【英语财经】不应高估中国对国际市场影响 Biggest threat from China slowdown is a US overreaction

Concern about the slowdown in China’s economy and Beijing’s tenuous policy responses have been the primary driver of the past two big slides in global equities. Throw in the uncertainty about what Saudi Arabia might or might not do to stabilise oil prices, and investors should brace for extreme volatility in markets.

This volatility reflects an overreaction to the slowdown in China, but the absence of a clear strategy for the devaluation of the renminbi has not helped. What was billed as a one-off currency change last August has morphed into a series of depreciation measures against the US dollar.

China is undergoing significant transition. It is attempting a shift away from an export-driven and investment-led economy to a more balanced, consumption-oriented one. To achieve its goals and double gross domestic product and GDP per capita by 2020 from 2010 levels, the leadership has set out an extensive reform agenda. This includes further financial market liberalisation and state-owned enterprise, fiscal and rural land reform. Such widespread transition brings risks and significant uncertainties. A complex and interconnected reform agenda has never been achieved on this scale or at this speed.

China is walled in. If reforms are implemented too quickly, it risks a sharp slowdown. If they are implemented too slowly or not at all, it risks an unsustainable increase in debt-to-GDP ratio, which could push the country past the tipping point into economic and, in all likelihood, political instability. Beijing is also constrained by deep structural faultlines, including weak demographics and low rankings on human capital factors such as tertiary education, labour productivity and business environment indicators.

These challenges are being faced against a backdrop of modest projected global growth of about 3 per cent in 2016.

At first glance, investors may think such a backdrop warrants the recent market downdrafts. US markets, however, are overreacting to the slowdown.

Yes, China is the second-largest economy, generating 12.7 per cent of global exports and 10.4 per cent of imports. And its demand accounts for 50 to 60 per cent of the production of iron ore, nickel, thermal coal and aluminium, and a significant share of copper, tin, zinc, steel, cotton and soyabeans.

But China is not the “next subprime crisis”. Why? First, while confidence in the latest published GDP growth of 6.9 per cent is limited, more widely accepted indicators do not portend a collapsing economy. The Goldman Sachs China Current Activity Indicator and Emerging Advisors Group China Activity index show growth of 5.2 per cent and 6.1 per cent respectively.

This growth is driven by consumption-oriented sectors such as retail and travel.

Second, given President Xi Jinping’s remarks that the GDP growth rate “should be no less than 6.5 per cent in the next five years”, policymakers will use all available tools to try to reach such targets.

Third, the US does not have significant direct and indirect economic and financial exposure to China. The US exports 0.7 per cent of its GDP to China. US banking sector exposure is 0.8 per cent of bank assets, compared with 39 per cent exposure to US mortgages in 2007.

According to US national income accounts, only 0.7 per cent of US profits are sourced in China. Goldman’s global investment research division estimates a 1 per cent drop in China’s GDP growth will have a 0.1 per cent impact on US GDP, including indirect exposure.

The greater impact will come from financial contagion. If markets overreact, the drop in US GDP growth could increase to 0.47 per cent. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund’s 2012 Spillover Report estimated that a 1 per cent slowdown in China’s GDP would lead to a 0.05 per cent slowdown in global growth — compared with 0.3 per cent from a 1 per cent US slowdown.

More consistent and transparent policy with respect to the near-term strategy for the renminbi is critical to stabilising markets and ultimately to China’s reform agenda, given the continuing reliance on exports to boost the economy and foreign currency reserves. But China’s impact on markets is overstated.

Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani is chief investment officer of Goldman Sachs Private Wealth Management Group

对中国经济放缓的担忧，以及北京方面含糊的政策回应，是全球股市最近两轮暴跌的主要诱因。再考虑到沙特阿拉伯在是否采取措施稳定油价方面的不确定性，投资者应当做好应对市场出现极端波动的准备。

近期市场波动反映了对中国经济放缓的过度反应，但中国缺乏人民币贬值的清晰策略也没起到好的作用。去年8月宣称的一次性汇率改革，已经演变成一系列的对美元贬值措施。

中国正在进行具有重大意义的转型，尝试从出口驱动、投资主导型经济向更加平衡的消费导向型经济转变。为了实现这些目标，以及到2020年国内生产总值(GDP)及人均GDP比2010年翻一番的目标，中国领导层推出了广泛的改革议程，包括金融市场进一步自由化，以及国有企业、财政和农村土地改革。如此大范围的转型将带来风险和重大的不确定性。历史上还没有哪个国家成功实现过规模或推进速度与之相当、错综复杂又环环相扣的改革议程。

中国正处于两难之中。如果改革步伐太快，将面临经济急剧放缓的风险。如果步伐过慢或者根本没有动静，债务与GDP之比可能上升到不可持续的水平——这有可能使中国越过临界点陷入经济动荡，并且极易引发政治不稳定。北京方面还受到深层结构性问题的制约，如人口结构不合理，在人力资本因素（如高等教育）、劳动生产率以及商业环境等指标中排名靠后。

而中国面临这些挑战的国际环境是，据预计2016年全球经济增速仅在3%左右。

乍一看，投资者或许会认为这一背景提供了近期市场暴跌的理由。然而，美国市场正在对中国经济放缓做出过度的反应。

没错，中国是世界第二大经济体，占全球出口的12.7%、进口的10.4%。中国的需求占全球铁矿石、镍、电煤及铝产量的50%至60%，占铜、锡、锌、钢材、棉花及大豆产量的相当大一部分。

但中国不会是“下一场次贷危机”的发生地。为什么呢？首先，虽然人们不太相信中国最新发布的6.9%的GDP增速，但一些公认的指标并未预示中国经济快要崩溃。高盛(Goldman Sachs)的“中国当前活动指标”，以及Emerging Advisors Group的“中国活动指数”，分别显示中国经济增速为5.2%和6.1%。

这种水平的增速主要是由零售、旅游等消费行业拉动的。

第二，鉴于中国国家主席习近平说过，未来五年中国年均经济增速不应低于6.5%，想必政策制定者将利用所有可用的工具设法实现这一目标。

第三，在经济和金融领域，美国对中国并不存在巨大的风险敞口，不管是直接的还是间接的。对华出口占美国GDP的0.7%。美国银行业对中国的风险敞口占银行总资产的0.8%——相比之下，2007年美国银行业对抵押贷款的风险敞口为银行资产的39%。

美国的国民收入账户显示，美国的利润只有0.7%来自中国。高盛旗下全球投资研究部门估计，中国GDP增速下降1%对美国GDP增长的影响为0.1%，包括直接和间接影响。

更大的影响来自金融传染效应。如果市场反应过度，美国GDP增速所受的影响可能扩大到下降0.47%。另外，国际货币基金组织(IMF)2012年发布的《溢出效应报告》(Spillover Report)估计，中国GDP增速下降1%将导致全球经济增长放缓0.05%——而美国经济增速下滑1%将导致全球增长放缓0.3%。

鉴于中国继续依赖出口提振经济和依赖外汇储备，中国在人民币短期策略方面能否制定更加连贯和透明的政策，对于稳定市场将至关重要，最终也攸关中国自身的改革议程。但是，中国对市场的影响被高估了。

莎尔明?莫萨瓦尔-拉赫马尼(Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani)是高盛私人财富管理部(Goldman Sachs Private Wealth Management)首席投资官

译者/陈隆祥