【英语生活】为何没有多少金融家获刑？

How many financiers do you think ended up in jail after America's Savings and Loan scandals? The answer can be found in a fascinating old report from the United States Department of Justice*.

According to some of its records, between 1990 and 1995 no fewer than 1,852 S&L officials were prosecuted, and 1,072 placed behind bars. Another 2,558 bankers were also jailed, often for offences which were S&L-linked too.

Those are thought-provoking numbers. These days the western world is reeling from another massive financial crisis, that eclipses the S&L debacle in terms of wealth destruction.

Yet, thus far, very few prison terms have been handed out. For sure, there have been a few high-profile dramas. Bernard Madoff is one, obvious, example.

But one reason why the Madoff drama has grabbed so much attention – and already sparked a slew of books this month – is precisely because there are precious few other financiers behind bars, or facing momentous fines. Compared with the S&L days, in other words, the level of retribution so far seems almost non-existent.

Why? In part, it may be a matter of timing. The wheels of American justice often grind slowly, and many cases are certainly now passing through the system. Navigant, a financial consultancy, for example, says that private investors have actually filed more suits against financial companies in the past two years than they did in the S&L days. And some are now seeing the light of day. Yesterday, for example, an American judge rejected attempts to block a lawsuit lodged by Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank against Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Morgan Stanley – meaning that case, which involves structured notes, will soon get under way. Separately, federal investigators have opened inquiries into at least 25 companies, including Lehman, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Washington Mutual.

Yet, in private many lawyers – and some government officials too – seem pretty cynical about just how many jail sentences or fines these initiatives will produce. In part that is because of the sheer complexity of the financial deals in the recent crisis – and the fact that these deals were often deliberately and cleverly constructed to “arbitrage” the law (ie skirt, but not break it).

Another big issue is the sheer number of powerful parties that typically participated in complex finance deals. Few private law firms have the resources or desire to go head-to-head with numerous Wall Street banks at one time. And government agencies are often short of resources too, partly because some, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have been forced to divert staff in recent years to terrorist financing issues.

However, another key problem is a lack of knowledge in western courts about complex finance. That makes it time-consuming to hear cases. It also makes verdicts unpredictable.

Some senior figures in the financial world are looking for solutions to this. Jeffrey Golden, a prominent lawyer who helped to create the modern derivatives world, for example, thinks there is an urgent need for a specialist, cross-border financial court (in much the same way, say, that there are specialist family or trade courts). This, he argues, could be staffed by former derivatives experts and lawyers, since they not only understand finance but also have a vested interest in ensuring that their beloved derivatives business is built on credible foundations.

But there seems limited chance that Mr Golden's sensible suggestion will fly soon. Right now, in other words, the western financial system is stuck with a legal structure that seems ill-equipped to cope.

And that is worrying on several levels. On a personal level, I have little taste for seeing hordes of bankers heading for jail, or facing massive fines. Nor do I have any illusion that public or private prosecutions will resolve bigger structural flaws (in fact, a witch-hunt might be a media distraction).

But, on the other hand, if there is no retribution against financiers, it will be very difficult to force a real change in behaviour. After all, no amount of twiddling with Basel rules or pious statements about bonuses will ever scare a financier as much as the thought of jail.

Moreover, without some retribution it will also be hard to persuade voters that finance is really being reformed, or has any credibility or moral authority. That is bad for politicians and regulators. However, it is also bad for bankers too. So, in the months ahead, keep a close eye on what happens to the legal cases in the system – and, above all, watch to see just how many do (or do not) quietly die, compared with those S&L days.

*DoJ, Financial Institution Fraud special report, June 30 1995; cited in The Great Texas Savings and Loan Financial Debacle; by Tom S. King

你认为在美国储贷协会(America's Savings and Loan)丑闻之后，有多少金融家最终锒铛入狱？答案可以在美国司法部(Department of Justice)先前一份有趣的报告*中找到。

根据此份报告上的一些记载，1990年至1995年间，至少1852名储贷协会官员被起诉，其中1072名被判监禁。另外还有2558名银行家被判刑，罪名往往也与储贷丑闻有关。

这些数字耐人寻味。这些日子，西方世界正遭遇另一场严重的金融危机。就造成的财富损失而言，此次金融危机令储贷危机黯然失色。

然而，迄今为止，没多少人为此获刑。当然，有一些令人瞩目的事件，伯纳德•马多夫(Bernard Madoff)就是一个明显的例子。

但马多夫之所以如此引人注目——本月已有多部相关著述面世——的原因之一，正因为之前很少有其他金融家被判刑，或被课以高额罚款。换言之，与储贷危机时期相比，迄今的惩罚力度似乎可以忽略不计。

原因何在？一定程度上，这可能是个时机问题。美国司法体系向来行动迟缓，许多案件现在的确在经过司法程序。例如，金融咨询公司Navigant表示，与储贷危机时期相比，实际上私人投资者对金融公司提起了更多的起诉。其中一些案件目前已公诸于众。例如，日前一位美国法官抵制了试图阻止阿布扎比商业银行(Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank)对穆迪(Moody's)、标准普尔(Standard & Poor's)和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)提起诉讼的行为——意味着将会很快开始审理这宗涉及结构性票据的案件。另外，联邦调查机构对至少25家公司展开了调查，其中包括雷曼(Lehman)、美国国际集团(AIG)、房利美(Fannie Mae)、房地美(Freddie Mac)和华盛顿互助银行(Washington Mutual)。

不过，对于这些调查将导致多少人被判刑或罚款，私下里有许多律师——及一些政府官员——似乎颇不以为然。一定程度上，这是因为最近危机中的金融交易极为复杂——事实上这些交易往往是精心设计的，以便钻法律的空子（即游走在法律边缘，但并不触犯法律）。

另一个重要问题在于，通常参与复杂金融交易的许多当事人有权有势。很少有私人律所有与众多华尔街银行同时正面交锋的资源或意愿。政府机构往往也资源匮乏，一定程度上，这是因为联邦调查局(Federal Bureau of Investigation)等机构近年来被迫将人手转移到应对恐怖主义融资事宜。

然而，另一个关键问题是西方法庭缺乏复杂金融的相关知识。这导致审案耗费大量时间，还使得判决无法预测。

一些金融领域中的资深人士正寻求解决之道。例如，知名律师杰弗里•戈尔登(Jeffrey Golden)认为，迫切需要成立一个跨境金融专家法庭（比如说，与专家法庭或贸易法庭非常相似）。该法庭成员可以由前衍生品专家和律师组成，因为他们不仅懂金融，而且，确保他们钟爱的衍生品业务建立在可信赖的基础之上，符合他们的既得利益。戈尔登曾帮助创建了现代的衍生品业务。

但戈尔登的明智建议被迅速付诸实施的可能性似乎不大。换句话说，西方金融体系目前所处的法律架构，似乎难以解决这些问题。

在几个层面上，这都令人感到忧虑。从个人层面而言，我不希望看到众多银行家入狱或遭到巨额罚款。同时对于公共或私人诉讼将解决更大的结构性问题，我也不抱任何幻想——实际上，政治迫害可能只是媒体的一种消遣。

但另一方面，如果对金融家没有任何惩戒，就很难迫使他们真正改变自己的行为。毕竟，再多的巴塞尔协议或虔诚的奖金声明，都不会比想到牢狱之灾更让金融家感到恐惧。

此外，如果不进行某些惩罚，将难以让选民相信，政府真在对金融业进行改革，或相信政府的可信性或道义上的权威性。这对政治家和监管机构而言十分不利。不过，这对银行家也十分不利。因此，今后几个月，要密切关注金融体系中诉讼案件的进展情况——而且，最重要的是，密切关注与储贷危机时期相比，有多少案件真的（或真的没有）悄悄偃旗息鼓。

*1995年6月30日，美国司法部《金融机构欺诈特别报告》，被《美国德克萨斯储贷金融危机》(Great Texas Savings and Loan Financial Debacle)引用，汤姆•金(Tom S. King)编写。

译者/君悦