【英语财经】注意中国经济的两个变数 The ugly subtext beneath China’s two-track economy tale

This week the Chinese government will attempt to take back control of the narrative. The release of its 2015 economic growth estimate on January 19 provides an opportunity for Beijing to argue that a renewed outburst of stock market chaos and currency policy confusion over recent weeks was just surface noise, while the underlying economy remains sound.

That China’s once-vaunted economic managers suddenly find themselves in this position is a reminder of how dramatically they too can be wrongfooted by events, albeit ones that were under their control until a series of self-inflicted policy errors.

Until China’s stock market bubble burst on June 15 — President Xi Jinping’s birthday of all days — the rest of the world was obsessed with the country’s downwards economic growth trajectory.

An ill-advised stock market rescue in July, followed by a poorly communicated currency policy adjustment in August, gave the world a bigger issue to worry about — the competence of China’s leadership, or lack thereof. In this context, the second and third-quarter gross domestic product estimates, in line with the government’s 7 per cent growth target, were reassuring.

Chinese officials now freely admit that the country’s growth story is a tale of two economies. There is the bad old industrial economy — credit-fuelled and investment-led, resulting in chronic overcapacity and unsold apartment blocks. And there is the good new services economy — innovative and consumption-driven.

Their key point is that the rise of the latter will balance the decline of the former, as has been the case this year. As a result, they argue, the overall economy will hum along at a “sustainable” rate of about 6.5 per cent over the next five years.

This spells trouble for the African, Australian, Russian and South American commodity producers who have grown fat off Chinese demand over the past 20 years. But it should benefit European and US service providers, market access permitting, as well as Japanese and South Korean gadget makers.

If only it were that simple.

There are at least two known unknowns that could disrupt China’s smooth glide path. The first is what happens to rust-belt regions that have plenty of the old economy but not much of the new. “It will be very difficult for those who work in the old economy to transition into the new economy,” says Chen Long, China economist at Gavekal Dragonomics. “Coal miners do not become internet programmers overnight, or even delivery men.”

The second is a potential debt crisis of historic proportions, stemming in part from the government’s fears about the consequences for coal country if they were to turn off the credit taps. In 2007, on the eve of the global financial crisis, China’s overall debt to GDP ratio was 147 per cent. Now it is at 231 per cent and climbing.

“They absolutely have no room left for further debt accumulation,” says Rodney Jones at Wigram Capital, an economic advisory firm. “That’s the central issue — not the exchange rate, not the stock market. These are symptoms. The problem is unsustainable growth and continued rapid accumulation of debt, leverage and credit.”

On Friday, the government said that new borrowing surged to Rmb1.7tn ($260bn) in December, the biggest monthly increase since January.

In a China-watching community where those at the extremes — “maximum” bulls and “coming collapse” Cassandras — often make the most noise, Jonathan Anderson at the Shanghai-based Emerging Advisors Group has long been regarded as one of the most thoughtful analysts. For years he laid out a convincing case for cautious optimism on the Chinese economy, but not any more.

“For years we have been waiting for China to make the tough choice and sacrifice near-term growth in order to stabilise macro balance sheets and stop its exploding debt cycle,” he wrote on January 4, the first day of this month’s market and currency mayhem. “[But] the costs of taking real adjustment are clearly too high for the government to bear?.?.?.?Right now we put the initial potential crisis threshold at around five years.”

本周，中国政府将尝试夺回叙事的控制权。1月19日发布的2015年经济增长估计数据，为中国政府提供了一个机会来辩称，再次爆发的股市动荡以及最近几周的汇率政策混乱只是表面的噪音，而经济基本面依然稳健。

中国一度自命不凡的经济管理者突然发现自己处于如此境地——这样的事实提醒人们，中国的经济管理者同样可被事态发展搞得手足无措，尽管在一系列自己酿成的政策失误出现前事态发展一直处于他们的掌控之下。

直到去年6月15日（偏偏是中国国家主席习近平生日那天）中国股市泡沫破裂为止，世界其余地区一直对中国经济增长的下行轨迹耿耿于怀。

去年6月考虑欠妥的股市救市行动，以及去年8月沟通不到位的汇率政策调整，让世界产生了一个更大的担忧：中国领导层是否具备足够的能力。在这种背景下，与7%的官方增长指标吻合的第二季度和第三季度国内生产总值(GDP)估计数字，令人们心里踏实了不少。

如今，中国官员坦率地承认，中国的增长故事说的是两个层面的经济。既有糟糕的旧工业经济，由信贷助推、由投资拉动，最终导致了长期产能过剩和住房滞销；也有良好的新服务经济，由创新和消费驱动。

他们的核心观点是，就像这一年的情形一样，服务经济的崛起将会抵消工业经济的衰落。他们辩称，其结果是，未来5年中国经济总体上将以6.5%左右这一“可持续的”速度稳步增长。

这对非洲、澳大利亚、俄罗斯和南美洲的大宗商品生产商来说不是个好消息，这些生产商过去20年因中国的需求而发展壮大。但这应当会让欧美的服务提供商、市场准入许可以及日韩的消费电子产品生产商受益。

事情真这么简单就好了。

至少有两个已知的变数可能会打乱中国的平稳发展轨迹。第一个变数是旧经济占比很高、新经济占比较低的“锈带区”会发生什么。“在旧经济中工作的人将很难转型到新经济中，”龙洲经讯(Gavekal Dragonomics)的中国经济学家陈龙表示，“煤矿工人不会一夜之间变成互联网程序员、甚至是快递员。”

第二个变数是可能爆发史无前例的债务危机，这一危机在一定程度上是由政府担心若关闭信贷水龙头会对旧经济造成何种影响导致的。2007年，在全球金融危机前夕，中国债务总额与GDP之比为147%。如今，这一比例已达231%，并且仍在攀升。

“他们绝对再没有进一步积累债务的空间了，”经济咨询公司Wigram Capital的罗德尼?琼斯(Rodney Jones)表示，“这才是核心问题——汇率和股市都不是。汇率和股市是症状。增长不可持续以及债务、杠杆和信贷的持续快速累积才是问题所在。”

上周五，中国政府表示，去年12月新增贷款飙升至1.7万亿元人民币（合2600亿美元），为去年1月以来的最大月度增幅。

在由关注中国的人士组成的圈子中，那些持极端观点的人，即“极度”看好中国的人和预言中国“即将崩溃”的人，往往制造出最多的噪音，而上海Emerging Advisors Group的乔纳森?安德森(Jonathan Anderson)一直被视为这个圈子中思维最缜密的分析师之一。多年来，他给出了一条令人信服的理由，支持对中国经济持谨慎乐观态度，但他现在不再这么认为了。

“多年来，我们一直在等待中国作出艰难的选择，牺牲短期增长以稳定宏观资产负债表和终止其爆炸式的债务周期，”他在1月4日、即本月股市和汇市动荡的首日写道，“（但）进行真正调整的成本对中国政府而言无疑太高了，难以承受……目前我们认为，中国发生首次可能的危机的临界时间，大约在5年之后。”

译者/邢嵬