【英语生活】多哈回合为什么谈崩了？

The Doha trade round has stalled. Again. In so far as anyone pays much attention, they will probably struggle to stifle a yawn. That is a pity. The deadlock will not see the international trading system crashing down about us. Yet the failure is more than a missed opportunity. It underscores a dangerous inability among rich and rising nations alike to recognise their individual in their mutual interest.

Some, of course, are celebrating. Nicolas Sarkozy casts himself as the French president who will make his country's peace with the 21st century. The embrace of modernity, though, must not extend to anything that upsets a hugely costly agricultural policy designed for the 1950s.

Mr Sarkozy's choice of words gives the game away. A truly confident leader would talk about meeting the challenges of globalisation: about equipping France, and indeed Europe, to draw further prosperity from an integrated world economy.

Instead the French president's language betrays temerity. In spite of all its manifest strengths – economic, technological, cultural, political – France, it seems, cannot stand on its own feet. Europe's leaders must “protect” the continent from the ravages of globalisation.

So indignant was Mr Sarkozy with the efforts of the supposedly neoliberal Peter Mandelson to forge a deal that at one point he demanded that the European Commission's trade negotiator leave Geneva for a public dressing down at the Elysée. Sensibly, Mr Mandelson declined.

Perhaps, though, I am being unfair in singling out Mr Sarkozy. For all the efforts of the indefatigable Pascal Lamy (a free-trade Frenchman) as head of the World Trade Organisation, and Mr Mandelson's decision to negotiate at the limits of the EU mandate, the truth is that most of the big players in Geneva were happy to see the process collapse.

Among rich nations, domestic politics militate against trade liberalisation. The wealthier emerging nations meanwhile are happier to keep the privileges they have got than see them extended to those lower on the development ladder. Doha has been a story with few heroes; though, in parenthesis, Britain's otherwise beleaguered prime minister, Gordon Brown, was among the small minority.

In the event, hopes of a deal this week were scuppered by a stand-off between India and China on one side, the US on the other. The rising powers of Asia wanted a special protection mechanism for their farmers. The US refused.

For the NGOs who lined up in the television studios to denounce George W. Bush and all his works, this was a classic case of the world's most powerful nation once again oppressing the poor. A procession of spokespeople for what used to be called aid agencies (do these organisations actually do aid any more?) denounced the Americans.

In so far as fat subsidies for rich US (and European) farmers are unconscionable, they have a point. The US Congress has just passed a law pouring even more money into agriculture. The Bush administration's demand for market access in developing countries as the price for cutting its own farm support demonstrates an absence both of economic logic and good faith.

As Mr Mandelson has pointed out many times, the industrialised world cannot talk seriously about a commitment to development as long as it locks poor farmers out of global food markets. But the breakdown was more complicated. The developing world scarcely speaks as one. India and China are as concerned to protect their markets from poorer nations as to keep out US multinationals. Brazil, another of the so-called Brics, was among the small group wanting a deal. Uruguay sided with Washington in demanding China and India open markets. The losers from the impasse will not be the prosperous, but some of the poorest.

So it will be tempting for the big players to shrug their shoulders. The direct costs of failure – a successful Doha round might have added another $100bn, or one tenth of one per cent, to the world economy – look small in the scheme of things. Many existing tariffs are already below the maximums in the proposed agreement.

This sanguine analysis misses a more important point.

For the past few decades the opening of markets and growing economic interdependence have been a force for geopolitical stability as well as of rising economic welfare for the world's poorest. We learned at the beginning of the 20th century that globalisation offers no guarantee against war. But mutual economic dependence does provide a powerful incentive to settle political differences.

The present strains on the world economy, notably the imbalance between supply and demand of raw materials and a rising protectionist clamour threatens this progress. And it threatens it at a moment of huge geopolitical upheaval as the global order adjusts to the emergence of China and India as great powers.

Earlier this summer I heard a senior US official set out two possible paths for the next decade or so. Along one lay a world fractured by Malthusian competition for resources and by mercantilist trade policies; along another one, free international markets were underpinned by multilateralism.

As it happens, this official was speaking at a conference in Beijing. His hosts nodded in approval at the implicit warning. None has benefited as much as China from the opening of the world economy. Over and again, I heard senior Chinese officials emphasise the commitment to preserve a rules-based system.

The collapse of Doha, however, speaks to the failure of both sides to own up to the world as it is. On the side of the rich countries, particularly the US but no less many European nations, there is a refusal to acknowledge that globalisation no longer belongs to the west. In previous trade rounds, the rich nations set the rules and the rest could take it or leave it. No longer.

Equally, the new powers now give the impression – and you see this as much in India as China – that they want to be free riders. They are happy to profit from the rules, but unwilling to support the architecture of the system. Doha, in this respect, saw both sides in blindfolds.

The implications reach well beyond trade. The parallel with the need to strike a global bargain on climate change is the obvious one. But there are a host of other areas – think of nuclear non-proliferation, energy security, state failure, terrorism – where the habit of multilateralism offers the only sensible answers. A trade deal in Geneva would have offered a glimmer of hope that world leaders understand this.

多哈回合贸易谈判已经搁置。又一次。那些对此相当关注的人，大概忍不住要打哈欠了。真是遗憾。谈判僵局不会致使国际贸易体系分崩离析。但失败不仅在于一次错失的机遇，它突显出富裕国家和新兴国家一样，都没有能力认同共同利益中的个体利益，这种无能是危险的。

当然，有人在庆祝。尼古拉•萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)将自己塑造成将令法国与21世纪平和相处的总统。然而，对现代性的接纳，不应该扩大到推翻为上世纪50年代设计的成本巨大的农业政策。

萨科齐的措辞泄漏了天机。一位真正自信的领导人应该谈论的是应对全球化的挑战：要让法国乃至欧洲做好准备，从一体化的全球经济中获取进一步的繁荣。

相反，这位法国总统的言语表露出他的鲁莽。尽管法国在多方面都有明显的实力——经济、科技、文化、政治，但它似乎不可能孤军作战。欧洲领导人必须“保护”欧洲大陆不受全球化的蹂躏。

对于大概是新自由派的彼得•曼德尔森(Peter Mandelson)打造协议的努力，萨科齐是如此愤怒，以至于他一度要求这位欧盟委员会(European Commission)贸易谈判代表离开日内瓦，到爱丽舍宫发表公开演说。曼德尔森明智地拒绝了。

不过，我单单把萨科齐挑出来或许有些不公平。虽然不知疲倦的帕斯卡•拉米(Pascal Lamy)（一位推崇自由贸易的法国人）以世贸组织(WTO)总干事的身份做出了不懈努力，曼德尔森也决定以欧盟委任的最大权限进行谈判，但事实是，日内瓦谈判的多数参与者都乐意看到谈判失败。

在富裕国家中，国内政治妨碍了贸易自由化。同时，比较富裕的新兴国家也更乐意继续占有自己已获得的特权，而不愿让发达程度不如自己的国家也拥有这些特权。多哈回合谈判中一直没有什么英雄；不过，插句题外话，在其它方面饱受攻击的英国首相戈登•布朗(Gordon Brown)，却是为数不多的英雄之一。

结果，达成协议的希望，由于中国和印度与美国之间的僵局而破裂。亚洲的新兴强国希望本国农民获得特殊保护机制，而美国则不同意。

对于那些在电视演播厅中排着队指责乔治•W•布什(George W. Bush)及其工作的非政府组织来说，这是世界最强大的国家再次压迫穷国的一个典型案例。一连串过去被称作援助机构的发言人纷纷对美国进行声讨（这些组织是否确实还在提供援助？）。

关于美国（和欧洲）富裕农民获得丰厚补贴有昧良心这一点，他们言之有理。美国国会刚刚通过一项法案，将向农业投入更多资金。布什政府将发展中国家的市场开放作为换取美国削减农业补贴的条件，这个要求既不符合经济逻辑又缺乏诚意。

正如曼德尔森多次指出的那样，只要工业化国家将贫困的农民拦在全球粮食市场之外，它们对发展的承诺就不可能是真诚的。但谈判破裂的原因更加复杂。发展中国家很少意见一致。印度和中国对于保护本国市场不让更贫穷国家进入的关切程度，与将美国跨国公司挡在门外是一样的。所谓金砖四国中的另一个国家巴西，是少数希望达成协议的国家之一。乌拉圭站在美国一边，要求中国和印度开放市场。这场僵局中的输家不是那些经济繁荣的国家，而是一些最贫穷的国家。

所以，主要谈判国很可能会对谈判失败表示漠然。谈判失败的直接损失——多哈回合的成功，本来也许会使世界经济规模再增加1000亿美元，即千分之一——在整体过程中显得微不足道。许多现行关税已经低于拟议协议的最高限额。

然而，这种乐观的分析漏掉了更重要的一点。

在过去几十年间，市场开放和经济相互依赖性的增强，既推动了地缘政治的稳定，也提高了世界最穷困国家的经济福利。在20世纪初，我们就已经认识到，全球化无法保证不发生战争。但彼此间的经济依赖的确为解决政治分歧提供了强有力的动机。

世界经济当前的紧张局势，特别是原材料的供需失衡和日益增高的贸易保护主义呼声，对这种进步造成了威胁。而且这种威胁出现在地缘政治发生巨变之时：由于中国和印度崛起成为世界强国，全球格局正在进行调整。

今年夏季的早些时候，我听到一名美国高层官员描述了未来10年左右两条可能的发展道路。沿着第一条道路，世界将在对资源的马尔萨斯式竞争和重商主义贸易政策中分崩离析；沿着另一条道路，多边主义将巩固国际自由市场。

碰巧，这名官员是在北京的一次会议上说的这番话。东道国的官员对其中暗含的警告点头称是。没有哪个国家从世界经济开放中获得的利益有中国这么多。我一再听到中国高层官员强调对保护建立在规则之上的制度的承诺。

然而，多哈回合的失败，说明双方都未能坦然承认世界的现状。在富国方面——特别是美国，但也包括许多欧洲国家——它们拒绝承认全球化已不再仅仅属于西方。在以前几轮贸易谈判中，都是富国制定规则，其它国家要么接受规则，要么退出谈判。但现在情况不再如此。

同样，新兴强国如今给人一种印象——在这一点上，印度和中国一样——即它们希望成为搭便车的人。它们乐于从规则中受益，但不愿意支撑构成体制的结构。从这个方面来看，在多哈回合中，富裕国家和新兴国家双方都被蒙上双眼。

影响之深远远超越了贸易范畴。与之相似的就气候变化问题达成全球协定的需要就是最明显的领域。但是，在很多其它领域，例如核不扩散、能源安全、国家失败、恐怖主义，多边主义惯例都是唯一明智的答案。在日内瓦达成贸易协议，本应会带来一线希望，让全世界的领导者都能意识到这一点。

译者／管婧