015 and about one-third owed at least three times as much in debts as they owned in assets, according to Wind.

Such fragile financials are by no means restricted to the stay-at-home stalwarts of corporate China. Data from 54 Chinese companies that did overseas deals last year show that many are “highly leveraged”, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that Chinese corporate investments overseas are driven solely by a dash for cash, or by capital flight because of fears that the value of the renminbi may slump. Distinct strategic thinking also underlies the moves.

Many of their investments are linked to the emergence of the global Chinese consumer.

In residential real estate, Shanghai-based Greenland Group bought a majority stake in the Atlantic Yards development in Brooklyn, promising to help sell units to wealthy Chinese immigrants and investors. Part of the project has been renamed Pacific Park.

Dalian Wanda, owned by China’s richest man, Wang Jianlin, has similar plans for its projects in Madrid, Australia’s Gold Coast, Chicago and Beverly Hills in Los Angeles.

In other cases, the motivation is to acquire foreign technology. China’s leaders have long said that they want national champions to move up the value chain, especially in basic commodity industries suffering from overcapacity, which has cut profit margins to the bone. Many of these deals are too small to grab headlines.

In 2014, state-owned China National Building Materials acquired Avancis, a German manufacturer of advanced materials used in solar panels. This year’s $43bn bid by ChemChina, a large state-owned enterprise, for Syngenta, the Swiss agribusiness, was driven mainly by the Swiss company’s biotechnology and agrochemcial prowess.

Alongside this thirst for technology and iconic western brands is the impressive speed with which some Chinese acquirers can act. Mr Wang of Dalian Wanda, which like Anbang is a private company that enjoys top-level official relationships, recently criticised the ponderous approach of his country’s state-owned enterprises.

“State-owned enterprises do not have international standards for their management systems, and have long cycles for their approval process,” said Mr Wang, whose company this year acquired Legendary Entertainment, the Hollywood studio that made Jurassic World and The Hangover, for $3.5bn.

But private companies are different, he added. When bidding for a real estate project in London, he was given one week to complete the deal before the asset would go up for auction, resulting in a higher price. “I made the quick decision to go for it, signed the agreement and paid the cash in three days,” he said.

But for the western target companies, a bid can present a perplexing set of issues. Shareholders may simply wish to sell out to the highest bidder. Stakeholders, however, may agonise over how sustainable an owner a company such as Anbang may be. Without the ability to scrutinise the company’s balance sheet and answer queries over the nature of its business model or the security of its political relationships, they may feel that their judgment is impaired.

In Chinese, Anbang means “peaceful union”. Target companies will be hoping it lives up to its name.

安邦，这个在国际舞台上并不知名的中国保险公司，过去18个月已宣布完成了320亿美元的海外收购。如果有谁想更多地了解这个公司，可以访问该公司的网站，在这儿他们会发现一家公司在“愿景”的表述上，竟同时做到了含义隐晦和坚定自信。

在“安邦思维”的标题下，“愿景”宣言下面写着“共赢”。“组织架构”后面的介绍是“扁平”，“人力资源”的描述是“专业”，而“流程系统”则用“简单”一词概括。

如果想进一步了解这家公司，可以向下滚动页面到企业文化的部分，这里用中文及其他四种语言写着，安邦“从水中体悟企业生存之道：‘水’一样自然，与客户、与市场、与社会息息相通；‘水’一样的多变，虚怀若谷，包容万物，即以专业的品质满足客户变化多样的需求……”

虽然安邦的企业思想有些异想天开，但其行动展示出了截然不同的特点。短短一年多的时间里，安邦从一家在海外没什么名气的公司，成为一波恪守北京方面“走出去”指示的中国企业中最积极的企业之一。就像其他在海外市场上表现活跃的中国企业一样，安邦对目标公司下手果断，提出的现金报价往往令竞争对手无力对抗。

2014年以来，安邦通过高于竞争对手的报价，以19.5亿美元抢购下美国地标性的华尔道夫酒店(Waldorf Astoria)，以16亿美元收购了美国信保人寿保险公司(Fidelity & Guaranty Life)，以10亿美元取得韩国保险集团东洋人寿(Tongyang Life)的控股权，还在伦敦购得引人注目的地产，也收购了一些欧洲企业。

龙洲经讯(Gavekal Dragonomics)的葛艺豪(Arthur Kroeber)表示：“过去的几个月中国海外投资的激增非同寻常，且前所未有。”龙洲经讯是一家专门研究中国的研究机构。

据龙洲经讯的数据显示，自1月份以来，中国的海外收购累计达1020亿美元，而去年全年创下的历史新高为1060亿美元。但在中国收购交易的此番激增中，对目标公司而言却存在着矛盾。虽然中国企业的现金报价看起来高到令人无法拒绝，但同时也让人觉得这些出价者仿佛来自外太空，关于它们的信息十分有限。

安邦就是个很好的例子。上周，安邦出价65亿美元收购Strategic Hotels & Resorts后，紧接着就向美国酒店经营企业喜达屋酒店及度假村集团(Starwood Hotels & Resorts)发出132亿美元收购要约。但安邦从未公布过经审计的财务报表，而且既不透露最终所有者的身份，给出所有高管名单，也没有解释旗下越来越多的外国子公司将如何融入其网站上列出的10个业务部门。

（编者按：据报道，万豪国际3月21日与喜达屋酒店及度假村国际集团之间达成一项新协议，在最后时刻反超中国安邦的竞争性报价。另据中国媒体《财新》报道，中国保监会对安邦近期两笔海外并购持明确不支持态度，理由之一指，安邦的境外投资已经碰触了保监会关于“保险资金境外投资不超过总资产15%”的监管红线。）

外界认为，该公司神秘的董事长吴小晖（49岁）与中共精英有着紧密的关系，这部分得益于他娶了改革开放总设计师邓小平的外孙女。但据英国《金融时报》查阅中外媒体资料了解到的情况，吴小晖从没接受过记者采访。

有时候，安邦躲避聚光灯的愿望几近偏执。据中国报纸《南方周末》报道，《财新》——一家颇受尊敬的中国杂志——曾在2014年刊登过一篇名为《黑马安邦》的调查报道，结果安邦派出员工到街上买光了他们能买到的所有该期杂志。记者请求安邦对公司的财务状况、公司股东身份、以及公司在2014年后怎样实现如此快速增长等问题置评，安邦的答案都是“无可奉告”。

成立仅12年的安邦曾在2014年震惊中国保险界，通过连续融资，该公司在不到一年的时间里将注册资本从120亿元人民币（合18亿美元）扩大到620亿元人民币，新增31个投资者。安邦从此被推到了中国保险业的头把交椅上，超过了中国人寿(China Life)和中国人民保险集团股份有限公司(People’s Insurance Co of China)等公司，虽然安邦在保费方面远远落后于这些公司。

分析师表示，许多中国竞购者之所以喜欢全现金报价，可能正是与缺乏透明度有关。在西方，收购交易的普遍特征是采用现金加股票报价，这种方式就需要中国企业透露重要股东信息，并对其资产进行彻底说明。

偏右智库、华盛顿美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的中国分析师史剑道(Derek Scissors)表示：“中国企业信息披露严重不足，是其常常必须进行全现金报价的原因。与其说现金报价是为了让出价更具吸引力，不如说是为了弥补如下事实——这些公司要么资产水平不够理想，要么无法合理提供资产证明文件。”

对中国企业收购狂潮的更广泛关注，来自于一个问题：为什么会出现这股狂潮？是受企业实力驱动，还是反映了负债累累的企业在日益放缓的国内市场活力减弱？分析师表示，在很大程度上，中国企业海外大举投资其实是为了“追求现金流”。

伦敦的一名收购顾问表示：“中国一些大收购方一开始就向我们表示，他们有兴趣购买任何资产——只要它有现金流。”

中国投行交银国际控股(Bocom International Holdings)首席策略师洪灏表示，北京宽松的货币政策提供了充足的廉价信贷，让那些与银行有着良好关系的公司可以在海外大举投资，进行多元化，减小对国内利润日益减少的业务的依赖。他说：“该策略是向人民币资产以外的资产转移。如果有机会获得廉价流动性来购买海外资产，我想他们会抓住这个机会。”

已有1627家中国国内上市公司（占上市公司总数的58%）公告2015年业绩，其数据显示，它们的命运在2015年明显恶化。数据提供商万得资讯(Wind Information)的数据显示，每股平均营收下降至本10年迄今最低水平，从2014年的6.55元人民币下降至5.4元人民币。

此外，万得资讯的数据显示，略高于五分之一的中国上市公司公告2015年的现金流为负，约三分之一中国上市公司的负债至少为资产的三倍。

财务状况如此脆弱的不仅限于一心在中国国内发展的公司。标准普尔全球市场情报(S&P Global Market Intelligence)表示，54家在去年进行过海外收购的中国公司的数据显示，许多公司“杠杆很高”。

然而，如果认为中国公司海外投资的唯一动机是追求现金流，或者是担心人民币大幅贬值而进行的资本出逃，将是错误的。支撑这些投资举动的还有清晰的战略思考。

它们的许多投资跟中国崛起为全球性消费大国有关。

在住宅地产领域，上海的绿地集团(Greenland Group)收购了纽约布鲁克林区(Brooklyn) Atlantic Yards楼盘的多数股权，承诺将帮助向富裕的中国移民和投资者出售物业。该项目的一部分已被更名为“太平洋公园”(Pacific Park)。

中国首富王健林旗下的大连万达(Dalian Wanda)，在其位于马德里、澳大利亚黄金海岸(Gold Coast)、芝加哥和洛杉矶贝弗利山(Beverly Hills)的地产项目上也有类似的计划。

还有一些情况下，中国公司对外投资旨在获得外国技术。长期以来，中国领导人一直在说，他们希望中国领军企业向价值链上方攀登，尤其是在遭受产能过剩之苦的基本大宗商品行业。产能过剩已极度削薄利润率。许多这类投资的规模太小，没能登上媒体头条。

2014年，国有的中国建材(China National Building Materials)收购了生产太阳能电池板所用高级材料的德国企业Avancis。今年，大型国企中国化工(ChemChina)出价430亿美元收购瑞士农业综合企业先正达(Syngenta)，主要是看中了这家瑞士企业的生物科技和农业化学实力。

在对技术和标志性的西方品牌流露出强烈渴望的同时，一些中国企业在收购时也表现出了惊人的速度。大连万达是一家像安邦一样拥有最高层官方人脉的民企。不久前，王健林对中国国企的迟缓笨拙提出了批评。

“国企管理体系缺乏国际标准，而且审批程序冗长，”王健林说。今年，大连万达斥资35亿美元收购了《侏罗纪世界》(Jurassic World)和《宿醉》(The Hangover)的出品方、好莱坞电影制作公司传奇娱乐(Legendary Entertainment)。

但民企是不同的，他补充道。当竞标伦敦一处房地产项目时，他只有一周时间完成交易，否则该资产将进行拍卖，那会导致价格上升。“我迅速做出了投资决定，签订了协议，并在3天内支付了现金，”他说。

但对西方目标公司而言，中国企业的出价可能带来一些令人困惑的问题。股东或许只是希望把公司卖给出价最高者。然而，股东或许会头疼于安邦这样的公司作为所有者能有多持久。他们既无法审查安邦的资产负债表，也无法回答有关安邦业务模式性质或其政治人脉安全程度的问题，因此他们或许会感觉自己不能做出完整的判断。

在汉语中，安邦的意思是“使国家平安稳定”。它的目标公司一定会希望，安邦不要辜负公司名称的含义。

译者/何黎