【英语国际】建立新的国际货币体系

With talk of currency wars and disagreements over the US Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing, the summit of the Group of 20 leading economies in Seoul this week is shaping up as the latest test of international co-operation. So we should ask: co-operation to what end?

When the G7 experimented with economic co-ordination in the 1980s, the Plaza and Louvre Accords focused attention on exchange rates. Yet the policy underpinnings ran deeper. The Reagan administration, guided by James Baker, the then Treasury secretary, wanted to resist a protectionist upsurge from Congress, like the one we see today. It therefore combined currency co-ordination with the launch of the Uruguay Round that created the World Trade Organisation and a push for free trade that led to agreements with Canada and Mexico. International leadership worked with domestic policies to boost competitiveness.

As part of this “package approach”, G7 countries were supposed to address the fundamentals of growth – today’s structural reform agenda. For example, the 1986 Tax Reform Act broadened the revenue base while slashing marginal income tax rates. Mr Baker worked with his G7 colleagues and central bankers to orchestrate international co-operation to build private-sector confidence.

History moved on after the huge changes of 1989 and the experience of the 1980s is still being debated, but this package approach was significant for its combination of pro-growth reforms, open trade and exchange rate co-ordination.

What might such an approach look like today? First, to focus on fundamentals, a key group of G20 countries should agree on parallel agendas of structural reforms, not just to rebalance demand but to spur growth. For example, China’s next five-year plan is supposed to transfer attention from export industries to new domestic businesses, and the service sector, provide more social services and shift financing from oligopolistic state-owned enterprises to ventures that will boost productivity and domestic demand.

With a new Congress, the US will need to address structural spending and ballooning debt that will tax future growth. President Barack Obama has also spoken of plans to boost competitiveness and revive free-trade agreements.

The US and China could agree on specific, mutually reinforcing steps to boost growth. Based on this, the two might also agree on a course for renminbi appreciation, or a move to wide bands for exchange rates. The US, in turn, could commit to resist tit-for-tat trade actions; or better, to advance agreements to open markets.

Second, other major economies, starting with the G7, should agree to forego currency intervention, except in rare circumstances agreed to by others. Other G7 countries may wish to boost confidence by committing to structural growth plans as well.

Third, these steps would assist emerging economies to adjust to asymmetries in recoveries by relying on flexible exchange rates and independent monetary policies. Some may need tools to cope with short-term hot money flows. The G20 could develop norms to guide these measures.

Fourth, the G20 should support growth by focusing on supply-side bottlenecks in developing countries. These economies are already contributing to half of global growth, and their import demand is rising twice as fast as that of advanced economies. The G20 should give special support to infrastructure, agriculture and developing healthy, skilled labour forces. The World Bank Group and the regional development banks could be the instruments of building multiple poles of future growth based on private sector development.

Fifth, the G20 should complement this growth recovery programme with a plan to build a co-operative monetary system that reflects emerging economic conditions. This new system is likely to need to involve the dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound and a renminbi that moves towards internationalisation and then an open capital account.

The system should also consider employing gold as an international reference point of market expectations about inflation, deflation and future currency values. Although textbooks may view gold as the old money, markets are using gold as an alternative monetary asset today.

The development of a monetary system to succeed “Bretton Woods II”, launched in 1971, will take time. But we need to begin. The scope of the changes since 1971 certainly matches those between 1945 and 1971 that prompted the shift from Bretton Woods I to II. Serious work should include possible changes in International Monetary Fund rules to review capital as well as current account policies, and connect IMF monetary assessments with WTO obligations not to use currency policies to remove trade concessions.

This package approach to economic co-operation reaches beyond the recent G20 dialogue, but the ideas are practical and feasible, not radical. And it has clear advantages. It supplies a growth and monetary agenda that parallels the G20 financial sector reforms. It could be built upon prompt incremental actions, combined with credible steps to be pursued over time, allowing for political dialogue at home. And it could help rebuild public and market confidence, which will remain under stress in 2011. Perhaps most importantly, this package could get governments ahead of problems instead of reacting to economic, political and social storms.

Drive or drift? How the G20 decides could determine whether multilateral co-operation can achieve a strong economic recovery.

The author, president of the World Bank Group, served at the US Treasury from 1985-88

在人们大谈“汇率战”、而美联储(Fed)定量宽松政策引发争议的形势下，本周在首尔举行的“20国集团”(G20)峰会，将成为对国际合作状况的最新检验。因此我们应该问：为什么要合作？

上世纪80年代，当“7国集团”(G7)尝试开展经济协作时，《广场协议》和《卢浮宫协议》的焦点是汇率。但各项相关支持政策却更为深远。在时任财长詹姆斯?贝克尔(James Baker)的指导下，里根政府力图抵制来自国会的保护主义浪潮——于目前的保护主义浪潮如出一辙。为此，里根政府除了推动汇率协作以外，还发起“乌拉圭回合谈判”，由此缔造了世界贸易组织(WTO)，并推动自由贸易，促成了与加拿大和墨西哥的自由贸易协议。国际舞台上的领导作用与国内政策相辅相成，增强了美国的竞争力。

根据上述“一揽子措施”，G7国家应致力解决经济增长中的基本问题——在今天则是结构性改革议程。譬如，1986年出台的《税务改革法案》在大幅降低边际所得税率的同时，扩大了税基。贝克和G7同仁们以及各国央行联手策划了一场国际合作，以帮助私人部门树立信心。

在1989年的种种巨变之后，历史的车轮继续前行，而上世纪80年代的经历，人们至今仍在争论不休。但是，这个一揽子措施同时结合了有利于增长的改革、自由贸易以及汇率协作，可以说意义重大。

在当今形势下，如果采取一套类似的措施，可能会是什么样的呢？首先，从基本面来说，G20的关键成员国应就制定结构改革议程达成一致，不仅是为了推动需求再平衡，也是为了促进经济增长。例如，中国的下一个“五年计划”应把注意力从出口行业转向国内新兴产业和服务业，提供更多社会服务，改变主要为国有寡头企业提供融资支持的做法，加大对有利于提高生产率和内需企业的融资支持。

美国在国会换届后，必须着力解决结构性支出和不断膨胀的债务问题——巨额债务将是美国未来经济增长的一大负担。此外，巴拉克?奥巴马总统(Barack Obama)也已谈到了一些旨在提升竞争力和重振自贸谈判的计划。

美国和中国可以就一些具有互补作用的具体经济增长措施达成共识。在此基础上，双方还可能就人民币升值进程、或扩大汇率浮动区间达成一致。反过来，美国可能承诺不采取“以牙还牙”的贸易措施，甚至是推进开放市场的协议。

其次，其它主要经济体（从G7成员国开始）应同意放弃干预汇率的做法，除非是在其它国家一致赞同的极少数情况下。其它G7国家可能也希望通过致力于结构性经济增长计划，来提振信心。

第三，这些举措将有助于新兴经济体借助灵活的汇率机制和独立的货币政策，适应复苏中的不对称状况。部分经济体或许需要一些工具来应对短期热钱的流动。G20可以制定用以规范相关措施的准则。

第四，G20应着眼于发展中国家供应方面的瓶颈，为它们的经济增长提供支持。目前全球经济增长的一半动力来自于这些经济体，而它们的进口需求增速是发达经济体的两倍。G20应为基础设施建设、农业，以及发展健康、熟练的劳动力提供特别支持。在构建未来具有多个增长支柱、以私人部门发展为基础的经济增长模式方面，世界银行(World Bank Group)和各地区性发展银行可以发挥有效作用。

第五，除了上述经济复苏计划以外，G20还应制定一项补充计划，着眼于建设一个反映新兴经济状况的协作性货币体系。新体系可能必须包含美元、欧元、日元、英镑，以及迈向国际化及资本账户开放的人民币。

新体系也应考虑以黄金作为市场对通胀、通缩及未来货币价值预期的国际参考基准。虽然教科书或许把黄金视为一种古老货币，但如今市场则把黄金当作一种另类货币资产。

发展一种承继“布雷顿森林体系II”（1971年问世）的货币体系需要时间。但我们现在必须开始行动。1971年以来发生的各种变化，不会亚于1945-1971年期间（其间完成了“布雷顿森林体系I”向“布雷顿森林体系II”的转变）。重要事项可能应该包括修订国际货币基金组织(IMF)的相关规则，以重审资本及经常账户政策，并把IMF的汇率评估和WTO义务联系起来，不使用汇率政策来取消贸易优惠。

这种一揽子经济合作措施超越了G20近期的对话范畴，但相关想法并不激进，而是切实可行的，而且有明显的益处。它提供了一种与G20金融行业改革相对应的增长及货币议程。它可以建立在果断、激进的行动基础上，结合以可逐步推进的可靠措施，容许国内政治对话。它可能有助于重建公众和市场的信心（预计到明年还无法完全恢复）。最重要的或许是，这一揽子措施可能使各国政府“抢在问题出现之前”，而不是等到经济、政治和社会危机爆发才被迫应对。

主动驾驭，还是随波逐流？G20如何抉择，可能会决定多边合作能否使经济实现强劲复苏。

本文作者是世界银行行长，1985-88年期间在美国财政部任职

译者/杨远