【英语中国】地方政府不良贷款规模初露端倪

At last some answers to a major question mark hanging over the Chinese banking sector: Just how much of its lending has gone to local government investment vehicles -- and how iffy has that lending been?

Because of restrictions on how much local governments can borrow from banks directly, off-balance-sheet funding has become a key means for them to obtain financing. These funds, in turn, have fueled the investment boom that lies behind China's solid economic growth since the global financial crisis.

The use of these vehicles ballooned in 2009 during China's $1.4 trillion lending binge. The worry is that many of the loans were invested in projects that won't generate an economic return, and aren't properly collateralized. Figures leaking out from China's banking regulator offer both comfort and cause for concern.

Reports suggest that at the end of June, there were about $1.13 trillion in loans from banks to local government-related vehicles outstanding. Based on data submitted to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, about 20% of these loans -- which would mean something like $230 billion -- could be termed high-risk, a person familiar with the situation suggests.

Such estimates are pretty sobering, even if the figure given on total loans outstanding is at the lower end of the $0.9 trillion-to-$1.6 trillion range analysts had estimated.

They show, for example, that official data could be seriously underestimating bad loans. As of June 30, the official total of nonperforming loans across all of China's commercial banks was $67 billion, or 1.3% of total loans. That balance increases more than fourfold if the $230 billion of risky loans to local government vehicles are added, assuming no double counting. At the very least, it seems China's banks will have to make some adjustments to the bad loan levels they have publicly disclosed to date.

The good news is that even the most pessimistic interpretation of the figures doesn't suggest China's banks have a systemic problem. Even a fourfold increase in the amount of bad loans in the system would keep their level, as a proportion of overall lending, far off highs seen a decade ago, when Chinese banks needed a major government-led bailout. Still, someone will eventually have to pay to restore the banks' balance sheets to health. Shareholders are already being called upon to stump up new capital for banks: Policies, such as maintaining a wide spread between bank lending and deposit rates to help support bank profits, will have to be extended, further postponing any possibility China can move to a more market-based interest-rate system.

The clear-up of the Chinese lending party is only just beginning. At least some daylight on the extent of the job to be done is starting to appear through the fuzz.

悬在中国银行业头上的一个大问号终于有了些眉目，这个问题就是有多少银行贷款发放给了地方政府的投资工具，这些贷款的问题又有多大？

由于对地方政府可直接从银行获得的贷款额有限制，表外融资就成了地方政府获得融资的一个重要途径。这些资金反过来刺激了自全球金融危机以来一直支撑中国强劲经济增长的投资热。

2009年中国1.4万亿美元的放贷潮期间，这些投资工具的使用激增。令人担心的是，很多贷款投在了无法产生经济回报、没有适当抵押品的项目上。从中国银行业监管机构泄漏出来的数据让人既喜又忧。

报告显示，6月底，银行向地方政府相关工具发放的、尚未偿还的贷款约有1.13万亿美元。据一位知情人士透露，根据提交给中国银监会的数据，其中约有20%的贷款（也就是约2,300亿美元）可以被归为高风险贷款。

分析人士此前估计未偿贷款在总额在0.9万亿美元至1.6万亿美元之间。即便当前估计的数字在这个区间靠近下限的部分，也让人很是震惊。

举例来讲，这显示出官方数据可能严重低估了不良贷款的规模。截至6月30日，官方给出的中国商业银行不良贷款总额为670亿美元，占贷款总额的1.3%。如果算上地方政府工具获得的2,300亿美元高风险贷款，假设没有重复计算的话，不良贷款总额就会增加四倍多。至少，看起来中国银行业将不得不对目前为止公布的不良贷款水平进行一些调整。

好消息是，即使对数据最悲观的解读也并不表明中国银行业存在系统性问题。即使银行业不良贷款增加四倍，不良贷款占贷款总额的比例也比10年前的高点要低的多，当时中国银行业需要一次政府牵头的重大救助。尽管如此，有人最终将必须付出代价恢复银行资产负债表的健康。已经开始呼吁股东为银行投入新资本：保持银行间贷款利率与存款利率之间较宽的利差等帮助支撑银行利润的政策需要延长，这会进一步延缓中国向更加以市场为基础的利率系统迈进的可能。

收拾中国放贷潮残局的工作才刚刚开始。对于需要做的工作有多少，至少有些曙光开始穿透迷雾。