【英语生活】解构普京的沙皇梦

We need to get this straight. Vladimir Putin's Russia has invaded a neighbour, annexed territory and put in place a partial military occupation. It seeks to overthrow the president of Georgia and to overturn the global geopolitical order. It has repudiated its signature on a ceasefire negotiated by France's Nicolas Sarkozy and disowned its frequent affirmations of Georgia's territorial integrity. Most importantly: all of this is our fault.

The “our” in this context, of course, refers to the US and the more headstrong of its European allies such as Britain. If only Washington had been nicer to the Russians after the fall of the Berlin Wall. If only the west had not humiliated Moscow after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Surely we can see now what a provocation it was to allow the former vassal states of the Soviet empire to exercise their democratic choice to join the community of nations? And what of permitting them to shelter under Nato's security umbrella and to seek prosperity for their peoples in the European Union? Nothing, surely, could have been more calculated to squander the post-cold-war peace.

Such is the cracked record played over and over again by the Russian prime minister and recited now by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's notional president. Sadly, it also finds echoes among those in Europe who prefer appeasing Mr Putin to upholding the freedoms of their neighbours.

This Russian claim to victimhood is as vacuous as it is dishonest.

Mr Putin has said the collapse of the Soviet Union was the great geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Now he wants to subjugate his country's neighbours in the cause of a greater Russia. The aim is to turn back the clock: to extend his country's borders to create the greater Russia sought by the leaders of the abortive coup against Boris Yeltsin in 1991. The west must not collude with Mr Putin's falsified version of history.

There is no doubt that Russians feel they suffered great hurt and indignity during the 1990s. They did. But it is a misreading of events to blame the US, the west, the EU or Nato.

The blindingly obvious point is that humiliation was inevitable and unavoidable. Until the collapse of communism the world belonged to Washington and Moscow. Suddenly almost everything was lost to Russia. The political and economic system that had once aspired to global domination was reduced to dust.

Open a history book. Humiliation is what happens when nations lose their empires. Ask the British. Half a century after Suez, part of the British psyche still laments this retreat from the world. You could say the same about the French.

The implosion of the Soviet Union could not stir anything but a sense of shame among Russians. But ah, you hear Mr Putin's apologists say, the west fed Russian paranoia. For half a century central and eastern Europe had been signed over to Moscow. Now the west's institutions rolled like tanks up to Russia's borders.

The problem is that this account does not fit the facts. George H.W. Bush was anything but triumphalist in his response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the then US president faced sharp criticism from many Americans for refusing to dance on communism's grave.

It is true Bill Clinton's presidency began with some rhetorical flourishes about spreading democracy. And the US administration did press hard for the expansion of Nato, in part because the EU dragged its feet about opening its doors. Some doubted the wisdom of the Nato policy. George Kennan, the author of the cold war doctrine of containment, was among those arguing against Mr Clinton. But then, the revered Mr Kennan was not infallible. He had, after all, opposed the creation of the alliance.

Doubtless there were moments when the US, and Europe for that matter, could have been more tactful. The disciples of free markets dispatched to Moscow by the International Monetary Fund probably bear some blame for the catastrophic melt-down of Russia's economy. But no, the historical record does not show a deliberate or concerted effort by the US or anyone else to mock or multiply Russia's misfortunes.

When Mr Putin talks about humiliation, he means something else. Washington's crime was to assume that the Yalta agreement had fallen along with the Berlin Wall, and that the peoples and nations of the erstwhile Soviet empire should thus be free to make their own choices.

In the Kremlin's mindset, showing due respect for Russia would have meant allowing it to continue to hold sway over its near-abroad. The most that the citizens of Ukraine and the Baltic states should have expected was the ersatz independence now bestowed on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and the rest should have been locked out of western institutions.

Mr Putin has reopened the issue that seemed to have been settled in 1991 when Yeltsin saw off the tanks at the doors of the Russian White House. Yeltsin decided that the borders of the Russian Federation should follow those of the Soviet republics. That left the Crimea as part of Ukraine, Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Mr Putin's doctrine is calculated to reclaim Moscow's sovereignty over ethnic Russians in neighbouring states. This is a greater Russia by another means.

The doctrine overturns one of the central geopolitical assumptions of the past two decades: that, for all its hurt pride, Russia saw its role as a powerful player within a post-cold-war geopolitical order. Mr Medvedev, speaking with his master's voice, now repudiates the laws and institutions of that order.

For all the occasional bluster about a new authoritarian axis between Moscow and Beijing, the contrast that has most struck me in recent weeks has been between China and Russia. Beijing saw the Olympics as a celebration of China's return as a great power. China has by no means signed up to the norms and assumptions of liberal democracy; it has still to decide whether it wants to be a free rider or a stakeholder in the international system. But it has concluded that its future lies with integration into a stable world order.

Moscow's invasion of Georgia and its public scorn at the likely international response speaks to an entirely different mindset: a retreat from integration and a preference for force over rules. Russia's neighbours are told they can be vassals or enemies. Mr Medvedev boasts Russia is ready for another cold war.

I struggle to see what Russia will gain. It is friendless. Governments and foreign investors alike now know that Moscow's word is worthless. The price of aggression will be pariah status. Mr Putin, of course, will blame the west.

我们必须把情况弄清楚。弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)领导下的俄罗斯入侵邻国、吞并领土，并实行局部军事占领。它企图推翻格鲁吉亚总统，颠覆全球地缘政治秩序。它还拒绝遵守签署过的停火协议（该协议由法国总统尼古拉•萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)斡旋达成）；过去多次承认过格鲁吉亚领土完整，如今也予以否认。最重要的是：这一切都是我们的错。当然，在这里，“我们”指的是美国和其比较固执的欧洲盟国，例如英国。要是在柏林墙(Berlin Wall)倒下之后，美国政府能对俄罗斯好一些；要是在前苏联解体之后，西方没有令莫斯科蒙羞，便不会出现这种局面。

想必我们现在能够认识到，允许前苏联帝国的附属国行使民主选择权，加入独立国家的行列，是多么严重的挑衅行为了吧？允许它们处于北约(Nato)的安全庇护下，加入欧盟为人民寻求繁荣之道，同样如此。诚然，若要抛弃冷战后的和平，没有比这更处心积虑的做法了。

这张声音刺耳的唱片，被俄罗斯总理一再播放，如今又被俄罗斯名义上的总统德米特里•梅德韦杰夫(Dmitry Medvedev)重复。不幸的是，它还在一些欧洲人中间获得了共鸣，这些人宁愿姑息普京，而不愿支持邻国的自由。

俄罗斯自称受害者，这种说法既空洞又虚伪。

普京曾说过，苏联解体是20世纪地缘政治的大灾难。如今，他企图让俄罗斯的邻邦都屈从于一个大俄罗斯(greater Russia)的构想。其目标是让时光倒流：让俄罗斯的边境线向外延伸，创建1991年政变领导者所谋求的大俄罗斯——那场反对鲍里斯•叶利钦(Boris Yeltsin)的政变最终流产。西方世界决不能参与普京篡改历史的阴谋。

无疑，俄罗斯人感觉自己在20世纪90年代蒙受了重大的伤害和侮辱。事实的确如此。但如果因此而怪罪美国、西方国家、欧盟或是北约，则是对事件的误读。

极其明显的一点是，屈辱不可避免，也无法回避。直到共产主义崩溃之前，世界属于华盛顿和莫斯科。转瞬间俄罗斯几乎失去了一切。一度渴望主宰全球的政治经济体制顿时灰飞烟灭。

去看看历史吧。当一个民族丧失了他们的帝国，屈辱感便会产生。不妨问问英国人。在苏伊士危机过去半个世纪之后，英国人部分程度上仍有因放弃争夺世界霸权而懊恼的心理。法国也是同样的情况。

苏联的内部崩溃只会激发俄罗斯人的羞耻感。但是，啊哈，你听到为普京辩护的人说，是西方国家加重了俄罗斯的疑心。在长达半个世纪的时间里，中欧和东欧都归苏联掌控。如今西方制度却像坦克般一直推进到俄罗斯边境。

问题是，这种说法与事实不符。谈到柏林墙的倒塌，乔治•H•W•布什(George H.W. Bush)没有任何欢庆胜利的反应。事实上，这位时任美国总统受到许多美国人的尖锐批评，原因是他拒绝借共产主义倒台之机庆祝胜利。

不错，比尔•克林顿(Bill Clinton)总统任期之初，开始了某种传播民主的热潮。而美国当局的确也竭力推进北约扩张，部分原因是欧盟在吸纳新成员国方面拖了后腿。有些人怀疑北约的政策是否明智。发明了“遏制”这一冷战策略的作家乔治•凯南(George Kennan)就是克林顿的反对者之一。不过，受人尊敬的凯南并非一贯正确。毕竟，他反对建立北约。

无疑，在某些时候，美国本可以处理得更有技巧，在这方面欧洲也是如此。国际货币基金组织(IMF)派往莫斯科的自由市场信徒们，大概需要为俄罗斯经济的灾难性危机承担一部分罪责。但是，没有任何历史纪录显示出美国，或是其他国家，曾故意或合谋嘲弄或加重俄罗斯的不幸。

当普京谈到羞辱时，他指的是其他事情。美国政府的错误在于想当然地认为雅尔塔协定(Yalta agreement)也伴随着柏林墙的倒塌而失效，因此昔日臣服于苏联帝国的民族和国家应该可以自由选择。

但在克里姆林宫的思维模式中，向俄罗斯表示出应有的尊敬，就意味着允许俄罗斯继续对其周边地区享有控制权。乌克兰和波罗的海诸国公民所能期望的，最多也就是南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹所获得的虚假独立。波兰人、匈牙利人、捷克人和其余民族应该被西方的制度拒之门外。

普京重新开启了一个似乎在1991年就得到解决的议题，当时叶利钦在俄罗斯白宫门前劝退了坦克。叶利钦决定，俄罗斯联邦的边境线应该遵循苏联加盟共和国的边境。这使得克里米亚成为乌克兰的一部分，而奥塞梯和阿布哈兹则归属了格鲁吉亚。普京奉行的原则旨在恢复莫斯科对于邻国国内俄罗斯族民众的主权。这是另一种意义上的大俄罗斯。

这种原则颠覆了过去20年来地缘政治中的一种核心假设：虽然自尊心受到伤害，俄罗斯仍然自视为后冷战地缘政治格局的一个强有力参与者。如今，梅德韦杰夫用其导师的口吻，摈弃了这种秩序下的规则与制度。

虽然不时有人叫嚣，应建立新的莫斯科-北京威权轴心，但近几周内令我印象最深刻的便是中国和俄罗斯之间的差异。中国政府将奥运会视为中国重返世界强国的庆典。中国并没有接受自由民主的准则与前提；中国还需要决定，是想成为国际体系中的搭便车者，还是利益相关者。但中国已得出结论认为：其未来在于融入一个稳定的世界秩序。

俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚，以及公开蔑视国际社会可能的反应，则表现出截然不同的思维模式：放弃融合，认为武力高于规则。俄罗斯的邻国得知，它们若不臣服于俄罗斯，便是俄罗斯的敌人。梅德韦杰夫自豪地宣布，俄罗斯已经为另一场冷战做好了准备。

我很难看出俄罗斯从中能得到什么。它已经众叛亲离。各国政府和海外投资者如今都已意识到俄罗斯政府的承诺是不值钱的。这种挑衅行为的代价将是为国际社会所唾弃。当然，普京又会因此指责西方国家。

译者/管婧