【英语财经】中国在市场和干预之间进退两难 China’s push-me-pull-you policies leave the world reeling

It used to be that when America sneezed, the rest of the world caught a cold. Now the US has real competition when it comes to spreading economic influenza. These days, it seems, if China sneezes, the world comes down with bird flu.

That is hardly surprising given China now accounts for 16 per cent of global output, the same as the US in purchasing power parity terms. Although economists have long urged Beijing to adopt pro-market reforms, the dirty secret is that China has borne the global economy on its back by doing precisely the opposite. Now its economy is juddering and its policymakers are allowing markets to exert a modicum of influence, global investors are looking on in horrified awe. Back in 2008, when the world went into virtual lockdown, it was Chinese state intervention — old-fashioned pump-priming on a truly colossal scale — that kept things going. Chinese demand for oil, iron ore and copper triggered booms in commodity-producing countries from South America to Africa. A surge in Chinese consumer demand kept US carmakers and Taiwanese chipmakers afloat.

For the Chinese economy, though, there was a price to pay. Total debt in the system has swelled since 2009 from 130 per cent of gross domestic product to about 280 per cent. As China ramped up investment levels to nearly 50 per cent of GDP, it built houses, offices and steel mills it simply did not need. Instead of leaning on exports, Beijing allowed the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar. Even when its arch-rival Japan set the printing presses rolling, China sucked it up. The renminbi has appreciated nearly 40 per cent against the yen since the 2013 launch of Abenomics, Tokyo’s bid to revive and reflate its economy.

Now Beijing is adjusting policy, clumsily and uncertainly. It has accepted that its economy cannot grow at 10 per cent forever. It has trimmed fixed capital investment, sending global commodity prices into a tailspin, and damaging economies from Brazil to Australia. More recently, after its futile attempts to tame the stock market, it has bowed to market forces. The result has been a frightening slide. Just in case things were not interesting enough, the People’s Bank of China picked this month of all months to move to a more market-determined exchange rate. It has let loose a whirlwind. “It’s payback time,” says Jonathan Slone, chief executive of CLSA, the Hong-Kong based brokerage, referring to the deferred cost of 2009’s $600bn stimulus.

The sense of panic emanating from China has been exacerbated by the mixed signals. The world does not have a clue what Beijing is up to. Take the exchange rate. Technocrats at the central bank were almost certainly not seeking a competitive devaluation. Rather, they wanted to move to a more flexible exchange rate in order to improve the renminbi’s chances of being included in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. How do we know devaluation was not the real aim? Because China has since lavished tens of billions of dollars a day to prop up its currency. This shows just how tied up in knots Chinese policymakers have become.

In order to convince markets the bank was seeking a market-friendly exchange rate regime it has been obliged to intervene on a massive scale. How perverse is that?

That in microcosm is the state of China’s economy policy as a whole. Policymakers find themselves squeezed between the Scylla of the market and the Charybdis of state control. The economic road map laid out at the Communist party’s Third Plenum in 2013 called for both “a decisive role” for markets and a “dominant role” for the state. All clear, then? In practice, policymakers have slalomed alarmingly between the two. They propped up the stock market, only to let it collapse. They reined in credit, only to open the sluices again. They announced drastic reform of state-owned enterprises, only to do not much of anything. Their push-me-pull you policies have left the world uncertain about the direction of travel and unsure about whether Chinese policymakers are as competent as they were always cracked up to be.

So where is China heading? If we look to Xi Jinping for clues we might deduce that state control will win the day. China’s president does not exactly give the impression of being willing to leave things to chance. He is all about control: of his party, of the media and doubtless of the economy too. When push comes to shove, state intervention is likely to prevail over what must have looked to China’s leaders like a reckless dabbling with market forces by their technocrats. ??REFORMERS V TECHNOCRATS??If that is right, Beijing will do everything to stabilise the situation and ensure a decent level of growth. In the short term, that will be good for the world. It may, however, only be postponing the day of reckoning.

过去通常是美国一打喷嚏，世界其他地区就感冒。现在，美国在扩散经济流感方面遇上了真正的对手。近来，似乎中国一打喷嚏，世界就患上了禽流感。

这不足为奇，因为按购买力平价(PPP)计算，目前中国占全球产出的比重达到16%，已跟美国相当。尽管经济学家们长期以来一直敦促北京方面实施市场化改革，但一个难以启齿的秘密是，中国恰恰通过相反方式背负起了全球经济。如今，中国经济势头不稳，中国政策制定者正允许市场发挥些许作用，全球投资者又惊又惧地观望着这一切。在2008年，当世界经济几乎停摆时，正是中国政府的干预——为刺激经济而推出规模极其庞大的政府投资的旧套路——使得全球经济保持运转。中国对石油、铁矿石和铜的需求，给从南美到非洲的大宗商品生产国带来了繁荣。中国消费需求猛增，让美国汽车公司和台湾芯片制造商得以维持运营。

不过，中国经济却要为此付出代价。中国总债务自2009年开始膨胀，债务对国内生产总值(GDP)比例从130%升高到约280%。中国把投资水平提高到接近GDP的50%，兴建了并不需要的住宅、写字楼和钢铁厂。中国没有依赖出口，反而允许人民币兑美元升值。甚至当主要对手日本开动印钞机时，中国也忍住了。自2013年日本旨在重振经济和恢复通胀的“安倍经济学”亮相以来，人民币兑日元已累计升值了近40%。

如今中国正在调整政策，笨拙且没有把握。中国接受了其经济不可能永远保持10%增长率的现实。中国减少了固定资本投资，导致全球大宗商品价格暴跌，冲击了从巴西到澳大利亚等许多国家的经济。最近，在尝试驯服股市未果之后，中国顺从了市场力量。结果股市出现令人恐惧的下滑。中国央行(PBoC)仿佛担心事情不够有趣，在所有月份中偏偏选中这个月采取行动，要让汇率更多地由市场决定。这引发了一场旋风。“报应的时候到了，”总部位于香港的券商里昂证券(CLSA)的首席执行官施立宏(Jonathan Slone)说。他这里指的是2009年6000亿美元刺激计划的迟来代价。

源于中国的恐慌感被各种参差不齐的信号放大了。世界不知道中国要做什么。以汇率为例。几乎可以肯定，中国央行的技术官僚们不是在寻求竞争性贬值。相反，他们想要提高汇率的灵活性，以提高人民币被纳入国际货币基金组织(IMF)特别提款权(SDR)货币篮子的可能性。我们如何知道他们的真实目的不是贬值呢？因为中国后来在一天内动用数百亿美元托住人民币汇率。从中可见，中国政策制定者变得有多手忙脚乱。

为了让市场相信自己寻求市场化的汇率形成机制，中国央行被迫进行了大规模干预。这是多么离奇啊？

这正是中国整体经济政策情况的缩影。政策制定者发现自己在市场和政府控制之间进退两难。2013年中共十八届三中全会制定的经济路线图，提出发挥市场的“决定性作用”和政府的“主导作用”。那么，非常清楚了吧？在实践中，政策制定者们令人心惊胆战地在这两者之间迂回。他们推高了股市，结果只能让股市跌下来。他们抑制了信贷，结果只能再次打开闸门。他们宣布要实施大刀阔斧的国企改革，结果却无所作为。他们这种“我推你拉的”政策让世界摸不清楚中国前进的方向，不确定中国政策制定者是否像他们总是被吹捧的那样能干。

那么中国将朝哪个方向前进？如果从习近平身上找线索，我们或许会推断出，政府控制将会胜出。中国国家主席根本没给人愿意顺其自然的印象。他表现出全面的控制欲：控制党，控制媒体，无疑也会控制经济。当到紧要关头时，中国领导人眼中技术官僚们鲁莽地尝试利用市场力量之举，可能会让位于政府干预。如果是这样，中国政府将采取一切措施稳定局势，并确保实现体面的增速。在短期内，这对世界将是有利的。然而，这或许只是在推迟清算日的到来。

译者/邢嵬