【英语国际】关注金正日继位人选

North Korea is seeing its second transition of power since its founding after the second world war, and it may be its last. Most Korea-watchers see this week’s meeting of the delegates of the Korean Workers’ People’s Congress as a probable move to pave the way to designate Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s twenty-something son, as his successor.

The elder Kim has already begun laying the groundwork. His bureaucratic reshuffling in 2009 was seen as enhancing the authority of his brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek. He is regarded as a potential regent, who may be entrusted with sustaining the viability of the state while his charge builds his own power base.

Kim Jong-il has also visited China twice in the past four months, causing many to speculate he is seeking Beijing’s approval of his succession plans. While China’s views are unclear, there is speculation it would prefer the known quantity of Mr Chang. Given North Korea’s economic and political dependence on China, Beijing’s opinion on this matters.

The younger Kim would be forced to tackle problems – including a lack of legitimacy and authority – that his father never had to confront as he took over from his own father, the founder of the country, Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il’s worsening health has forced Pyongyang to designate a successor without properly building the ideological legitimacy and networks of power that will sustain his leadership.

Kim Jong-un’s inexperience will make consolidating power difficult, especially given his huge reliance on a coterie of generals and party officials whose ambitions, wealth and safety will not be under his personal control as they were under his father.

In essence, the era of one-man rule in North Korea may be ending. Power may no longer be concentrated in the hands of one man, meaning the political dynamics will be more complex, and possibly more unstable. Dispersion of power at the top could lead to a weak state that acts even more irresponsibly, as officials jockey for power by trying to demonstrate bravado on the world scene.

The new leader may emerge as a mere figurehead for a cluster of generals and other bosses. Ultimately, at times of such upheaval in authoritarian states, the fate of millions can hang on the thread of a strong or weak personality and the complex relationships between family members and their ambitions.

If the new Kim cannot consolidate power, the regime could collapse. This would prompt a major humanitarian intervention as the world would have to help feed, medicate, and rebuild a society of more than 22m that has faced poverty and near-starvation for decades.

The longer-term problems of economic reconstruction would be challenging as well. East Germany was the Warsaw Pact’s most advanced member, yet integrating it into the west has been a generational project. North Korea, by contrast, is insular, centralised and destitute.

Even if Kim Jong-un succeeds in consolidating power, he will take control of a country with no economy to speak of, an ageing and decrepit military, and a populace increasingly aware of their destitute status in the eyes of the world. Sustaining North Korea as a viable entity will not only require the younger Kim’s successful consolidation of power – he will probably have to open up the country economically. The very liberalisation that North Korea requires will itself be destabilising.

The prospect of a North Korea in which Kim Jong-un has consolidated power and managed to hold the state together much as his father did is equally troubling. Though a relative unknown, Kim the younger has a reputation for being modelled in his father’s pathological image.

North Korea is entering a pivotal period. Kim Jong-un will either oversee the collapse of the state his grandfather created, or – improbably – a radical reform of its approach to economic management and state control. Either way, the future stability of the world’s most dynamic region – northeast Asia – is likely to be most directly threatened by the whims of the untested and unknown youth. The implications for the Korean peninsula, and the broader region, are historic.

Robert D. Kaplan is a senior fellow, and Abraham Denmark is a fellow, at the Center for a New American Security. Kaplan is the author of Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power

朝鲜即将迎来其在二战后建国以来的第二次权力交接，而且可能是最后一次。关注朝鲜局势的多数观察人士认为，将于本周召开的朝鲜劳动党党代会，可能是金正日(Kim Jong-il)要为其指定金正恩(Kim Jong-un)接班铺路。金正恩是金正日的小儿子，年约20多岁。

金正日已经开始了筹备。他在2009年进行的人事调整就被认为是为了加强其妹夫张成泽(Chang Song-taek)的权力。张成泽被视为潜在的摄政者，可能受托维护国家稳定，但同时他也会建立自己的权力班底。

金正日还在过去四个月里两次访问中国，使得许多人猜测，他在寻求中国政府认可其传位计划。尽管中国的态度尚不明朗，但有人猜测它将倾向于已经为人所知的张成泽。鉴于朝鲜在经济和政治上对中国的依赖，中国的意见很重要。

金正恩将被迫应对其父亲从朝鲜创立者金日成(Kim Il-sung)那里接班时从未遇到的问题，包括缺乏合法性和权威。金正日健康状况日渐恶化，迫使朝鲜政府不得不在尚未建设好意识形态合法性和支持其领导地位的权力网络的情况下指定接班人。

金正恩缺乏经验将使得其难以巩固权力，尤其是考虑到他对一小批将军和党内官员的严重依赖——他们的野心、财富和安全将不再像金正日时代那样，受到最高领导人的个人控制。

从本质上看，朝鲜一人执政的时代可能终结。权力可能不再集中于一个人的手中，这意味着政治格局将更加复杂，或许更加不稳定。高层权力分散可能导致一个行事更加不负责任的弱国，因为官员们试图通过在世界舞台上虚张声势来角逐权力。

对一群将军和其他权贵们而言，新领袖可能只是一个有名无实的领导人。最终，在威权国家出现如此剧变的时期，数以百万计人的命运可能系于某人坚强或软弱的个性，以及家族成员及其野心之间的复杂关系。

如果金正恩不能巩固权力，朝鲜政权就可能垮台。这将引发大规模的人道主义干预，世界不得不为几十年来面临贫穷和饥饿状况的逾2200万人口的社会提供食品、医疗和重建援助。

经济重建的长期问题也将具有挑战性。东德曾经是华沙条约组织(Warsaw Pact)中最发达的成员国，然而，将其整合进西方花了一代人的时间。相比之下，朝鲜孤立、集权化而且贫穷。

即使金正恩成功地巩固了权力，他将要控制的国家也是一团糟：经济乏善可陈，军力老化破旧，而民众逐渐意识到自己在全球眼里是贫穷的。要想让朝鲜成为一个有活力的实体，金正恩不仅需要成功地巩固权力，他还不得不开放朝鲜经济。朝鲜需要的自由化本身就是不稳定因素。

如果金正恩像其父亲那样巩固权力并成功凝聚民心，前景同样令人不安。尽管相对还不为人所知，但金正恩也有与其父一样的病态名声。

朝鲜正进入一个关键时期。金正恩要么看着其祖父创立的国家崩溃，要么对其经济管理和政府控制方式进行彻底改革（这不太可能）。无论出现哪种情形，东北亚这个全球最具活力的地区的未来稳定，可能最直接地受到这个未经检验、不为人所知的年轻人一时奇想的威胁。对朝鲜半岛乃至更广泛地区来说，影响是历史性的。

本文作者卡普兰和登马克分别是“新美国安全中心”(CNAS)的高级研究员和研究员。卡普兰著有《季风：印度洋与美国强权的未来》(Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power)一书

译者/何黎