【英语国际】日本消费者“乐见”通缩

Last year, the Bank of Japan surveyed its population about attitudes towards deflation. You might have thought this would paint a picture of pain, if not panic. After all, during most of the past decade, as Japanese prices gently drifted down, Western economists and policymakers have recoiled in horror; “deflation” has been a dirty word.

But Japanese consumers apparently feel rather differently. In last year’s survey, 44 per cent of Japanese said deflation was “favourable”, while a further 35 per cent felt neutral about the phenomenon – and just 20.7 per cent described it as “unfavourable”. Since then, the negative reaction has risen slightly. Nevertheless, that proportion remains low. Or as Kathy Matsui, an economist of Goldman Sachs, told a meeting at the International Monetary Fund in Washington last week: “More Japanese actually feel deflation is positive rather than a negative.”

This is thought-provoking stuff for investors; if not central banks. Right now, speculation is sky-high that the US Federal Reserve will soon unleash more quantitative easing, following signs that growth is slowing, unemployment rising – and that deflation might be rearing its head. European central bankers have also been fretting about deflation in the past three years. Might the experience of Japan suggest that this is an overreaction, at least in the eyes of voters? Or is this equanimity in itself, part of the problem?

The experience of Japan can be read several ways. One factor that might have skewed the BoJ survey is that the Japanese have already had a decade to adjust their inflation expectations; not only have prices been falling for many years, but average wages have drifted 5 per cent lower in the last decade, in nominal terms.

Demography is also critical. Japan has a very large number of retired people, with low debt and large savings, generally invested in cash or bonds. These elderly usually benefit if their money can buy more goods. Younger working families which have larger debts, benefit less; particularly since their wages are flat or falling and their tax bill looks set to rise in the future, due to the high levels of public debt. That, coupled with the fact that the older generation tend to control policymaking, is creating severe “intergenerational unfairness”, Naoko Ishii, deputy vice minister of Japan’s Ministry of Finance observes.

But even for the younger generation, falling consumer prices are cushioning the blow of lower wages. And the Ministry of Finance is enjoying short-term benefits too: though deflation is raising the real size of the national debt, in the short term there are “low interest payments “thanks” to deflation”, as Ms Ishi says. Thus while the stock of Japanese government bonds has almost doubled since 2000, debt service costs last year were Y7,700bn, down from Y10,000bn in 2000.

America obviously differs in some key ways. It has a larger proportion of young people and much higher levels of consumer debt. Consumption is closely tied to the equity market and house prices. But American median wages have shown little – or no – growth over the past decade, and its companies are struggling to be competitive against overseas rivals who will not let their currencies rise. Given that, I suspect that if anyone ever actually asked American voters how they felt about deflation, the answer might be less negative than assumed.

Now, let me stress that I am not trying to argue that price falls are a good thing; a severe deflationary spiral is clearly dangerous. Nor do I think that the Fed is about to embrace it anytime soon; quite apart from the economic risks, central bankers are hard-wired to hate deflation, since it renders their policy tools ineffective.

But if nothing else, the story of Japan shows how difficult it is to spark price rises when the velocity of money has collapsed; and a large chunk of the population has learnt to accept mild deflation.

After all, as Peter Fisher, head of fixed income at BlackRock points out: “Inflation is a three-variable, not a two-variable equation. It is not just about the quantity of money and the output gap; it requires chasing behaviour to close the output gap and drive prices higher.” This, he says, highlights the Fed’s challenge: by driving asset prices higher, can it induce households and businesses to chase consumption and investment through a wealth effect alone or, by pumping money into the system, will it discourage this type of chasing behaviour and, instead, stimulate a chase for yield through higher savings. Investors should take note.

去年，日本央行(BoJ)就民众对通缩的态度进行了一次民意调查。你也许会以为，调查结果会是怨声载道，就算还达不到恐慌的地步。毕竟，过去十年里，随着日本物价在大部分时间缓慢下降，西方经济学家和政策制定者感到惊恐；“通缩”是一个贬义词。

但日本消费者的反应显然正相反。在去年的调查中，44%的日本人表示，通缩是“有利的”，还有35%的人对这一现象持中立态度，仅有20.7%的人认为通缩是“有害的”。此后，负面反应略有增强，但比例依然不高。用高盛(Goldman Sachs)经济学家松井凯蒂(Kathy Matsui)最近在华盛顿国际货币基金组织(IMF)会议上的话说，“实际上，日本对通缩持积极看法的人要多于持消极看法的人。”

这对投资者而言颇具启发性，就算各国央行不以为然。目前，人们普遍猜测，美联储(Fed)很快将推出更多的定量宽松，因为有迹象显示，美国增长正在减速，失业率正在攀升，通缩或许正在抬头。过去3年内，欧洲央行官员也一直在担心出现通缩。日本的经历难道是说，美欧央行的反应有些过火，至少在选民眼中如此？还是说，日本人对通缩的这种镇定态度本身就是问题的一部分？

日本的经验可以作几种理解。一个有可能扭曲了日本央行调查结果的因素是，日本人已经有十年时间来调整他们的通胀预期；不仅多年来物价持续下降，而且过去十年来名义平均工资也下降了5%。

人口组成也很关键。日本退休人数极其庞大。他们负债少，拥有大量储蓄，一般以现金或债券形式投资。如果可以用同样的钱买更多的东西，这些老年人通常会从中受惠。而年轻一些的劳动家庭负债较多，受益就会小一些；尤其是他们的工资未涨，甚至在下降，而且由于公共债务水平高企，未来他们的税负铁定会上涨。日本财务省代理副部长石井直子(Naoko Ishii)表示，这种人口组成，加之老一代人往往控制着政策的制定，这正导致两代人之间严重不公平。

但即便是对年轻一代来说，消费物价的下降也减弱了工资水平下降的冲击。而日本财务省也获得了短期收益：如石井直子所言，尽管通缩让国家债务的实际规模有所增加，但从短期看，“‘多亏了’通缩，国家支付的利息很低”。因此，尽管自2000年以来，日本政府债券总量已将近翻了一番，但偿债成本却从2000年的10万亿日元降至去年的7.7万亿日元。

美国在某些关键方面和日本明显不同。美国年轻人比例要大一些，消费者债务水平也高出许多。美国人的消费与股市和房价紧密相连。但过去十年间，美国人的工资中位数几乎没什么增长，甚至可以说毫无增长，而美国企业在不愿让本币升值的海外竞争对手面前很难有竞争力。基于此，我认为，如果真有人调查美国选民对通缩的感受，答案可能并不如想象中的悲观。

在此，我要强调一句。我并不是在主张物价下降是好事；严重的通缩螺旋无疑很危险。我也不认为，美联储很快就会接受通缩；撇开经济风险，央行打心底里讨厌通缩，因为通缩会让他们的政策工具失效。

但日本的经历至少说明，当货币流速暴跌、大部分民众已学会了接受温和通缩时，推动物价上涨是多么困难的一件事。

毕竟，正如贝莱德(BlackRock)固定收益部门主管彼得?费舍尔(Peter Fisher)指出的：“通胀是一个有三个变量、而非只有两个变量的等式。变量不仅包括货币总量和产出缺口，还包括弥合产出缺口和推高价格的追逐行为。”他表示，这突显了美联储的挑战：通过推高资产价格，它能仅靠财富效应，就引导家庭和企业追逐消费和投资？还是说，通过向系统注入大量资金，它将抑制这种追逐行为，反而刺激储蓄和对收益的追逐？投资者应当心。

译者/陈云飞