【英语生活】如何解决全球失衡？

In international finance, disasters brew but the sources of woe are arcane – structural imbalances in global savings, a binge of highly leveraged finance that leads to global credit mispricing. The experts know when a situation is unsustainable and will even say so, but then years go by without action. The severity of the present crisis is an opportunity to remedy deep-seated problems. A fundamental (not proximate) cause of our economic plight is the imbalance in current accounts – in particular between the US and China – during the past decade. We can choose our narrative tone – for example, that US spending saved the world from a decline in growth as the east Asians and some others built up their reserves through export-led expansion.

Alternatively, the reckless US financial system and irresponsible American consumers accommodated the Chinese mercantilism as the dollar became overvalued and the Chinese built up reserves and maintained an undervalued exchange rate. Of course, both are true. But there is a bigger truth.

The global system as governed by the International Monetary Fund is asymmetric in its approach to deficit versus surplus countries. The IMF has an important operational function – to provide financing to deficit countries that experience a crisis in their balance of payments because of unavailability of external finance in a convertible currency. While the Fund also has provisions prohibiting the manipulation of exchange rates to achieve competitive advantage (what we call a competitive devaluation), there is no operating approach to redress this distortion to fair trade.

Up to now, we managed. But the present crisis is likely to produce an explosion of would-be mercantilists. What could be the international remedy to competitive exchange rate management and reserves build-up?

We should consider a solution that would rely on both the IMF and the World Trade Organisation for judgment and implementation. If a country runs a surplus on its current account for some period (more than a year) and is simultaneously intervening to purchase foreign exchange at a particular percentage of gross national product, then that country should come up for automatic consideration at the IMF. In order to strengthen political will for action, the presumption should be that a country that sustains the scope and pattern of trade surplus and reserves described in the guidelines is achieving a distortion of trade that should be remedied.

Unless an exception is voted by a majority in the Fund, a recommendation to the WTO would follow in favour of remedial action (such as a surcharge on the exports of the named country). This would be consistent with the existing agreements between the two institutions, which gives precedence to the IMF in determinations on foreign exchange matters and provides for the Fund to inform the WTO regarding measures that are inconsistent with Fund articles. All IMF members would be governed by the policy, which would not be subject to a blocking veto in its implementation.

The process itself would help to remedy problems well before the sanctions were activated. At the end of even one year of reserve build-up, the behaviour would be noted in IMF reports and board deliberations. The application of sanctions would not be a surprise disruption but the culmination of an international legal process that allowed ample time for a corrective policy response. The prohibition of such surpluses might also help discipline a deficit country that is too large to rely on the IMF for deficit financing.

Tackling this problem would provide an excellent context to address the long-standing issue of reapportioning quota shares (the system that determines votes at the IMF). These negotiations have been going on for years with little redress. If the big industrial countries had something at stake in curbing the excesses of currency imbalance, the prospects might be more positive.

Indeed, if the US would agree to surrender its hold on the presidency of the World Bank, then there would be a package of reform worthy of the effort. The Europeans give up shares, the Asians and others give up mercantilism, and the US gives up a vestige of unipolarism. The IMF and the World Bank gain legitimacy and the Fund resolves a dilemma that haunts its fundamental mission. A grand slam for international financial governance.

The writer is dean of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

国际金融领域酝酿着灾难，但灾难的源头却令人费解——全球储蓄的结构性失衡，这场高杠杆金融狂欢导致了全球的信贷错误定价。专家们知道某种情况是不可持续的，甚至也会这样说，但多年过去了，却没有采取任何行动。

当前危机的严重性提供了解决根深蒂固问题的机遇。我们经济困境的一个根本（而非近似）原因是过去10年经常账户的失衡——尤其是美国和中国之间。我们可以选择自己的说法，例如，在东亚和一些其他国家利用出口导向型经济扩张积累外汇储备之际，美国的消费挽救了全球经济增长，使其免于下降。

此外，在美元估值过高，中国积累外汇储备并保持低估的汇率之际，草率的美国金融体系和不负责任的美国消费者容忍了中国的重商主义。当然，这两者都是事实，但还有一个更重要的事实。



国际货币基金组织(IMF)管理的全球体系对待赤字国与盈余国的方法是不对称的。IMF有一个重要的操作职能——向由于无法获得某种可兑换货币的外部融资而发生国际收支危机的赤字国提供融资。尽管IMF也规定禁止通过操纵汇率来获得竞争性优势（我们称为竞争性贬值），但没有可行性方法来纠正这种对公平贸易的扭曲。





迄今为止，我们都对付过去了。但当前的危机可能导致准重商主义者的爆炸式增长。对竞争性汇率管理和外汇储备积累的国际性纠正方法可能是什么？



我们应该考虑一种依赖于IMF和世界贸易组织(WTO)进行判断和执行的解决方案。如果一个国家的经常账户在一段时间（一年以上）内保持盈余，同时以国内生产总值(GDP)的特定比例买入外汇进行干预，那么这个国家就应该自动纳入IMF的考虑范围。为了增强采取行动的政治意愿，应该假定保持方案中所描述贸易顺差和外汇储备范围及模式的国家，正在造成应予以纠正的贸易扭曲。





除了大多数IMF成员国投票同意的例外情形，应在随后向世贸组织提出有利于补救行动的建议（比如对所提及的国家的出口增加收费）。这与两家机构间的现有协议一致，即IMF有决定外汇事宜的优先权，并需要向WTO通报与IMF条款不相符的措施。所有IMF成员国都要遵守这项政策，其执行不会受到否决权的阻碍。





该过程本身将有助于在实施制裁之前就对问题进行纠正。在外汇储备积累刚满一年后，这种行为就会在IMF的报告中指出，并在理事会上审议。申请制裁不会是突然之举，而是国际司法程序的最后结果，从而给纠正性政策回应留出充分时间。禁止此类盈余可能也有助于让规模太大而无法依靠IMF进行赤字融资的国家遵守准则。



解决这一问题将为处理长期存在的配额再分配事宜（决定IMF投票权的制度）提供良好的前提。这些谈判已进行了多年，但几乎没有进展。如果抑制过度的外汇失衡会让大型工业国的某些利益受到威胁，前景可能会更为积极。





实际上，如果美国同意放弃对世界银行(World Bank)行长职位的把持，那么就会有值得努力的一揽子改革措施。欧洲人放弃份额，亚洲和其他人放弃重商主义，美国放弃单极主义残余。IMF和世界银行取得正统地位，IMF解决影响其基本使命的两难困境。国际金融治理赢得大满贯。



本文作者为美国约翰•霍普金斯大学(Johns Hopkins University)高级国际问题研究院(SAIS)院长

译者/君悦