【英语中国】中国农业银行处理坏帐有一手

China's banking regulator has been urging banks to become less dependent on interest income for their profit and to diversify their operations by boosting fee revenue.

Taking the message to heart, Agricultural Bank of China has come up with a clever approach. It involves first selling the government its bad loans, then charging the government to dispose of them.

According to the prospectus for AgBank's forthcoming initial public offerings, agency commissions-which account for about a third of the bank's fee income-rose to 10.7 billion yuan, or about $1.6 billion, last year from 5.5 billion a year earlier (see today's Heard on the Street by Andrew Peaple).

That was 'primarily attributable to the commission from our agency services for the Ministry of Finance in connection with the disposal of and recovery on non-performing assets,' says the prospectus. Distribution of insurance products also contributed to the increase.

In 2008, the Ministry of Finance spun off more than 800 billion yuan worth of nonperforming loans from AgBank's balance sheet. That had become a standard step for China's major banks in preparation for their IPOs. But while the other major banks sold their bad loans to asset management corporations, or AMCs, set up with the express purpose of disposing of the banks' bad debts, AgBank had its loans placed in a special fund, co-managed by Ministry of Finance and AgBank.

And AgBank is solely responsible for the disposal of the loans.

That's in part because the AMCs baulked at the idea of having to take on more bad debt. After buying the NPLs of China Construction Bank, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China and Bank of China in the run up to their IPOs in 2005 and 2006, the AMCs shifted gears, with Beijing's backing, and started diversifying their businesses. For example China Orient Asset Management Corp, originally set up to handle Bank of China's NPLs, has since expanded into securities, credit ratings and financial leasing.

The loans they bought from the big banks a decade ago are still a millstone around their necks. Back then they bought the banks' loans at face value by issuing the banks ten-year bonds backed by the Finance Ministry. Needless to say, the AMCs realized nowhere near the face value of the loans they were saddled with. Six years after issuing the bonds - the last data publicly available - the AMCs had a cash recovery rate of only about 20%. Starting last September, those bonds have been rolled over for another ten years.

Any financial institution other than AgBank may have trouble trying to manage the bank's bad loan portfolio. With a network of more than 60,000 branches at its peak - when many of these bad loans were being issued - the roster of small, agricultural loans penetrating deep into the country's hinterland would be nightmare for any of the AMCs to manage.

Still, without paying fees it might be difficult to motivate AgBank to try and get some return on the loans. Sure, under the original agreement AgBank has 15 years to repay the principal and accrued interest on the loans in the fund, but cash dividends paid out to the Finance Ministry (AgBank's biggest shareholder) and corporate income tax paid to the central government are to be counted against paying down the debt. And given the experience of the AMCs, 15 years is probably not a particularly hard target.

So far AgBank has given no indication of how many of the loans have been resolved or the cash recovery rate. For than matter, it's even unclear how the loans are being disposed of. Foreign investors involved in buying NPLs from the AMCs say they haven't seen any of AgBank's bad loans being marketed.

Since much of AgBank's bad debt was accumulated supporting government policy - or at least in the interests of some level of government - it's probably fair that any benefit the government gets from AgBank should go toward paying down the debt.

But paying fees to AgBank doesn't necessarily set a healthy precedent for the next time - heaven forbid - NPLs build up in the financial system and Beijing is compelled to step in to sort them out.

中国银行监管机构一直在敦促各银行在利润方面更少依赖利息收益，希望各银行通过提高费用收入来使运营多元化。

中国农业银行将这一信息铭记在心，下出了聪明的一招棋。它采用的办法是先向中国政府出售其坏帐，然后要求政府处置这些坏帐。

根据中国农业银行即将进行的首次公开募股的招股书，农业银行的代理手续费从前年的55亿元人民币升至去年的107亿元人民币（约合16亿美元）。代理手续费约占农业银行费用收入的三分之一。

招股书上说，这主要是为财政部提供服务而收取的代理手续费，这与处置和回收不良资产有关。另外分销保险产品也促进了代理手续费的增加。

2008年财政部剥离了农业银行资产负债表上价值超过8000亿元人民币的不良贷款。剥离不良贷款已经成了中国大型银行准备进行首次公开募股前的标准步骤。不过其他大型银行将他们的坏帐出售给资产管理公司（AMC），以达到快速处置银行坏帐的目的，但农业银行将其坏帐置于一个特别基金内，由财政部和农业银行共同管理。

而处置坏帐则由农业银行独力负责。

这部分是因为资产管理公司对不得不接纳更多坏帐有些犹豫。2005和2006年在中国建设银行、中国工商银行和中国银行准备进行首次公开募股前，这些资产管理公司买入了它们的不良贷款，此后在北京方面的支持下，这些资产管理公司改变了方式，他们开始将业务多元化。以中国东方资产管理公司（China Orient Asset Management Corp）为例，起先建立该公司是为处置中国银行的不良贷款，但自那以来业务已扩展至证券、信用评级和融资租赁。

10年前从大型银行买入的不良贷款仍是套在他们脖子上的沉重负担。当时他们通过发行财政部支持下的银行10年期债券，以面值买入银行不良贷款。不用说资产管理公司已意识到他们持有的不良贷款不再接近它们的面值。根据可公开获得的最新数据，债券发行六年后，资产管理公司的现金回收率仅约为20%。从去年9月开始，这些债券已被再展期10年。

农业银行以外的任何金融机构在管理该银行的坏帐时都可能面临困境。农业银行高峰时有超过60,000家分支机构，许多坏帐是在当时造成的，小型农业贷款深入渗透中国内陆地区，是任何一家资产管理公司的噩梦。

然而如果不支付费用，可能很难激励农业银行在这些坏帐上试着获得一些回报。当然根据原先的协议，农业银行将有15年时间偿付基金内的贷款本金和相应的利息，但农业银行还要向财政部（农业银行的最大股东）支付现金股息、向中央政府缴纳企业所得税，这两项不利于其偿付债务。鉴于资产管理公司的经验，15年可能不是一个特别艰难的目标。

迄今农业银行尚没有表示已有多少坏帐已解决，以及现金回收率是多少。就此而言，甚至不清楚坏帐是如何处置的。那些从资产管理公司买入不良贷款的外国投资者表示，他们还没有看到农业银行的坏帐面市。

既然农业银行的坏帐有很大一部分是为了支撑政府政策而积累下来的，或至少在一定程度上符合政府利益，那么政府应当利用从农业银行获得的利益去偿付债务，可能也是合理的。

不过，等到下一次──但愿不会出现──金融体统内不良贷款增加、北京方面被迫出手将之剥离之时，向农业银行支付费用可不一定是良好的示范。