【英语生活】布什将去北京看奥运

The Bushes are heading for Beijing. By the busload. Visiting the Chinese capital last week, I was told that President Hu Jintao hopes to greet three generations of America's first family at the opening ceremony for the Olympics. That must be some kind of record – and a nightmare for the secret service.

They are fond of George W. Bush in China. There are not many capitals around the world where foreign policy practitioners say hand on heart that they will miss the US president. Beijing is an important exception. Sino-American relations, I heard several times during my trip, have been consistently steadier than at any time since the door to dialogue was opened by the ping-pong diplomacy of the early 1970s.

The Chinese, of course, still have plenty of differences with the US, and vice versa. But Mr Bush is credited with delivering the thing that matters most in Beijing: an essentially stable process of engagement.

It might have been otherwise. Before the 2000 election Mr Bush decried the so-called strategic partnership with Beijing promoted by the Clinton administration. Instead, he would treat China as a “competitor”. A collision between a Chinese interceptor and a US reconnaissance aircraft over the island of Hainan in the early months of the Bush presidency looked likely to confirm him on that course. But the attacks of September 11 2001 changed all the calculations. The US had enemies enough. In east Asia, at least, Mr Bush's foreign policy would embrace the hard-headed realism of his father, George H.W. Bush.

Not everyone, of course, thinks being pals with the Chinese regime is something to be worn as a badge of honour. Powerful voices on the right of US politics want a tougher stance against China's military spending. Some realist scholars see a clash as inevitable as China challenges US primacy. On the left, Beijing's repression in Tibet and its support for pariah regimes in places such as Sudan and Burma prompt charges of appeasement.

So supporters of John McCain, the Republican candidate for the presidency, say he would be more robust in defending US security interests in the region; those of Barack Obama, the Democratic contender, that he would give sharper focus to human rights.

From a strategic perspective, though, and amid the wreckage of
Mr Bush's foreign policy elsewhere, the sustained stability has been reassuring. Sino-American ties are likely to be the most important, and potentially combustible, component of international relations for the next several decades.

At its crudest, the question is whether China's re-emergence after two centuries in the geopolitical twilight can be managed without a conflict with today's sole superpower. History is not comforting. The cautionary precedent frequently cited is that of Germany's rise at the end of the 19th century.

On a slightly subtler level, the condition of the relationship between Beijing and Washington will be pivotal to the nature of the global order. Competition would herald a revival of great power rivalries, a return to a world of balancing, hedging and competing alliances. Co-operation could pave the way for an overhaul of the existing multilateral system to accommodate China and other rising powers.

The geopolitical case for engagement is reinforced by the economics. The US is China's market place; China is America's largest creditor. There is no clearer expression of the interdependence that comes with globalisation.

The big doubts are about China's intentions: does it want to be a responsible stakeholder in the system, or is it playing for time until it can confront the US on its own terms? We do not know the answer, and the US, quite sensibly, is combining a policy of engagement with one of hedging.

My sense is that Chinese policymakers have not made up their minds. The western instinct is to assume that Beijing has worked out precisely how the world will look in 10, 15 even 50 years hence. If that is the case, it is a plan well hidden.

During my visit I sat in on a seminar co-sponsored by the US National Intelligence Council, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. The purpose was to peer into the future ahead of the publication early next year of the NIC's Global Trends in 2025. CICIR, diplomats told me, is the think-tank most closely associated with the Chinese intelligence community. So the simple fact of the seminar, with a high-ranking presence from both sides, spoke to the easy nature of the bilateral relationship.

The hosts certainly seemed fully conscious of China's new-found power – and unapologetic about its expanding reach in the quest to feed a voracious appetite for resources.

But China's international presence takes a distant second place to domestic concerns. The mantra of the policymaking elite is the need to safeguard economic growth, social stability and national unity. The neuroses about Taiwan and Tibet merge into a broader anxiety about the cohesion of this vast, multi-ethnic state. Foreign policy matters mostly to the extent that it has an impact – positive or negative – on a fragile domestic order.

With the US, stability now rests on a panoply of institutional dialogues – economic and political – in which differences can be addressed. The system seems to work. Sharp disagreements over China's exchange rate policy have been managed, although not resolved, within the economic dialogue. The six-party talks with North Korea about Pyongyang's nuclear weapons yesterday claimed another, albeit modest, advance towards disarmament. Chinese foreign policy experts see the forum as a possible model for a more permanent east Asian security system.

Nothing is perfect. China is secretive about its military and dismissive of any intrusion into its domestic affairs. It professes support for the international system, but shows great reluctance to accept any constraint on national sovereignty. Taiwan is a permanent source of tension; relations with Japan, much better now than two years ago, always hold the potential for conflict.

But as Mr Bush enjoys the Olympics, he can reflect that here at least is a foreign policy that may outlive his presidency. The case for applying more pressure on China to uphold human rights at home and international law abroad is unanswerable. The best context, though, is engagement.

布什家族的一些人将动身前往北京。人数还不少。我最近访问中国首都时，有人告诉我：胡锦涛主席希望在奥运会开幕式上，欢迎美国第一家庭的三代成员。这肯定创造了某种纪录——对美国特勤处而言，当然将是一场噩梦。中国人喜欢乔治•W•布什(George W. Bush)。世界上没有多少首都的外交政策执行者会真诚地表示自己将想念这位美国总统。北京是一个重要的例外。我在访问过程中多次听说，自上世纪70年代初乒乓外交开启两国对话之门以来，目前的中美关系比以往任何时候都更为稳固。

当然，中国和美国之间仍存在许多分歧，反之亦然。但布什的功劳是提供了北京最重视的一样东西：基本稳定的接触过程。

情况本可能完全不同。2000年大选前，布什还在谴责克林顿(Clinton)政府推行的所谓中美战略合作伙伴关系。相反，他将把中国视为“竞争者”。布什上任之初几个月后，一架中国战斗机和一架美国侦察机在海南岛上空相撞的事件似乎证实，他正在执行这一方针。但2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击改变了所有的盘算。美国的敌人够多了。至少在东亚地区，布什的外交政策会承继他父亲、前总统乔治•H•W•布什(George H. W. Bush)冷静的现实主义态度。

当然，并非所有人都认为与中国政府称兄道弟是件值得炫耀的事情。美国政界右派的强大声音希望对中国的军费开支采取更强硬的立场。某些现实主义学者认为，随着中国挑战美国的优势地位，冲突在所难免。而北京在西藏的镇压行动、对苏丹和缅甸等国际社会唾弃政权的支持，成为左派指责政府姑息的理由。

因此，共和党总统候选人约翰•麦凯恩(John McCain)的支持者表示，麦凯恩将更有力地捍卫美国在东亚地区的安全利益；而民主党总统候选人巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)的支持者则称，奥巴马会更关注人权问题。

不过，从战略角度看，并考虑到布什外交政策在其它地区的糟糕表现，持续稳定的中美关系一直让人比较放心。未来数十年内，中美关系可能成为国际关系中最重要的组成部分，但也存在爆发冲突的可能。

最直白地说，问题在于：在经历了地缘政治方面两个世纪的疲弱之后，中国的重新崛起能否保持可控，而不致与当今唯一的超级大国发生冲突？对此，历史不能让人感到安心。经常被提及的前车之鉴，就是19世纪末德国的崛起。

用比较委婉一点的语言表述，中美关系的状况，对全球秩序的性质至关重要。竞争可能重启强国对抗的时代，世界重返不同联盟间抗衡、防范和竞争的格局。合作则可能为彻底改革现有的多边体系铺平道路，以接纳中国和其它新兴强国。

双方接触的地缘政治理由，得到了经济层面理由的支持。美国是中国的市场所在；而中国是美国最大的债权国。再没有什么表达方式，能更清楚地描述全球化带来的相互依赖关系了。

人们对于中国的意图存在很大的疑问：中国是希望成为这一体系中负责任的利益相关者，还是只是在争取时间，直到它能够以自己的条件对美国摊牌？对此，我们不得而知，而美国则相当明智地将接触与防范政策结合起来。

我的感觉是，中国的决策者还没有打定主意。按西方的直觉，北京已设想出今后10年、15年、甚至50年后世界的准确格局。如果情况果真如此，这个计划隐藏得相当不错。

在访问中国期间，我出席了一场专家研讨会，主办人包括美国国家情报委员会(NIC)、日内瓦国际问题高等研究生院(Graduate Institute of International Studies)、以及中国现代国际关系研究院(CICIR)。研讨会的主题是展望未来，为NIC明年初即将发布的《全球趋势2025》(Global Trends in 2025)做铺垫。有外交官员告诉我，CICIR是同中国情报界关系最为密切的智囊机构。因此，此次有中美双方高级官员出席的研讨会，本身就反映了双边关系的从容性质。

当然，东道主似乎完全清楚中国的新实力——也无意辩护中国为满足对资源渴求而在海外不断拓展。

然而，中国对海外势力范围的重视，远低于其国内关切。决策精英们的原则是要维护经济增长、社会稳定和国家统一。他们对于这个幅员辽阔的多民族国家的凝聚力存在着更广泛的担忧，台湾和西藏问题的心结也包含其中。外交政策的重要程度，主要仅限于它对脆弱的国内秩序的影响——无论积极还是消极。

在美国方面，稳定性目前取决于一整套经济和政治制度性对话——通过对话来处理分歧。这一体系似乎起到了作用。在经济对话中，围绕中国汇率政策的尖锐分歧尽管尚未解决，但已得到了控制。同朝鲜就核武器问题进行的六方会谈最近宣布，朝鲜弃核进程又有新的进展，虽然进展有限。中国的外交政策专家认为，六方会谈可能成为一种更为永久的东亚安全体系的范例。

任何事都不完美。中国对其军力总是遮遮掩掩，并拒绝对其内政的任何干预。中国声称支持国际体系，但非常不情愿接受对国家主权的任何约束。台湾一直是紧张局势的源头；中日关系同两年前相比已有明显改善，但始终有可能爆发冲突。

但当布什观看奥运的时候，他可能会想到，至少有一项外交政策能够延续到他的总统任期之后。向中国施加更大压力，使其在国内秉持人权标准、在国际上遵守国际法，其理由是无可辩驳的。不过，这样做的最佳背景，就是保持接触。

译者/何黎