【英语生活】纽约爱乐的平壤余音

I once heard a Chinese official say that North Korea's Kim Jong-il was always abreast of global events. The people of North Korea may have been imprisoned for decades in misery and isolation, but their great leader kept a close eye on the wider world. Out of sight of the masses, he idled away his days surfing the web. The official, sadly, did not list his favourite sites.

This week Mr Kim opened North Korea's door an inch or two. Breaking with half-a-century of public repudiation of most things western and all things American, he invited the New York Philharmonic to perform in Pyongyang. There had not been so many Americans in the city since the US army briefly occupied it during the Korean war. This time the Stars and Stripes was raised alongside the national flag of North Korea.

Whether the concert marked a tentative first step in North Korea's return to the community of nations we shall have to wait and see. There are one or two encouraging straws in the wind. A North Korean official told the FT's Anna Fifield that the rock guitarist, Eric Clapton, had also been invited to Pyongyang. Perhaps Mr Kim watches him on the web.

Whatever the leader's intentions, this week's event offered powerful testimony to what you might call the other dimension of American power. As Ms Fifield reported from the East Pyongyang Grand Theatre, the orchestra was a stunning hit. Although the North Korean guests had doubtless been carefully chosen, the power of the music broke through regardless.

The orchestra's rendition of Arirang, a Korean folk song, provoked something rarely seen in this closed society – spontaneity. George Gershwin's An American in Paris brought similar appreciation. Ms Fifield watched North Koreans “perking up, tapping their feet, smiles across their faces”. Lorin Maazel, the orchestra's conductor, said afterwards he could “feel this warmth coming back”.

We should not get carried away. It is too early to draw parallels with the ping-pong diplomacy that heralded the Sino-American thaw in the 1970s. Mr Kim, the Chinese official observed, is an odd leader. You have to be, I suppose, to inflict such misery and suffering on your own people.

After an encouraging start, the negotiations between North Korea, its neighbours and the US about its nuclear weapons programme have stumbled. An agreement at these six-party talks envisaged that Pyongyang would give up its weapons and fissile material in exchange for supplies of fuel oil, food and, eventually, US security guarantees.

Mr Kim, however, seems reluctant to be hurried into disclosing how much plutonium and uranium he has hidden, nor the details of North Korea's weapons programme. Those in Washington who belong to the General MacArthur school of diplomacy are already crowing that talk has not worked. Those who think President Truman got it right acknowledge, nonetheless, that there is a hard road ahead.

To paraphrase a certain British prime minister, however, there is no alternative to negotiation. As far as I can tell not even the craziest US hawks want to bomb Pyongyang. And they offer nothing to support their contention that the regime can be starved into submission.

We should not be surprised that the New York Philharmonic was so well received. We may live in an age of anti-Americanism but, in spite of all the brickbats hurled at the Bush administration, lots of people, even in so-called rogue states, still like and admire America. Ask the young in Iran, who seem capable of holding on to the idea that the US is at once threatening and a model to be emulated. US military power is loathed; its culture, vibrancy and openness admired.

Why, I often wonder, does not the US capitalise on this innate goodwill and (often secret) approbation? The answer, I suppose, is: because Washington confuses engagement with approval, talking with backing down. Too many in the present administration have got caught up in the idea that to talk to one's enemies is somehow to reward “bad behaviour”. As a superpower, the US has the ability, not available to lesser nations, to cut ties with those it does not like. That does not make it a sensible thing to do.

This week's concert was a reminder of the important difference between contact and concession. I imagine it was much the same when the late Leonard Bernstein played the role of cultural emissary and took the New York Philharmonic to Moscow in 1959.

This makes all the more odd the self-defeating determination to isolate Cuba and Iran. The parallels are inexact. The US has a mission in Havana and American wrestlers have travelled to Tehran to compete in the Persian Gulf Cup. But in both cases it has set preconditions for diplomatic engagement.

In a rational world (and I have heard this from US officials) the passing of Fidel Castro's rule would be a moment to ease the half-century-long, and largely futile, embargo on Cuba. Instead the Bush administration insists that Cuba must embrace democracy before the US will open dialogue, allow significant economic ties or relax travel restrictions.

Even some of the Democrats are timid. True, Barack Obama has called, vaguely, for a new policy towards Cuba, but Hillary Clinton, his rival for the Democratic nomination, insists the regime in Havana should first take steps towards democracy. John McCain, the prospective Republican nominee, is similarly dismissive. I would be the last to say that carrying the torch for democracy is a bad thing. The question is: how?

The question Washington seems unwilling to confront is for most people rhetorical: would normalising relations most likely help or hinder those in Cuba who want a change of political course? The same logic can be applied to ties with Tehran. Who, save the hardliners there, would lose if the next US president restored diplomatic relations? In setting preconditions for talks, the US gives strength to those in Iran who argue that a nuclear capability is the only sure protection against the “great satan”. And what, anyway, is the point of having diplomats if they are not permitted to talk to your enemies.

None of the above implies that the US, or Europe for that matter, should be relaxed about North Korea's nuclear stockpile or Iran's apparent intention to acquire one. And, yes, of course they should be ready to apply sanctions. But America needs to rediscover that other dimension of its power. The best hope is that the applause in Pyongyang this week was the start of a trend.

我曾听到一位中国官员说过，金正日(Kim Jong-il)对全球大事的了解可不落伍。几十年来，朝鲜人民一直处于在悲苦与孤立的状态。但是，他们的伟大领袖却在密切关注外面的大世界。在朝鲜民众视线以外，金正日上网冲浪，打发时光。可惜的是，这位中国官员并未列举出金正日收藏的网址。

上周，金正日把朝鲜的大门开了个缝。他一反常态，暂时放弃半个世纪以来公开批判多数西方事物和所有美国事物的做法，邀请纽约爱乐乐团(New York Philharmonic)赴平壤演出。自从美军在朝鲜战争期间临时占领平壤以来，平壤还从来没有见过这么多美国人。这一次，星条旗与朝鲜国旗同时升起。

纽约爱乐乐团的音乐会是否标志着朝鲜尝试回归国际社会的第一步，我们仍将拭目以待。但是，目前已有一丝令人鼓舞的迹象。一位朝鲜官员向英国《金融时报》的安娜•费菲尔德(Anna Fifield)表示，已经邀请摇滚吉他手埃里克•克莱普顿(Eric Clapton)赴平壤演出。也许，金正日是在网上看到他的。

不管金正日意图如何，纽约爱乐乐团上周访问平壤，有力地证明了人们也许会称为“美国实力的另一个层面”。正如费菲尔德从东平壤大剧场所报道的那样，纽约爱乐乐团引起了极大的轰动。尽管朝鲜观众无疑是经过精心挑选的，但音乐的力量仍然突破了隔阂。

纽约爱乐乐团演奏了朝鲜民歌《阿里郎》(Arirang )，在这个封闭的社会里勾起了一种罕见之情：情不自禁。乐团还演奏了美国作曲家乔治•格什温(George Gershwin)的《一个美国人在巴黎》(An American in Paris)，也获得了类似的反应。费菲尔德看到，朝鲜观众“情绪踊跃，脚下打着拍子，脸上漾溢着微笑。” 乐团指挥洛林•马泽尔(Lorin Maazel)后来表示，他能够“体会到这种自发的热情。”

但是，我们不应为此感到飘飘然。要是把它跟上世纪70年代预示中美关系解冻的乒乓外交划等号，那还为时过早。据上述中国官员的观察，金正日是一位古怪的领导人。我想，只有怪人，才会给自己的人民带来如此之多的悲痛和苦难。

朝鲜与邻国以及美国围绕其核武器计划举行谈判，在取得令人鼓舞的开局之后又出现障碍。根据六方会谈协议构想，平壤将放弃核武器和核燃料，以换取燃油、食品供应，以及最终获得美国的安全保证。

然而，金正日看来并急于公布隐匿了多少钚和铀原料，也不想公布朝鲜核武计划细节。在华盛顿，麦克阿瑟(General MacArthur)外交学派的那批人已经在叫嚣，声称谈判并未奏效。但是，那些相信杜鲁门(President Truman)路线的人承认，前面还有一段艰难的路要走。

然而，借用某位英国首相曾说过的话，那就是除了谈判，别无选择。据我所知，即便是美国最狂热的鹰派人士也没想去轰炸平壤。而且，他们也无法提供支持性的论据来证明，饥饿会让朝鲜政权妥协。

纽约爱乐乐团如此受欢迎，我们不应感到诧异。我们或许生活在一个反美的时代，不过，尽管布什政府常被人扔板砖，但有许多人，甚至是所谓“无赖国家”里的人，他们仍然喜欢乃至仰慕美国。问一问伊朗的年轻人就会知道，他们心目中的观念是：美国既是一种威胁，同时也是一个可以仿效的榜样。美国的军事力量虽令人憎恶，但美国的文化、活力和开放性则令人称赞。

我常常想，为什么美国不能善加利用这种内在的善意和（常常是隐秘的）嘉许？我猜，这个问题的答案是：因为华盛顿混淆了接触与认可、谈判与让步。美国现政府中，大多数人在那种观念里无法自拔，他们认为，与敌人谈判就是某种程度上奖励“恶行”。作为一个超级大国，美国有能力与它不喜欢的国家断绝联系，这是小一点的国家所办不到的。但是，拒绝交往并不能证明这样做是理智之举。

上周的音乐会提醒大家：在接触与妥协之间，存在着重大的区别。我猜想，当已故的雷昂纳德•伯恩斯坦(Leonard Bernstein)在1959年扮演文化使者、带领纽约爱乐乐团抵达莫斯科的时候，情形也是大致相同。

因此，那种弄巧成拙的、孤立古巴和伊朗的决心，也就显得更为怪异。这样的类比并不确切。美国在哈瓦那驻有使团，美国的摔跤手也曾到德黑兰去参加波斯湾杯(Persian Gulf Cup)的比赛。但在这两种情况下，外交接触都有前提。

在一个理性世界（我是从美国官员口中听到这个词的），菲德尔•卡斯特罗(Fidel Castro)统治的结束，应该是美国放宽对古巴长达半个世纪、基本上毫无结果的禁运之际。然而，布什政府却坚持表示，古巴必须首先接受民主，然后美国才能与古巴展开对话，扩大经济交往，或放宽旅游限制。

甚至一些民主党人士也相当胆小。是的，巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)含糊其辞的呼吁对古巴实行新政，但他在民主党内部的候选人对手希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)却坚称，古巴政府应首先采取措施实行民主。共和党候选人约翰•麦凯恩(John McCain)也是类似的态度。我决不认为高举民主火炬是一件坏事。但问题是：民主火炬如何举？

美国政府似乎不愿面对的一个问题，对多数人而言很有说服力：即对于那些希望古巴改变政治进程的古巴人来说，美古关系正常化是有所助益还是有所阻碍呢？这种逻辑也适用于美国与伊朗的关系。如果美国下届总统重新与伊朗恢复外交关系，除了那些强硬派之外，谁还将是失败者？通过为双方会谈设定了先决条件，美国为那些声称核能力是防范这个“伟大撒旦”（美国）的唯一保证的伊朗人赋予了力量。而且，无论如何，如果不准外交官与敌方对话，那么，要外交官还有什么意义呢？

上述看法并非暗示，美国或欧洲应该对朝鲜的核武库或伊朗拥有核武器的明显意图有所松懈。而且，美欧当然应该做好实施制裁的准备。但美国需要重新发现国力的其它层面。我们最期待看到的是，朝鲜上周发出的掌声代表着一个趋势的开始。

译者/何黎