【英语财经】中国经济模式神话破灭？ FT Big Read: China: Credibility on the line

As Chinese stocks plummeted on “Black Monday”, triggering waves of panicked selling around the globe, China’s leaders seemed strangely unperturbed.

Premier Li Keqiang was quoted in state media calling for development of China’s 3D printing industry. President Xi Jinping attended a Communist party meeting, where he vowed to crush followers of the Dalai Lama and urged Tibetans to absorb “Marxist values”.

In the days that followed, under strict orders from the Communist party’s propaganda department, the country’s heavily censored media was no longer dwelling on the global sell-off or China’s role in it. In the rare reports on the worst multi-day Chinese equity rout since 1996, they admonished “global financial markets [that] have overreacted like a burnt child fearing fire”.

In a way they were right.

Behind the global headlines declaring the “great fall of China” nothing actually changed in the country’s “real” economy, which has been slowing for years but is still growing in line with the government’s target of around 7 per cent — at least according to official figures.

But what did change this week is the perception, pushed by many on Wall Street and in the City of London, that China’s authoritarian leaders were the world’s most competent technocrats.

The mishandling of a bursting stock bubble — and especially the decision on August 11 to break a two-decade taboo and devalue the renminbi — have badly shaken global faith in the Chinese model of market authoritarianism.

“Many of the market’s substantive worries (economic collapse, financial collapse, competitive devaluation) are overblown,” says Arthur Kroeber, head of research at Gavekal Dragonomics. “But markets trade as much on policy signals as on economic reality, and there has clearly been a breakdown of communication between Beijing and the rest of the world.”

The problem is not just one of public relations or global perception, however. Many of the actions the authorities have taken since late last year now appear badly mistaken. More recently, the moves have smacked of panic.

Not only have global investors lost faith in China’s mandarins but within China itself the reform-minded officials who have overseen the turmoil have also been widely discredited, their plans for market-oriented economic reforms now in tatters.

In April, as investors were questioning whether China’s benchmark Shanghai Composite Index was approaching a bubble after doubling in less than a year, the Communist party’s main mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, ran a prominent editorial dismissing those fears and declaring the start of a long-term bull market. “The capital markets can be a true reflection of the ‘China dream’,” the paper crowed. “As carriers of the ‘China dream’ [the markets] hold enormous opportunities for investors.”

Encouraged by what appeared to be an apparent ironclad guarantee from the ruling party, small investors poured money into already overpriced stocks.

The benchmark index peaked on June 12 then began to slide, accelerating as the government watched helplessly, until July 8 when a plan approved by Premier Li and vice-premier Ma Kai was rolled out to save the market.

China’s stock exchanges, set up in the early 1990s, have been through several booms and busts, and every time they have peaked the government has halfheartedly tried to prop up share prices before giving up and allowing them to fall. But this time Beijing went all-out: banning short sellers, encouraging margin trading, halting initial public offerings, prohibiting share sales by all major investors and ordering state-owned funds and investors to buy up shares on a massive scale.

This unorthodox intervention convinced many Chinese punters to pile back in. But the moves were viewed with deep scepticism by investors abroad, especially after Beijing effectively criminalised large share sales.

“The Chinese authorities’ instinctive reaction to everything is control and retribution,” says a Hong Kong-based partner at a large hedge fund. “Global investors look at the witch-hunt going on in the equity market and they ask what the hell is going on?”

Currency intervention

The biggest shock was still to come. Just before China’s markets opened on August 11, the People’s Bank of China announced it would devalue the currency by around 2 per cent against the dollar in a “one-off” move.

The central bank also said this devaluation, the first by China since 1994, would be accompanied by a new “market-oriented” mechanism for setting the daily benchmark from which the currency can rise or fall by up to 2 per cent on a given day. This effective de-pegging of the renminbi from the dollar led to two more days of devaluation before the central bank decided to halt the slide by buying the Chinese currency and selling US dollars.

In a hastily called — and extremely rare — press conference two days later, the PBoC vowed to intervene in the market whenever Beijing saw the need, reversing the earlier decision to allow the market to set exchange rates.

The PBoC has since spent roughly $200bn in the onshore and offshore currency markets to keep the renminbi from devaluing further, begging the question of why it decided to de-peg its currency to begin with.

“Before they announced this reform they had a credible peg to the US dollar and they hardly needed to intervene in the [foreign exchange] markets, but now they are having to spend huge amounts just to achieve the same effect,” says a person with ties to the PBoC. “It’s like they decided to cross the river because it looked nice and calm but then they slipped and got dragged downstream, and now they are having to use all their strength to get back to the shallow water they were in before.”

At the end of July, China’s foreign exchange reserves stood at $3.65tn, the largest in the world. If the PBoC were to keep intervening in the currency markets at the current rate (and no other cash flowed in) those reserves could be gone within a year.

The apparent mishandling of what could have been an important step towards a freely floating currency — a key part of becoming a rival currency to the dollar, a cherished policy objective — has left reform-minded officials within the regime deeply discredited.

“The government clearly has the right intentions to proceed with reforms but is fumbling the communication and implementation of those reforms,” says Eswar Prasad, former China head at the IMF. “Internal support for market reforms is eroded every time they see big volatility and that is why we have seen this whipsawing between liberalisation and control.”

Contradictory policy

That same tension can be seen in the attempts to prop up the stock market.

State-owned entities have spent more than $200bn buying stocks to reverse the stock market crash, say people familiar with the matter. Monday’s crash, when Chinese stocks fell 8.5 per cent in their worst day since February 2007, appears to be largely due to the Chinese government’s decision to cut its losses and stop buying shares to prop up the index.

The fall was also blamed on the fact the government did not cut interest rates or inject cash into the banking system over the weekend, as many investors had expected. The PBoC did both on Tuesday, after the benchmark index had already fallen by more than a quarter in just one week.

There was more support to come. A group of state-owned stock investors known as the “national team” poured back in to buy shares in the last hour of trading on Thursday and lifted the index from a small loss to close up more than 5 per cent. The market closed up another 4.8 per cent yesterday, but the total market value wiped out since the peak in early June is around $4.5tn — more than the entire German economy.

The main reason for renewed state intervention late this week was a directive from top party leaders to provide a backdrop of rising markets when Beijing hosts a huge military parade next Thursday to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the “Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression”, according to market participants and people familiar with the matter.

In private, some officials say the incoherent and contradictory policy reversals of recent weeks have much to do with the planning and preparation of the parade.

Because President Xi Jinping is preoccupied with making this display of military might and “national rejuvenation” a success, he has left the economic response to other leaders, these people say. But since taking power in 2012, Mr Xi has concentrated decision-making power in his own hands to such an extent that his weakened underlings are unable to make firm decisions and stick with them.

“People are finally starting to realise the Chinese government is not omnipotent and omniscient,” said Jim Chanos, the hedge fund manager and long-term bear on China, in an interview with CNBC. “The way they handled the run up in their stock market, the panicked responses, the devaluation, the non-devaluation, the various different mixed signals coming out of the various different ministries, I think has started to give investors pause [and realise] that in fact, like many of us, sometimes they don’t have a clue.”

Additional Reporting by Christian Shepherd

中国股市上周“黑色星期一”的暴跌引发了全球性的恐慌抛售潮，中国领导人却似乎冷静得出奇。

中国总理李克强被官方媒体引用的讲话是呼吁发展中国的3D打印业。中国国家主席习近平参加了一次中共会议，在会上发誓要击溃达赖喇嘛(Dalai Lama)的追随者，并敦促西藏民众接受马克思主义价值观。

随后几天里，在中共宣传部门的严令下，中国受到高度审查的媒体不再大篇幅报道全球抛售或中国在其中发挥的作用。在有关1996年来中国股市最糟糕的多日连跌的罕见报道中，他们告诫称全球金融市场属于反应过度，好比一朝被蛇咬，十年怕井绳。

他们在某种程度上是正确的。

在惊呼“中国大跌”(Great Fall of China)的全球头条新闻背后，中国“实体”经济其实并无变化。多年来，中国实体经济一直在放缓，但增长率仍保持在7%左右的政府目标上——起码从官方数据来看是如此。

但上周，一种看法确实发生了变化。这种看法是：中国的威权领导人是世界上最有能力的技术官僚。华尔街和伦敦金融城的许多人士过去一直在推动这种看法。

对即将破裂的股市泡沫处理不当——尤其是加上8月11日打破20年的禁忌、让人民币贬值的决定——已严重动摇了全球对于中国市场威权主义模式的信心。

“市场的许多严重担忧（经济崩溃、金融崩盘、竞争性贬值）都言过其实了，”龙洲经讯(Gavekal Dragonomics)研究主管葛艺豪(Arthur Kroeber)说。“但是，中国股市行情受到政策信号的影响程度与受到经济现实的影响程度相当，目前中国与世界其他地区之间明显出现了沟通失败。”

然而，这并不单单是公共关系或全球认知的问题。中国当局自去年底以来采取的许多动作现在看上去都是严重错误的。最近，中国当局的动作显示出了些许恐慌。

不但全球投资者对中国高官失去了信心，而且中国国内民众对那些在此次市场动荡期间主管市场的改革派官员也普遍失去了信任，如今他们的市场化经济改革计划已支离破碎。

4月份，当投资者质疑，中国基准股指上证综指(Shanghai Composite Index)在不到1年时间内翻倍之后是否已接近泡沫时，中共主要喉舌《人民日报》(People’s Daily)发表了一篇著名的社论来打消这些疑虑，并宣布中国A股正在启动长期牛市。“长期看，‘中国梦’会在资本市场有真实的反映，”该报高呼道，“如果将A股看作‘中国梦’的载体，那么其蕴藏的投资机会是巨大的。”

这看上去似乎是执政党做出的牢不可破的担保，受其鼓舞，散户们大量买入了估值已然很高的股票。

一家大型对冲基金驻香港的合伙人表示，“全球投资者都关注着中国股市的‘猎巫’行动，并且在问到底发生了什么？”上证综指在6月12日见顶后开始下挫，在政府无助观望之际加速下跌，直到7月8日一项得到总理李克强和副总理马凯批准的救市方案被抛了出来。

成立于1990年代初的中国股票交易所，已经历了多轮繁荣与萧条，之前每一次股指见顶时，政府都半心半意地努力支撑股价，然后放弃，让股指跌下去。但这一次，中国政府竭尽了全力：禁止做空，鼓励保证金交易，暂停首次公开发行(IPO)，禁止所有大股东减持，下令国有基金和投资机构大规模买入股票。

这种不同寻常的干预说服许多中国股民重回股市。但这些措施受到了国外投资者的深度质疑，尤其是在中国政府实际上宣布大规模出售股票为非法行为之后。

“中国当局对所有事情的本能反应就是控制与惩罚，”一家大型对冲基金驻香港的合伙人表示，“全球投资者都关注着中国股市的‘猎巫’行动，并且在问到底发生了什么？”

汇率干预

接下来才是最大的冲击。就在8月11日汇市开盘前，中国央行(PBoC)宣布，人民币将“一次性”对美元贬值2%左右。

中国央行还表示，伴随此次贬值（为人民币自1994年以来首次贬值），将实行设定人民币汇率中间价的“市场化”新机制。目前人民币兑美元汇率每日可以在中间价上下2%的区间内波动。这次人民币与美元实际上的脱钩，导致人民币又接着贬值了两天，直到中国央行决定买入人民币、卖出美元，止住汇率下跌趋势。

在两天后一次匆忙召集的——并且极端罕见的——记者招待会上，中国央行发誓将在政府觉得有必要的任何时候干预市场，扭转了之前允许市场设定汇率的决定。

随后，中国央行在境内和离岸外汇市场投入了约2000亿美元，以防止人民币进一步贬值，这让人不禁要问：一开始又为什么决定让人民币与美元脱钩呢？



“在宣布此轮改革前，人民币与美元有可靠的挂钩机制，他们几乎不需要干预（外汇）市场，但是如今他们不得不耗费巨资，只为达到相同的效果”

“在宣布此轮改革前，人民币与美元有可靠的挂钩机制，他们几乎不需要干预（外汇）市场，但是如今他们不得不耗费巨资，只为达到相同的效果，”一名与中国央行有关系的人称，“就好像，他们决定渡过这条河，因为它看起来美好而平静，但是之后他们滑入深水区并被湍流带到下游，如今他们不得不用尽全力回到之前他们所停留的浅水区。”

7月底，中国外汇储备达到3.65万亿美元，为全球最高。如果中国央行以现在的资金消耗速度继续干预外汇市场（而没有其他现金流入），这些外汇储备可能会在一年内耗尽。

这是一次明显的误操作，让一心改革的政府官员信誉扫地。中国本可以向自由浮动汇率制——让人民币能与美元竞争的关键，也是极受重视的政策目标——迈出重要一步。

“政府明显拥有推进改革的正确意图，但是一直在摸索这些改革的沟通和实施方式，”国际货币基金组织(IMF)中国部前负责人埃斯瓦尔?普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)称，“每当遇到巨大的市场波动时，对市场改革的内部支持都会遭到侵蚀，这就是我们看到自由化和管制二者反复拉锯的原因。”

矛盾的政策

在对股市的救市努力中也可以看到同样的紧张。

知情人士称，国有实体已经耗资逾2000亿美元购买股票以扭转股市暴跌的局面。上周一，中国股市下跌8.5%，为自2007年2月以来股市最大单日跌幅。此次暴跌似乎主要是由于中国政府决定止损、停止为支撑股指而购买股票。

上周一的那次暴跌也归咎于中国政府在之前一个周末没有像很多投资者预期的一样降息或向银行系统注入流动性。上周二，在基准股指在仅仅一周内下跌了逾四分之一之后，中国央行宣布降息降准。

这之后还有更多救市举措。在上周四收盘前的最后一个小时，一群被称为“国家队”的国有股票投资机构再度入市大举购买股票，将沪指由小幅下跌推至收涨逾5%。上周五，沪指又收涨4.8%，但自6月12日见顶以来，中国股市总市值已经抹去了4.5万亿美元左右——比整个德国的经济总量还大。

市场参与者及知情人士表示，上周政府再次出手干预的主要原因是来自中共高层领导的一条指示——在本周四北京举行庆祝“中国人民抗日战争胜利70周年”的大型阅兵式之际营造出股市上涨的气氛。

一些官员私下称，最近几周这种不连贯又相互矛盾的政策反复与此次阅兵式的筹划和准备有很大关系。

这些人表示，由于习近平正全神贯注于力保此次展示军事力量及“民族复兴”的阅兵式大获成功，他把经济问题留给了其他领导人应对。但是，自2012年执政以来，习近平将决策权极大地集中到自己手中，以至于其被削弱的部下无法做出坚定的决策，亦无法坚持执行决策。

“人们最终会逐渐意识到中国政府并非无所无能、无所不知，”长期看空中国的对冲基金经理吉姆?查诺斯(Jim Chanos)在接受CNBC采访时称，“我认为，他们应对股市上涨、市场惊慌失措的反应、人民币贬值、遏制人民币贬值、以及各种不同的政府部门释放的各种不同的混合信号的方式，已经开始让投资者停下来思考（并意识到），实际上，就像我们很多人一样，有时中国政府也毫无头绪。”

克里斯蒂安?谢泼德(Christian Shepherd)补充报道

译者/何黎