【英语生活】英国生活水平辩论的现实意义 Blame feeble productivity growth for stagnant living standards

In the financial year that ends on April 5, real household median incomes in the UK will at last regain the levels of 2007-08. So forecasts the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Does this mean the UK’s “standard of living”[PRIMARILY A UK DEBATE? OR BEYOND?] debate should be over? No: it is very much alive, not just with respect to the past but also with respect to the future.

The striking feature of the IFS analysis is the weakness of recovery. Real median incomes are estimated to have fallen by 4 per cent between 2009-10 and 2011-12. This is not exceptional: they fell by 7.3 per cent between 1973 and 1977 and 5.7 per cent between 1980 and 1982. But real median incomes are forecast to rise only 1.8 per cent in the three years after 2011-12, against 13.2 per cent and 9.2 per cent in the three years after the troughs of the 1970s and early 1980s. The recovery in living standards has been very weak this time. This, not the severity of the post-crisis decline, largely explains the stagnation.

It is important to understand what the numbers used by the IFS mean. They show household incomes after tax and benefits. But they exclude publicly provided services, such as health and education. This is an important qualification, since the latter also affect standards of living, properly measured.

The overall picture of a dismally slow recovery is quite clear. The fact that consumption per head of non-durable goods was 3.8 per cent lower in the third quarter of 2014 than in the first quarter of 2008 underlines this reality. At the same point after the recession of the early 1980s, such consumption was 14.4 per cent higher. Voters are grumpy for understandable reasons. Such a long period of stagnant living standards is not to be found within living memory.

Also important is the distributional impact of both the crisis itself and its aftermath. After one takes account of changes in real earnings, in taxes and benefits, and the prices of food and energy, the impact appears to have been quite similar across the income distribution. This is not true for the age distribution, however. Those of working age, particularly young adults aged 22-30, were worse[WORST?] hit; while those over 60 did relatively well. This is partly because the government protected the elderly; and partly because this group is less dependent on wages and salaries, which were directly hit by the crisis.

These details are complex. But the overall picture is not. In the third quarter of last year — despite the vaunted recovery of the UK economy — real gross domestic product per head was the same as in the third quarter of 2006 and 1.8 per cent lower than in the first quarter of 2008 (the pre-crisis peak). This has given the UK something very close to a lost decade. Why such a poor recovery should be a matter of congratulation is hard to comprehend. Is it that the eurozone has fared still worse?

It is noteworthy, given this, that the median real standard of living in fact rose in the first two years after 2007-08 and then fell by just 4 per cent between 2009-10 and 2011-12, even though the peak-to-trough fall in quarterly real GDP per head was 7 per cent. The most important cushion, initially, of living standards was increased government borrowing. This was unquestionably the right policy. At a time of severe crisis, the government was correct to let its balance sheet take the strain. But once a government starts to close its deficit[COULD WE MAKE THE TENSES CONSISTENT IN THIS SENTENCE?], as the coalition chose to do after 2010, measured standards of living are likely to lag behind GDP per head[BEHIND WHAT?], though the extent to which this will turn out to

be the case depends on precisely how (and also how far) it closes the deficit. Choices here are still to be made.

The main cause of the slow recovery in standards of living, then, has been the feeble recovery in GDP per head. Given the robust employment performance, this weakness is, in turn, directly related to the feeble productivity performance. In the third quarter of 2014, output per filled job in the UK economy was still

1 per cent lower than in the first quarter of 2008. Output per hour was actually 1.8 per cent lower. An important question is how far the reaction of a flexible labour market to policy-induced weakness in demand explains this dramatically poor productivity outcome.

What happens to living standards in the next parliament will then partly depend on how fiscal tightening is imposed and also how far it goes. But it will depend above all on whether a strong and sustained rise in productivity is in the offing. If it is, both fiscal fears and concerns about stagnant living standards will melt away. If it is not, the difficulties of today will become permanent. Without productivity growth, the desire for higher real incomes will turn into a zero-sum game. Politics will become nasty. This is the biggest issue. All else is secondary.

在截至4月5日的这个财年里，英国家庭实际收入中值将终于恢复到2007-08年的水平。伦敦财政研究所(Institute for Fiscal Studies)就是这样预测的。这是否意味着英国关于“生活水平”的辩论应当结束了？答案是否定的：这场辩论仍有很强的现实意义，不仅就过去而言是如此，就未来而言也是如此。

财政研究所的分析报告令人震惊的一点是经济复苏有多么疲弱。报告估计，实际收入中值在2009-10年以及2011-12年下降了4%。这并非前所未有的：实际收入中值在1973年至1977年间下降了7.3%，在1980年至1982年间下降了5.7%。但是，实际收入中值在2011-12年后的3年里预计仅会上升1.8%，而在前述两次低谷期后的那3年，这一指标却分别上升了13.2%和9.2%。这一次的生活水平回升非常不给力——今日的停滞主要是因为这个，而不是因为本次危机后衰退太过严重。

理解财政研究所使用的数据有何含义非常重要。他们使用的是税及福利后家庭收入，但剔除了医疗和教育等公共部门提供的服务。这是个重要的限定条件，因为公共服务也影响生活水平——前提是给予恰当的衡量。

经济复苏极其缓慢的总体图景是一目了然的。2014年第三季度，人均非耐用品消费比2008年第一季度低3.8%，凸显了这一现实。上世纪80年代初那次衰退过去同样这么久之后，人均非耐用品消费比衰退期高出14.4%。选民们愤怒地要求得到合理的解释。生活水平这么长时间停滞不前，是我们有生以来从未见过的。

同样重要的是危机本身及其后果对不同人群造成的影响。在考虑了实际收入、税及福利、食品和能源价格的变化之后，各收入水平人群受到的影响似乎是大致相同的。但对不同年龄人群来说，情况却并非如此。劳动年龄人口，尤其是22岁至30岁的年轻人，所受影响更为严重；60岁以上年龄人群所受影响相对较少。一部分原因是政府对老年人的保护；另一部分原因是，这个群体较少地依赖受危机直接冲击的工资和薪金。

这些细节很繁杂，但总体图景并非如此。去年第三季度，尽管英国自诩实现经济复苏，但实际人均国内生产总值(GDP)仅与2006年第三季度持平，与2008年第一季度的数字（危机前的峰值）相比则低了1.8%。可以说英国几乎是度过了一个“失去的十年”。很难理解为何如此乏力的复苏应当被当作值得庆贺之事。是因为欧元区的表现更加糟糕吗？

考虑到这一点，下面这件事就值得注意了：实际生活水平中值事实上在2007-08年后的头两年里有所上升，然后在2009-10年和2011-12年间仅下降了4%，尽管季度实际人均GDP从波峰到波谷下降了7%。最初，对生活水平起最重要缓冲作用的是政府借贷的增长。毫无疑问，这是正确的政策。面对严重的危机，政府让其资产负债表承担起压力是正确的。但是，一旦政府开始缩减赤字（正如本届联合政府在2010年后决定做的），生活水平指标的攀升很可能会落后于人均GDP，尽管结果在多大程度上会是如此要取决于政府如何（以及在多大程度上）缩减赤字。在这个问题上，我们仍然需要作出抉择。

因此，生活水平回升缓慢的主要原因在于人均GDP回升乏力。考虑到强劲的就业表现，这种乏力就与生产率表现不佳直接相关。2014年第三季度，英国经济的就业人员人均产出仍比2008年第一季度低1%。每小时产出竟然低了1.8%。一个重要的问题是，一个灵活的劳动力市场对由政策引起的需求疲软作出的反应，可在多大程度上解释这种极为糟糕的生产力表现。

下届议会期间，生活水平会发生怎样的变化将部分取决于如何实施财政紧缩、以及以多大力度实施。但这首先将取决于强劲而持续的生产率提升是否即将到来。如果答案是肯定的，财政方面的担忧以及对生活水平停滞不前的担心都会逐渐消散。如果答案是否定的，今天遇到的困难将成为永久性的。没有生产率的提升，对更高实际收入的渴望将演变成一场零和博弈。政治斗争将变得肮脏起来。这是最大的问题。其他一切都是次要的。

译者/何黎