【英语中国】实用主义促成中国汇率决定

China's decision to abandon its currency peg is a victory of pragmatism over divisive politics, the result of careful diplomacy by leaders in Beijing and in Washington, each side vulnerable to powerful domestic lobbies.

In the end, both sides agreed that a more flexible exchange rate was good for China, good for the U.S. and good for the global economy. Yet timing was everything.

China could not be seen caving to U.S. pressure. Nor did it want to reward speculators, who had been placing big bets on an appreciation of the yuan.

Beijing also wanted to extract the maximum diplomatic reward from its move while giving as little ground as possible.

The Chinese government has transformed the atmosphere just days ahead of a meeting of the Group of 20 leading industrial economies in Canada with an announcement that -- at most -- will result in a crawling upward adjustment in the value of the yuan. China has explicitly ruled out a big one-time appreciation.

China is often perceived as a monolithic state, but in reality Chinese leaders must strike a delicate balance between groups with competing economic interests. The argument over whether China should allow its currency to appreciate was fierce and public: The Ministry of Commerce, a strong backer of Chinese exporters, was adamantly opposed to a stronger yuan. The People's Bank of China, the central bank, which is responsible for the overall health of the economy, took a different view: A stronger yuan helps China combat inflation by bringing down the cost of imports, including energy and raw materials.

As the debate over the currency heated up, China's powerful aversion to foreign pressure was on full display. Chinese President Hu Jintao offered the outlines of a deal on an April trip to the U.S., when he told U.S. President Barack Obama in a one-on-one meeting that China remains committed to reform of the currency, but that Beijing 'won't push forward the reform under external pressure.'

Obama administration officials understood that overt pressure on China would be counterproductive. A more mild U.S. approach was most clearly signaled when U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced on April 3 that the Treasury would delay a report to Congress due April 15 on whether China manipulates its currency. A series of coming high-level meetings between the U.S. and China would be 'the best avenue for advancing U.S. interests at this time,' Mr. Geithner said.

Just days later, the Treasury secretary made a dramatic surprise visit to Beijing, meeting in an airport lounge with Vice Premier Wang Qishan, who oversees many aspects of financial and economic policy. Public statements from each side made no mention of the currency issue, but a U.S. official said the yuan was discussed. China didn't give an explicit commitment on the issue, but that had been expected, given China's concern about being perceived as yielding to foreign demands.

In most public statements on the yuan during this period, Mr. Geithner was careful to stress that it was 'China's choice' whether to shift policy, and that a more flexible exchange rate was in China's own economic interests.

At the same time as Obama administration officials were toning down the U.S. rhetoric on the currency, they had to contend with a far less patient U.S. Congress, and massive public dissatisfaction with persistently high unemployment.

Appearing before the Senate Finance Committee last week, Mr. Geithner used more pointed language. 'The distortions caused by China's exchange rate spread far beyond China's borders and are an impediment to the global rebalancing we need.'

But the Senate's most outspoken China critics weren't mollified. New York Sen. Charles Schumer, a Democrat, warned that the Senate would act 'soon' on a bill he cosponsored with several other senators that would mandate penalties against countries that don't adjust their currencies in line with market forces. 'China's mercantilist policies continue to undermine the health of U.S. industries,' he said. 'Despite the administration asking us not to do it, we are going to move forward with our bipartisan legislation.'

Beijing has always insisted that it will only carry out currency reform when its economic conditions permit. A raft of economic data out last week, including surging exports and rising inflation in May, likely convinced Chinese policy makers that the time had come. China's consumer price index rose 3.1% in May from a year earlier, above the psychologically significant 3% level, which is Beijing's official target for average inflation over all of 2010.

A stronger yuan can help tame inflation by reducing the price of imports. In theory, a more flexible exchange rate should also strengthen the independence of China's monetary policy, allowing it to raise interest rates without fearing an influx of foreign money seeking high returns on yuan-denominated assets.

China has a history of surprising the markets with its currency announcements. This time, it waited until speculators had removed bets that would benefit from a stronger yuan from the dollar-yuan nondeliverable forward, or NDF market, a derivative contract that moves with investors' expectations for the value of China's currency against the dollar.

On Friday, the closing level of the one-year NDF implied expectations for yuan appreciation that were well lower than in April. Some traders were even speculating that China would devalue its currency to counter the downturn in export demand from Europe.

On Friday, just one day before the policy shift, senior Chinese officials bristled at suggestions that the yuan would be a major topic of discussion at the Group of 20 nations summit next weekend.

The yuan 'is China's currency and this is not an issue the international community should discuss,' Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said at a news briefing.

Likely aiding in the path to reform was a rising chorus of dissatisfaction in April with the cheap yuan from some countries besides the U.S. and the European Union. Large developing nations such as Brazil, as well as fellow Asian exporters such as Japan, all began calling for a stronger yuan.

中国决定放弃人民币与美元挂钩之举是实用主义战胜分裂政治的结果，是受到强大的国内游说力量影响的北京和华盛顿领导人谨慎外交的结果。

最终，双方同意更灵活的汇率对中国有利、对美国有利，对世界经济发展也有利。然而，时机是关键所在。

相关报导奥巴马政府官员明白对中国公开施压将起反作用。4月3日，美国财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)宣布将推迟向国会提交有关中国是否操纵汇率的报告。这一报告本应于4月15日提交国会。这一决定非常明确地显示了美国采取了更温和的态度。盖特纳说，即将举行的一系列中美高层会谈将是“此刻推动美国利益的最佳渠道”。

几天后，盖特纳突访北京，在机场休息室与负责金融与经济政策的中国副总理王歧山会面。两国在各自的公开声明中均未提及汇率问题，但一名美国官员说二人在会谈中谈及了此事。中国未在这一问题上提供明确的承诺，但鉴于中国担心被视为向外国压力低头，这是意料之中的事。

在此期间的大多数有关人民币问题的公开声明中，盖特纳小心地强调，是否改变汇率政策“由中国自己决定”，但更灵活的汇率符合中国自己的经济利益。

奥巴马政府官员在人民币问题上调低美方声调的同时，又不得不面对远不那么耐心的国会，也不得不面对大众对于失业率居高不下的不满情绪。

上周在参议院财政委员会(Senate Finance Committee)作证时，盖特纳使用了更为尖锐的措辞。他说，中国汇率造成的扭曲远远跨越了中国的国境，对我们所需要的全球再平衡是一种妨碍。

但参议院对中国最坦白的批评者们并没有因此而平静下来。代表纽约州的民主党参议员舒默(Charles Schumer)警告说，参议院将很快对他和其他几位参议员联合发起的一项议案采取行动，根据这项议案，美国将对不根据市场力量调整汇率的国家施以惩罚。舒默说，中国的重商主义政策仍在损害美国各行各业的健康；虽然政府请求不要继续推进我们的两党立法，但我们还是要这么做。

北京一直坚持，只有在经济条件允许的情况下它才会实施汇改。上周大量经济数据出炉，其中5月份出口暴涨，通胀水平上升，可能就是这些数据让中国决策者相信，汇改时机已到。中国5月份居民消费价格水平较一年前上涨3.1%，突破3%的心理关口。3%是北京为整个2010年设定的平均通胀率官方目标。

人民币升值可以降低进口商品价格，从而有助于抑制通货膨胀。从理论上讲，提升汇率灵活性应该还会增强中国货币政策的独立性，使它可以在加息的时候不必担心谋求在人民币资产上取得高回报的海外资金大量涌入。

中国过去曾多次在市场意料之外宣布新的汇率政策。这一次，它一直按兵不动，直到投机者都撤除美元-人民币无本金交割远期市场(NDF)做多人民币的头寸。NDF是一种衍生品，其价格随着投资者对人民币兑美元汇率预期的变动而变动。

上周五一年期NDF的收盘水平说明，投资者对人民币升值的预期远远低于4月份。一些交易员甚至押注中国将使本币贬值，以对冲欧洲对其出口品需求的回落。

上周五，即宣布汇改一天之前，有中国高级官员对人民币将成下周末20国集团峰会主要讨论议题的说法表示了愤慨。

外交部副部长崔天凯在一场吹风会上说，人民币是中国的货币，这不应该是国际上讨论的事情。

4月份，除美国和欧盟以外的一些国家也对人民币被低估的问题齐声表达了越来越多的不满，可能也为中国的汇改起到了推动作用。巴西等发展中大国，日本等同为出口型的亚洲国家，都开始呼吁人民币升值。

（更新完成）