【英语财经】股市动荡背后的中国改革难题 Echoes of 1989 are bad news not just for China’s markets but the world

China faces a crucial choice between the competing priorities of political control and economic liberalisation. This summer the first tremors have already been felt.

The gyrations of the Shanghai stock market — down almost a third from its mid-June high — and the exchanges in Shenzhen may seem disconnected from the real economy, since only a small proportion of Chinese and even fewer foreigners invest in them. But the market turbulence and the authorities’ res-ponse raise a fundamental question. Will the world’s second-biggest economy shift to a course that will sustain not only its own growth but also global prosperity as a whole? Or will it instead be stuck in an outmoded model in which meaningful reform is deferred because of the ruling elite’s determination to retain control? Much depends on the final decision of the Chinese Communist party, which has until now bolstered its rule with the fruits of rapid economic expansion. The significance of its choice goes far beyond China’s borders.

Some 20 months ago the party launched an ambitious programme of change, including in the financial sector. It sought to “harness the dynamism of the market” to propel China into a new stage of economic evolution, 35 years after Deng Xiaoping connected the People’s Republic with the world. But reform is not always an unalloyed blessing, especially in its early stages. It can reduce growth and cause tensions and upsets — as was the case in 1980s China.

Deng’s vision was that, after the disasters of the Mao era, growth fuelled by partial market liberalisation could make China a world power again and legitimise the unelected party leadership. That policy worked in many ways but also produced runaway inflation and corruption. It swelled criticism of the regime, leading Deng and his colleagues to send in the tanks to squash the Beijing protests of 1989. Defending party rule and maintaining its control was paramount then. So it remains.

The current leadership recognises the need for widespread economic reform. President Xi Jinping, the party’s general secretary, was the first signatory to the 60-point programme of change set out at the end of 2013. Many of the party’s elite accept it is necessary to modernise the economy, moving beyond the outdated combination of cheap labour, cheap capital and a strong export market — if only because labour and capital are no longer so cheap and foreign demand is not what it used to be.

But conservative opponents of reform can now point to this year’s turbulence in the markets as a terrible warning of the dangers of altering the system.

Meanwhile the basic political equation remains the one Deng set out in 1989: material growth in return for a political straitjacket. Mr Xi has doubled down on political control, deploying an anti-corruption campaign that has caught up many of his rivals and detaining human rights activists this summer. By contrast, he has been relatively absent from the debate on the stock market turmoil, despite his extraordinary accumulation of power, which involves him in all policy areas.

Such caution does not engender confidence that China’s most senior leader will fight hard for structural changes such as reforming the state-owned enterprises that are a source of political power. That could be bad news for Li Keqiang, the reformist prime minister and the potential fall guy for a crash.

It is a fair bet that Mr Xi would like, when he steps down in 2022, to be hailed as the leader under whom the economy reached a new cruising altitude of slower but more sustainable growth, involving higher value-added manufacturing, an expanded service sector, a switch from fixed asset investment to consumption as the main driver of the economy and reduced reliance on debt to drive expansion.

Against this rosy picture must be set the danger of being remembered as the man behind reforms that lost the party the control it has exercised sinc e 1949.

As it is, crude manipulative measures, such as pouring funds from state utilities into the markets and cracking down on share-selling, have done the rulers’ reputation no good. As in the 1980s, mandarins have had real problems in dealing with the animal spirits unleashed by liberalisation.

Today, some big international investors are taking a more leery view. Volatility has made the opening of China’s capital account look even further off. The portents are not good for Beijing’s efforts to join the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights currency basket, which would help make the renminbi more widely accepted. Inclusion of Chinese markets in the MSCI global index, which would be a fillip for the country’s stock exchanges, also seems problematic.

Still, such considerations will not be allowed to affect the basic calculation that reform can be pursued only so long as it does not affect the political power structure. It has to be kept under control and used, as the 2013 reform agenda put it, to strengthen the party state — not a free market.

Convulsions and official manipulation are likely to continue in Shanghai and Shenzhen. But China faces a deeper challenge in trying to reconcile the reform needed for its economy and the political control so prized by its rulers.

中国正面临一个关键抉择，在政治控制和经济自由化之间，何者为重？二者是相互冲突的。今年夏天，人们已经感受了第一阵震颤。

上海和深圳股市的震荡（前者从6月中旬的高位下跌了近三分之一）看似与实体经济没什么关联，因为只有一小部分中国人和更少的外国人在这些市场投资。但是市场动荡和当局的反应引发了一个根本问题：世界第二大经济体是将转向不仅维持自身增长、同时也维持全球整体繁荣的道路？还是因为统治精英决心保持控制而陷入一种使重大改革遭到拖延的过时模式？这很大程度上取决于中国共产党的最终决定。直至目前，中共一直利用经济快速扩张的果实来支撑自身统治。中共将做出什么抉择，受影响的将不止是中国自己。

大约20个月前，中共提出了一项雄心勃勃的改革计划，包括对金融领域的改革。在邓小平开始将中国与世界联系起来35年后，该计划寻求通过“激发市场活力”推动中国经济发展进入一个新的阶段。但改革也会有负面影响，尤其是在早期阶段。它可能导致增长放缓，引起紧张和不安定——就如在上世纪80年代的中国。

邓小平的设想是，在毛泽东时代的灾难过后，市场部分自由化所带来的经济增长有望使中国重新崛起为一个世界大国，同时为并非经过选举产生的执政党提供合法性。该政策在很多方面奏效，但也引起了失控的通货膨胀和腐败。这使对该政权的批评声变大，促使邓小平和他的同僚出动坦克镇压1989年在北京举行的抗议。那时，维护党的统治、保持党的控制压倒一切。现在也依然如此。

当前的中共领导层认识到进行广泛经济改革的需要。中共中央总书记和国家主席习近平是2013年底出台的60点改革计划的首位签署人。党内许多精英赞同有必要推行经济现代化，超越由廉价劳动力、廉价资本和兴旺的出口市场组成的过时模式——即使这可能只是因为劳动力和资本不再那么廉价，外国需求也不如过去强劲。

但反对改革的保守派现在指出，今年市场的动荡是体制变革所蕴含危险的可怕警示。

与此同时，邓小平在1989年画下的一条基本政治等式依然存在：以物质增长，作为政治约束的回报。习近平已加码实施政治控制，他开展了一轮反腐运动，把其许多政敌拉下马，并在今年夏天羁押了多名人权活动人士。相比之下，虽然习近平的权力异常集中，介入了所有政策领域，但是在股市暴跌的争论上，他却较少露面。

这种谨慎并未激发对中国最高领导人将力争推行结构性改革的信心——比如改革国有企业这个政治权力的来源。对于李克强来说，这可能不是好事，假如发生危机，这位改革派总理可能担上罪名。

一个合理的猜测是，习近平可能希望在2022年卸任后得到这样的赞誉：在他的领导下，中国经济抵达了增长虽然较慢、可持续性却更强的新的巡航高度。这一新的增长模式意味着更高附加值的制造业、更大比重的服务业、从主要依赖固定资产投资转向主要依赖消费的经济增长模式、以及在经济增长中减少对债务的依赖。

在这副美好前景中，必然存在一种危险，即他可能会被视为这样一场改革的幕后人物：这场改革令中共失去了1949年来实施的控制。

实际上，粗暴的操纵市场举措，对于统治者的声誉并无好处——比如利用国家公用事业机构向市场注入资金、以及限制股票抛售行为的举措。正如在上世纪80年代，中国官员在应对自由化所释放出的“动物精神”时，就曾遇到大麻烦。

今天，一些大型国际投资者对中国抱着更为怀疑的看法。股市的波动已令中国资本账户开放看起来愈发遥远。对于中国政府寻求让人民币加入国际货币基金组织(IMF)特别提款权(SDR)货币篮子、从而有助于人民币得到更广泛接受的努力来说，这不是好兆头。此外，有关将A股纳入MSCI全球指数的事情——这会利好中国股市——似乎也遇到了问题。

不过，中共不会允许上述顾虑影响这样一种基本考量：只有在不影响政治权力结构的情况下，才能实施改革。改革必须处于控制之下，而且正如2013年的改革议程所说，要被用于巩固中共的政府——而不是自由化的市场。

在沪深两市，震荡和官方操纵可能会继续存在。然而，经济发展所需的改革，与统治者如此看重的政治控制，二者之间如何调和，是中国面临的更深层挑战。

本文作者是研究服务公司Trusted Sources中国研究总监乔纳森?芬比，著有《中国是否将主宰21世纪？》(Will China Dominate the 21st Century?)

译者/何黎