【英语财经】人民币贬值设立危险先例 China’s renminbi move sets a risky precedent

Beijing called it a step towards financial liberalisation but that did little to mask the true nature of a decision that, at a stroke, reduced the value of the renminbi by 1.9 per cent. This was a devaluation — a modest one, but still the biggest one-day change in the value of the currency since China began daily adjustments a decade ago. The consequences may be profound.

Until this week, the People’s Bank of China fixed the exchange rate daily, allowing the actual value to fluctuate by 2 per cent either side of its target. Now it will apply a formula that takes into account the previous day’s closing rate.

The aim, officials say, is to expose the renminbi to market forces as part of several measures designed to open the foreign exchange market, and eliminate the two-tier system whereby renminbi change hands “offshore” in Hong Kong and other foreign financial centres at one exchange rate, and in China’s tightly regulated “onshore” market at another.

The timing of the announcement

was surprising. Later this year, the International Monetary Fund board will review the composition of the special drawing right, the IMF’s accounting unit.

China is keen for the renminbi to be admitted, and had tried to maintain a stable currency and pursue financial reforms that the IMF would expect of an SDR member. The decision to let the renminbi slide, however, shows

that Beijing remains committed to intervention.

A fall in the yuan was undoubtedly what the authorities intended. They wanted it for two reasons. First, its trade-weighted value had risen significantly in recent months.

Second, it amounts to a further easing of monetary policy in the face of sluggish exports, a hiatus in economic growth, and the sharp depreciation of the currencies of many of China’s emerging-market competitors.

This intervention follows a series of policy failures. Beijing’s attempt to bolster the stock market, partly designed to nudge state enterprises away from debt and towards equity financing, has not worked. There is still serious overcapacity in the construction sector, and in heavy industries. The weight of debt in local governments and in non-financial companies is undiminished.

Beijing has been pulling other levers to try to stimulate the economy. Government-controlled institutions such as the China Development Bank have been allowed to issue Rmb1tn in new bonds to finance infrastructure projects.

Local government financing conditions have been relaxed, and the PBC had lowered interest rates and cut banks’ reserve requirement ratios, allowing them to lend more. In the first seven months of 2015, new loans were 36 per cent higher than in the same period a year ago. In short, officials had tried more or less everything they could short of devaluation.

Finally, China has succumbed. Some will say it has opened a new front in the global currency wars. At this point, that seems an exaggeration, especially in the light of more dramatic policy measures taken in both advanced and emerging countries in the past.

Beijing will probably want to manage its exchange rate lower gradually. It is likely to resist a major devaluation for fear of risking larger outflows of capital from the mainland, and running the gauntlet of the IMF, the US Treasury and many other authorities and bodies with which it is trying to align its interests.

Yet China has created a risky precedent. This is unlikely to be a one-off move and the new currency-setting regime will surely be tested by more uncertain currency markets.

At home, some currency depreciation may soothe the economy’s condition; but it is also the antithesis of economic rebalancing, which requires a stronger exchange rate to help switch spending away from exports and investment towards consumption. As with many other areas of economic reform, actions speak louder than words.

北京方面周二突然将人民币贬值1.9%，称这是向金融自由化方向迈进的一步，但这无助于掩盖该决定的真正本质。这是一个贬值举动——幅度不大，但仍是中国10年前开辟人民币每日浮动区间以来最大的单日变动。其后果可能是深远的。

直至本周之前，中国人民银行(PBoC)每日设定人民币汇率中间价，允许其在当日上升或下降2个百分点。现在它的定价公式将考虑前日收盘价。

官员们表示，此举意在让人民币暴露于市场力量，是数项举措的一部分，这些举措的目的是放开外汇市场，并消除双层体系，即在香港和其他境外金融中心的“离岸市场”形成一个汇率，而在中国内地严格控制的“在岸”市场形成另一个汇率。

中国宣布人民币贬值的时机令人意外。今年晚些时候，国际货币基金组织(IMF)理事会将评估其核算单位——特别提款权(SDR)——的货币构成。

中国渴望将人民币纳入SDR，而且此前试图保持货币稳定，并推行IMF会期望一个SDR成员完成的金融改革。然而，让人民币贬值的决定表明，北京方面依然致力于干预市场。

人民币贬值无疑是中国当局想要的结果。有两个原因，第一，人民币贸易加权汇率近几个月显著上升。

第二，在面临出口疲弱、经济增长停滞以及中国的新兴市场竞争对手货币急剧贬值的情况下，让人民币贬值相当于进一步放松货币政策。

此次干预是在一系列政策失败之后实施的。北京方面提振股市的努力（部分是为了推动国有企业减轻依赖债务，转向从股市募资）未能奏效。建筑业和重工业依然严重产能过剩。地方政府和非金融企业的债务负担未能减轻。

北京方面一直在拉动其他杠杆，试图刺激经济。政府控制的机构，如中国国家开发银行(CDB)，已获准发行1万亿元人民币的新债券，为基础设施建设项目提供资金。

地方政府的融资条件已被放松，同时中国央行下调了利率，还降低了银行存款准备金率，让银行加大放贷。2015年头7个月，新增贷款比去年同期高36%。简言之，此前官方已经尝试了除贬值以外的差不多一切手段。

最终，中国忍不住了。有人说，中国在全球货币战争中开辟了一条新战线。就目前而言，这种言论似乎有些夸大，尤其是鉴于发达国家和新兴国家之前都出台了更为戏剧性的政策措施。

北京方面很可能想要管理人民币汇率，使其逐渐走低。中国很可能会抵制大幅贬值的冲动，因为当局担心这将加剧资本外流，同时惹恼IMF、美国财政部(US Treasury)及其他许多中国正寻求共同利益的机构和实体。

然而，中国设立了一个有风险的先例。这不太可能是一次性举措，新的汇率形成机制必将面对更不确定的汇市的检验。

在国内，一定程度的货币贬值或许将舒缓经济状况；但这也将妨碍经济再平衡，后者需要比较坚挺的汇率来推动支出从出口和投资转向消费。正如经济改革的其他许多领域一样，行动比言语更响亮。

作者是瑞银(UBS)高级独立经济顾问

译者/何黎