【英语财经】和黄投资欧洲3G笑在最后 Hutchison’s long punt on European telecoms starts to come good

A little more than a decade ago, Li Ka-shing’s investment in European 3G telecoms was so poorly valued that analysts at CLSA dubbed it “free G”. They wondered how badly his flagship

Hutchison Whampoa

business would be hit if the whole $18bn venture was simply written off.

Last week, however, CK Hutchison Holdings, as it is now called, merged its Italian mobile business with that of

VimpelCom

in a deal valued at ￠21.8bn ($24bn).

And this merger, more than two years in the making, is the latest sign that telecoms, once a sector that threatened the reputation of the Hong Kong tycoon dubbed “Superman”, is starting to look like a long-term play coming good.

Hutchison’s European telecoms adventures did not look promising. In the early years, the cash drain was enormous: the company booked $18.6bn in capital expenditure and operating losses of $17.9bn before profits finally materialised.

To many, the business looked like a bad bet that the company could not bear to call time on. That in itself was unusual for a blue-chip global operator known for an unsentimental view of its portfolio. In addition, Hutchison’s Three brand tended to be the smallest in each telecoms market it entered. Investors were not used to thinking of Hutchison, or even Mr Li, as a scrappy, struggling underdog.

“One reason consolidation took so long is that everyone thought Hutch would be the seller, not the buyer,” explains one adviser to the company. “They’ve actually been talking about buying people for a long, long time.”

Now, as the number of competitors in each telecoms market shrinks, those still standing will find themselves protected by higher barriers to entry. Even if they struggle to raise prices, their reduced marketing spend and other synergies should improve their profitability.

Italy is just the latest market where this is happening, subject to regulatory approval. Germany, Ireland and Austria have been through the transition and the UK is likely to follow suit.

In each of these markets, apart from Germany, Hutchison was the catalyst. Its experiences in the early years of 3G had been all the more painful given that it had previously navigated Europe’s shifting telecoms scene with aplomb — and profits.

In 1999, Hutchison pocketed a double takeover premium when it sold its UK unit,

Orange, to Germany’s Mannesmann, which was itself bought by

Vodafone. Vodafone’s subsequent forced disposal of Orange to

France Telecom

raked in even more cash for Hutchison.

Combined, those deals produced profits of more than $21bn — which were then swallowed up by the costs of investing in 3G, with its eye-popping licence prices and subsequent network outlay.

In an example of Mr Li’s dealmaking skills, he paid ￡3.85bn for a UK 3G licence and promptly sold 35 per cent to Japan’s

NTT DoCoMo

and Dutch group

KPN, netting a 15 per cent profit in the process. Within two years, both groups had written down their investments by 80 per cent but Hutchison did not write off a penny.

More global dealmaking followed. Hutchison bought stakes, sold others, found partners and spun off units to help finance a business in which operating profits only materialised in 2010 — five years behind schedule.

Just reading the subtitles of the company’s annual reports shows the impact telecoms had on a business that spanned 50 countries and ranged from ports and property to one of the largest beauty retail chains in the world.

In 2006, Hutchison went with the staunchly optimistic “shaping future growth”, despite missing yet another target for profitability in Europe. In 2008, its chosen phrase was “solid foundation”, even as revenues per user dropped sharply.

By 2010, the company trumpeted “milestones achieved”, and two years later talked of “radiant growth”.

Hutchison executives are known to dislike the perennial debate over whether to view the company as a savvy asset trader or a builder of businesses. Certainly, Mr Li’s reputation is founded on some remarkable bargain-hunting — from buying Hong Kong property in the riots of 1967

to taking over Hutchison itself at a knockdown price

in 1979.

But the other point to consider is whether anyone but an Asian, majority-owned, company could have stuck with something so painful for so long. Probably not. At least these latest deals suggest that Hutchison is now employing its dealmaking acumen to build its business.

10年多一点以前，李嘉诚(Li Ka-shing)对欧洲3G电信业的投资得到的估值极低，里昂证券(CLSA)的分析师甚至将其戏称为“免费G”(free G)。他们揣测，如果这笔180亿美元的投资被一笔勾销，李嘉诚的旗舰企业和记黄埔(Hutchison Whampoa)会遭到多么严重的打击。

然而，现名为长江和记实业(CK Hutchison Holdings)的和黄上周将其在意大利的移动业务与VimpelCom的意大利移动业务合并，交易价值达218亿欧元（合240亿美元）。

这起并购已经酝酿了两年多。它是一个最新的迹象，表明一度危及被称为“李超人”的这位香港大亨名望的电信业，现在看起来像是一笔正在结出硕果的长期投资。

过去，和黄的欧洲电信业务看起来并非前景光明。早年公司的现金流失十分严重：在终于实现盈利之前，该公司计入了186亿美元的资本支出，179亿美元的运营亏损。

那时在很多人看来，该业务就像是和黄不忍叫停的糟糕赌注。对于一家以理性对待资产组合著称的蓝筹全球运营企业而言，这一点本身就不同寻常。而且，和黄的电信品牌“3”(Three)基本上在进入的每一个电信市场都是最小的。投资者不习惯将和黄，乃至李嘉诚，想成规模较小、努力挣扎的弱势竞争者。

“整合花了这么长时间，一个原因是大家都以为和黄是卖家，而不是买家，”和黄的一名顾问解释道，“实际上他们谈论收购其它企业已有很久了。”

现在，随着每个电信市场上的竞争对手的数量都减少了，那些尚存的运营商会发现，自己受到了更高进入门槛的保护。就算它们难以抬高价格，营销支出减少和其他协同效应也会提高它们的盈利能力。

意大利是发生这种情况的又一个市场（目前合并还有待监管部门批准）。德国、爱尔兰和奥地利已经经历了这种转变，英国也可能紧随其后。

除了德国以外，和黄是上述每一个市场中的催化剂。考虑到更早之前，和黄如何沉着自信地驾驭着欧洲电信业的转变并斩获利润，其在3G电信业初期的经历显得更为惨痛。

1999年，和黄将英国子公司Orange出售给德国的曼内斯曼(Mannesmann)，获得了双份的收购溢价，因为曼内斯曼本身又被沃达丰(Vodafone)收购。后来，沃达丰被迫将Orange出售给法国电信(France Telecom)，让和黄又赚了一笔。

这几宗交易加在一起，为和黄带来了逾210亿美元利润——接着，这笔钱被和黄投资3G的成本（以极高价格获得牌照，加上随后的网络建设）消耗掉了。

突显李嘉诚交易撮合本领的是，他支付38.5亿英镑在英国取得了一个3G牌照，随即把35%股权出售给日本的NTT DoCoMo与荷兰的KPN，从中获利15%。不到两年后，上述两家公司都把各自的投资减记了80%，但和黄没有减记一分一毫。

和黄接着撮合了更多全球交易。它买入一些股份，卖出另一些股份，找到合作伙伴，并剥离一些部门，以便为一项直到2010年才实现营业利润（比计划晚了5年）的业务提供资金。

只要看一看和黄年报的小标题，就能看出电信业务对这家公司的影响有多大。和黄的业务遍布50个国家，范围非常广泛，从港口、房地产，到世界最大美容连锁店之一。

2006年，和黄使用的口号是极其乐观的“塑造未来增长”，尽管又一次未能在欧洲实现盈利目标。2008年，在每用户营收大幅下降之际，和黄选用的小标题是“坚实的基础”。

到2010年，和黄大声宣告“达到里程碑”，两年后，和黄谈的是“强劲增长”。

和黄高管在一件事上出名：他们不喜欢关于该公司应当被视为精明的资产交易商还是企业创建者的长期辩论。当然，李嘉诚的声誉建立在某些精明的抄底上——从在1967年的政治骚动期买入香港房产，到1979年以跳楼价买下和黄本身。

但需要考虑的另一点是，除了一家亚洲的多数股权公司，还有什么公司能够忍受困境这么久？很可能没有。这些最新的交易至少表明，和黄正在利用自己的交易撮合能力打造自己的企业。

译者/何黎