【英语中国】中国金融改革的“主题公园模式”

There is a theme park in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen in which many of the world's most famous landmarks are recreated on a smaller scale. Visitors can stroll from the Eiffel Tower to the Pyramids, the Coliseum to the Taj Mahal, Stonehenge to Mount Fuji, Angkor Wat to the Kremlin and scores of other attractions all without leaving an area of 48 hectares. It may not be the real thing, but if offers a vision of the world in a controlled environment.

In that aspect, the park prefigures elements of China's evolving financial reforms. As it progresses, a plan unveiled earlier this year to turn Shanghai into a global financial centre by 2020 appears more concerned with bringing a controlled version of the world to Shanghai than with allowing Chinese money to engage with the real thing beyond its borders.

This may change, of course, but for now China appears to be seized more with reform than liberalisation. Indeed, its vigorous programmes to internationalise the renminbi, boost the size of its domestic futures markets and expand the Shanghai Stock Exchange are animated more by a desire to project power than to integrate China with the global financial system. Control is still the watchword.

Consider the first steps to turn Shanghai into a “global” financial centre. It looks increasingly likely that an “international board” may be launched on the SSE next year, providing a platform for some of the world's most famous companies to list. So far, such icons of the capitalist world as the UK's HSBC, America's GE, Brazil's Vale, and NYSE Euronext, the parent company of the New York Stock Exchange, hope to issue shares to the Chinese public in renminbi. Several more are expected to follow. In a few years' time, Chinese investors may be able to pick and choose among many of the world's top companies without ever leaving the comfort of the renminbi.

Reinforcing this sense of C2C (copying to China) is another plan to launch global exchange traded funds, products that will allow investors to buy a collection of overseas stocks and bonds denominated in renminbi. Even the recent launch of the ChiNext, an enterprise board for smaller Chinese companies, could be seen as part of the “locally global” trend. Before ChiNext, many smaller Chinese companies opted to list on Nasdaq, Hong Kong's Gem or London's Aim. Now the outward flow could slow.

In commodity futures trade too, signs of a controlling urge are clear. Policymakers make no secret of their desire to see China's pricing power for global energy, metal and farm commodities enhanced, partly by boosting the breadth and depth of three burgeoning commodity exchanges. Each of these is leaping up the world rankings in terms of traded volume, with the Dalian Commodity Exchange, the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange and the Shanghai Futures Exchange all set to be placed among the top 10 or thereabouts this year, following volume increases in the first nine months of the year of 60 per cent, 67 per cent and 253 per cent respectively.

In a nutshell, the hope of China's policymakers is that once the volumes of contracts traded on its domestic exchanges climb near to – or even exceed – those recorded on the Chicago Board of Trade, the London Metal Exchange and New York Mercantile Exchange, then the world will start to take its pricing cues from Chinese exchanges. This, as Beijing sees it, will not only reflect the natural order of things (China is the biggest buyer of almost all physical commodities), it will also reduce price volatility – allowing Chinese companies to buy what they need more cheaply.

It remains to be seen whether the grass will bend as this wind blows. Some experts overseas argue that unless China allows foreign capital free access to its domestic commodity markets, the prices reached on those markets will never be seen as global benchmarks. But such confidence may be misplaced. Already, the copper futures contract on the Shanghai Futures Exchange is used as a reference for global prices, allowing domestic traders to hedge their exposure without having to venture into unfamiliar overseas territories.

On the face of it, the drive to “internationalise” the renminbi does not seem to derive from controlling urges. Allowing foreigners to use renminbi to settle their trade with Chinese companies looks expansive and generous, the type of gesture that might be expected of a rising power confident of its new weight in world affairs. And so it may ultimately become. But in its antecedents, this policy was defensive – a reaction to the exquisite indignity of being part of the US dollar zone with domestic monetary policy effectively outsourced to the US Federal Reserve when the financial crisis struck. China knows that if it really wants to wriggle off the US dollar hook, it needs to start earning more renminbi (not US dollars) for the things it sells around the world. That may mean that its pile of foreign exchange reserves stacks up less quickly and a smaller proportion of its trade receipts will therefore need to be recycled into investments overseas.

Thus, the project to promote the use of the renminbi as a currency for trade settlement in Asia is of vital strategic importance, not so much as a projection of Chinese economic power but as a protection against imported financial turbulence. The inception of a free trade agreement with the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, scheduled for January 1 2010, represents a crucial moment in China's drive to reduce its trade dependency on the US and Europe and to start reclaiming independence for its monetary policy. To south-east Asians, the attractiveness of the renminbi – a stable, slowly appreciating currency issued by the regional trade giant – may prove considerable. Already, some shopkeepers in Bangkok, Hanoi and Singapore appear happy to accept renminbi as payment.

But little of this presents much hope for foreign investors who anticipate that China's multi-faceted financial reform programme will result in the speedy lifting of regulations on portfolio inflows. Controls over the capital account are an elemental aspect of Chinese statecraft, a storm barrier for the Middle Kingdom's bifenggang (“wind-protected harbour”). However, no plan is perfect, and one weakness in the scheme to internationalise the Chinese currency is that if it is successful, there could be so much renminbi liquidity sloshing around in Asia that it could erode away sections of the capital account's walls and send foreign money spilling over into domestic capital markets.

All this may be years in the future, but for now, the thrust of “globalisation” Chinese-style may derive more from the selective control of the Shenzhen theme park than from any uninhibited embrace of the outside world.

James Kynge is editor of China Confidential, a research service on China at the Financial Times

深圳有一座主题公园，许多世界上最著名的标志性景观在这里被按比例缩建。游客们无需离开这座占地48公顷的公园，就可从艾菲尔铁塔漫步到埃及金字塔，从罗马斗兽场漫步到泰姬陵，从巨石阵漫步到富士山，从吴哥窟漫步到克里姆林宫，并逛遍其它许多景观。这些景观或许不是真品，但它们在一个受管制的环境内为人们展现出了世界的精彩。

从这个角度来说，该公园映衬出中国发展中的金融改革的基本特点。随着这项改革的推进，中国在今年早些时候公布了一项计划，拟到2020年把上海建设成国际金融中心。该计划更关心的似乎是把一个“管制版”的世界带到上海，而不是准许中国资金接触境外真实世界。

当然，这一情况可能会发生改变，但从现阶段看，中国似乎更关注改革，而非自由化。实际上，中国多项雄心勃勃的计划，包括人民币国际化、提升国内期货市场规模和扩大上海证券交易所，在更大程度上是为了投射实力，而不是让中国融入全球金融体系。指导原则依然是管制。

我们先来考虑一下把上海建设成“全球性”金融中心的初步举措。目前看来，上交所2010年推出“国际板”的可能性越来越大，它将为一些世界最知名的企业提供一个上市平台。迄今，资本主义世界的标志性企业，如英国汇丰(HSBC)、美国通用电气(GE)、巴西淡水河谷(Vale)和纽约证交所(NYSE)的母公司纽约证交所-泛欧交易所(NYSE Euronext)，都希望向中国公众发行以人民币计价的股票。还有几家外国企业预计将紧随其后。要不了几年，中国投资者或许就能选择投资众多世界顶尖企业的股票，而且可用人民币轻松购股。

更具C2C（复制到中国）色彩的，是一项推出全球交易所交易基金(ETF)的计划，这类产品使得投资者能够购买以人民币计价的各种海外股票和债券组合。甚至连中国近期推出的、面向该国中小企业的创业板(ChiNext)，也可被视为“全球本地化”趋势的一部分。在创业板推出之前，许多中国中小企业选择在纳斯达克(Nasdaq)、香港创业板(Gem)或伦敦另类投资市场(AIM)上市。如今，这类企业到海外上市的势头可能会减缓。

在商品期货交易领域，中国渴望管制的迹象也清晰可见。中国政策制定者毫不掩饰的表示，他们希望看到中国在全球能源、金属和农产品领域的定价能力得到加强，这在一定程度上将通过扩大三家方兴未艾的商品交易所的广度和深度来实现。按交易量衡量，大连商品交易所、郑州商品交易所和上海期货交易所的世界排名均在大幅攀升，它们在2009年都有望跻身前十名的行列。这三家交易所去年头9个月交易量分别增长了60%、67%和253%。

简而言之，中国政策制定者希望，一旦国内交易所的交易合约量攀升至接近（甚至超过）芝加哥期货交易所(CBOT)、伦敦金属交易所(LME)和纽约商品交易所(NYME)的水平，世界就将开始在定价方面受到中国交易所的影响。中国政府认为，这不仅将反映事情的自然秩序（中国是几乎所有实物大宗商品的最大买家），还将减少价格的波动，令中国企业能以更便宜的价格买到它们需要的大宗商品。

至于这股风吹起的时候草是否会低头，还有待观察。有些外国专家认为，除非中国允许外国资本自由进入国内大宗商品市场，否则这些市场形成的价格将永远不会被视为全球基准。但这种信心或许放错了地方。上海期货交易所的铜期货合约已成为全球价格的一个参照，这使得中国交易员能够在国内对冲自己的头寸，而不必到陌生的海外市场冒险。

从表面上看，中国推动人民币“国际化”的努力似乎并不是源自对管制的渴望。允许外国人使用人民币来结算其与中国企业贸易的政策，显得既豪爽又大方，它或许是一个对自身在国际事务中的份量充满信心的、崛起中的大国所应有的姿态。这一政策或许最终会成为这样一种姿态。但在最初阶段，这一政策是防御性的，是中国对作为美元区一部分这一巨大屈辱的回应——在金融危机袭来时，中国的货币政策实际上“外包”给了美联储(Fed)。中国明白，如果它真的想与美元脱钩，就必须在向世界各地出口时开始更多的以人民币（而非美元）结算。这或许意味着，中国巨额外汇储备的累积速度将放缓，其贸易收入中必须重新投资到海外的那部分的比例也将因此下降。

所以，推动将人民币用作亚洲贸易结算货币的计划，其重要战略意义与其说是在投射中国经济实力，不如说是使中国免受外来金融动荡冲击。中国与东盟(ASEAN) 10个成员国签署的自由贸易协定于2010年1月1日生效。在中国减少对美欧贸易依赖、着手恢复货币政策独立性的努力中，这是一个非常重大的事件。事实或许会证明，人民币对东南亚人有着巨大吸引力，因为它是一个由亚洲贸易大国发行的、稳定且缓慢升值的币种。曼谷、河内和新加坡的一些店主似乎已欣然接受人民币付款。

但该计划并没有给外国投资者带来多大希望——这些投资者期盼，中国对证券组合投资流入的管制，会很快因多方位的金融改革计划而取消。资本账户管制是中国治国方略的一个基本方面，是“中央王国”避风港抵御风暴的一道屏障。不过，任何计划都不是完美的。人民币国际化计划的一个薄弱之处是，如果该计划如愿以偿，那么大量人民币流动性可能会在亚洲各地涌流，从而侵蚀资本账户的部分防护墙，导致外资溢入中国国内的资本市场。

这一切或许要过几年才会发生。就目前而言，中国式“全球化”的主旨，或许更多源自深圳主题公园那样的“有选择管制”，而非对外部世界不加限制的接受。

本文作者是《FT中国投资参考》(China Confidential)主编，《FT中国投资参考》是英国《金融时报》针对中国的一项研究服务



译者/汪洋