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2015-8-13 18:36
Not a one-off after all. Wednesday’s news that the renminbi had fallen another 1.6 per cent against the dollar after Tuesday’s 1.9 per cent fall somewhat supported the People’s Bank of China’s assertion that this was genuinely a move towards a market-determined exchange rate rather than a managed step devaluation.
The latter was always somewhat illogical. If the Chinese economy is in as big a hole as it appears, an exchange rate reduction of less than 2 per cent is highly unlikely to make a significant difference. Currencies have been sliding against the dollar across the emerging market world (most likely owing quite a lot to China’s economic travails, ironically or appropriately enough), and a one-off move would have restored only a smidgen of its competitiveness. The most likely explanation appears to be that, for once, two of China’s policy goals — helping the economy by loosening monetary policy and boosting its application for admission to the Special Drawing Right currency basket — were aligned, and that the PBoC thought it worth the risk to go for it. Those dangers, though, are considerable, not just in inviting rapid capital outflows but in raising international tensions such that its SDR campaign is (unfairly) undermined rather than bolstered. China joining the widespread fall in EM currencies could kick off another round of what journalists are pleased to call the currency wars. The International Monetary Fund’s technical criteria for SDR entry are one thing, and this week’s decision will help meet them, which is why the PBoC’s announcement was cautiously welcomed by the fund. But the US administration, which will have a big say in the final policy decision and itself supports the renminbi’s inclusion, will face pressure from congressmen and senators who have their own ideas about what constitutes the kind of properly run currency that ought to be admitted to the SDR. (Clue: it does not generally belong to a country with a trade surplus against the US which then lets its exchange rate fall.) Recently the manipulation malcontents in the US Congress have been focusing on trying to insert measures against exchange rate misalignment in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal with a group of Asia-Pacific nations. They can, however, to adapt a phrase, pivot to China at a second’s notice. Charles Schumer, veteran currency agitator and senator for parts of New York (Wall Street is unlikely to share his anti-manipulation crusade), was straight out of the traps on Tuesday fulminating against the perfidy of Beijing and making threatening noises about the SDR. Politically, the timing of the decision by the IMF’s shareholder countries later this year is unfortunate. It will come as the battle in the Democratic and Republican presidential primaries is intensifying. If you thought the discussion during the 2012 presidential campaign about labelling China a currency manipulator and imposing tariffs was a doozy, just wait until someone (odds currently even on Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump) starts to focus on the SDR decision as a symbol of economic patriotism. On this occasion, charges of competitive devaluation are surely absurd. By following the dollar higher, the renminbi was becoming increasingly overvalued. As various countries have discovered (including the UK in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism), you should be careful what currency you peg to. Still, that is not likely to placate US lawmakers looking for blood. The problem with fixing and managing currencies for so long is that you are less likely to be believed when you claim to have eschewed the practice. This is particularly true if the initial result of the policy move is a depreciation — if, to adapt a familiar football chant, you only float when you are losing. This week’s moves so far, by and of themselves, are not a huge deal. They will go a small part of the way to satisfying the criteria for entry into the SDR, and have an even smaller impact on boosting the Chinese economy by encouraging exports. It remains to be seen how the PBoC, which retains plenty of powers to manage the currency if it wants to, would react to serious downward pressure on the renminbi. If we really are in a new market-determined world, policymakers have embarked on a very delicate operation if they are trying to do something substantive that will not cause a big financial market dislocation in the short run nor kick off another round of currency wars. A premeditated one-off: evidently not. But a permanent shift to a market mechanism? China’s voluble critics on Capitol Hill and elsewhere are going to take a lot of convincing. 这毕竟不是一次性贬值。周三的新闻显示,人民币兑美元中间价在周二下跌1.9%之后再度下跌1.6%,这或多或少支持中国央行(PBoC)的说法:这实际上是朝着让市场决定汇率迈出的一步,而不是有管理的贬值。
若说是有管理的贬值,总是有些不合逻辑。如果中国经济状况真如表面上那么糟糕,那么汇率贬值不到2%根本不可能产生重要作用。几乎所有新兴市场国家的货币相对于美元都一直在贬值(既讽刺又合理的是,这很可能在很大程度上源于中国的经济阵痛),一次性贬值只能略微恢复中国的竞争力。 最有可能的解释似乎是,这一次,中国的两个政策目标——通过放松货币政策支持经济增长,以及推动人民币加入特别提款权(SDR)货币篮子——是一致的,中国央行认为值得冒险一试。 不过风险是很大的,这不仅导致资本快速外流,还加剧国际紧张——如此一来,人民币加入SDR货币篮子的努力(不公平地)受到了破坏,而不是得到支持。 中国加入新兴市场货币普遍的贬值行列,可能引发又一轮“汇率战”——新闻记者乐于这么叫。国际货币基金组织(IMF)对于将某国货币纳入SDR的技术标准是一件事情,中国央行本周的决定将有助于人民币满足这些标准,这是中国央行的公告受到IMF谨慎欢迎的原因。 但在IMF最终政策决策中拥有很大发言权、并且自身也支持人民币加入SDR的美国政府,将面临来自参众两院议员的压力——对于货币怎样才算受到合理的管理、应被纳入SDR,他们有着自己的看法。(对美拥有贸易顺差、然后让本国汇率贬值的国家的货币通常不在此列。) 近来,美国国会中对汇率操纵不满的人士,一直致力于在一群亚太国家谈判的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)中加入反汇率错位的措施。然而,套用美国的“重返亚洲”一词,他们可能在一瞬间“重返中国”。 周二,擅于煽动汇率问题的老手、代表纽约州一部分人(华尔街不大可能参与他的反汇率操纵“十字军东征”)的参议员查尔斯?舒默(Charles Schumer),立即跳出来强烈批评了北京方面的背信弃义,并就人民币加入SDR之事发出威胁性噪音。 在政治上看,IMF股东国将在今年晚些时候做出决定的这一时机不太妙。那时将正是民主党和共和党的总统初选竞争白热化的时候。如果你认为,2012年总统竞选中有关给中国贴上“汇率操纵国”标签并强加关税的讨论非常抢眼,那么就等着某人(目前甚至可能是希拉里?克林顿(Hillary Clinton)和唐纳德?特朗普(Donald Trump))开始关注人民币是否被纳入SDR的决定、把它当作一个经济爱国主义标志吧。 这一回,指责中国进行竞争性贬值无疑很荒谬。随着美元一起高涨之后,人民币汇率的高估越来越厉害。正如不同国家都已发现的那样(包括欧洲汇率机制(European Exchange Rate Mechanism)中的英国),你在选择跟哪种货币挂钩时应当小心谨慎。 不过这个道理不太可能安抚“嗜血”的美国议员们。问题在于,由于你这么长时间来一直设定和管理汇率,当你声称已放弃该做法时,就没那么容易取信于人。当政策举措的最初结果是贬值时,尤为如此——套用一句足球语,只有当你快输的时候,才会让汇率浮动。 到目前为止,中国央行本周的动作本身也不算太大的动作,只是距离满足人民币加入SDR的标准更近了一小步,对于通过促进出口提振中国经济的作用甚至更小了。 中国央行将如何应对严重的人民币下行压力,我们将拭目以待。目前,中国央行仍保留了在它想的时候管理汇率的很大权力。 如果我们真的处在一个新的由市场决定的世界里,如果中国的政策制定者在尝试采取既不会造成短期金融市场剧烈动荡、也不会引发又一轮汇率战的重大举措,那么他们已实施了非常精妙的操作。 预谋好的一次性贬值:明显不是。但这是永久性转向市场机制吗?在美国国会山和其他地方,那些夸夸其谈的中国批评者们将是很难说服的。 译者/何黎 |