【英语国际】FT社评：日本干预汇率出于政治动机

It may have been a victory lap of sorts. One day after the ruling Democratic Party of Japan leadership contest was resolved in prime minister Naoto Kan’s favour, the Japanese government intervened in the currency market to weaken the yen. While the move is a welcome escape from Tokyo’s policy paralysis, its significance is more political than economic.

Instructing the Bank of Japan to sell off yen will have flattered supporters of Ichiro Ozawa, Mr Kan’s defeated challenger, who argued strongly for intervention in the leadership contest. More importantly for the DPJ, it may bolster the party’s popularity, which has withered after its election landslide a year ago. The steady rise of the yen against the dollar – which broke through a 15-year high of Y83 to the dollar on Tuesday – has unsettled exporters.

Company owners seem to think knocking down the yen – by three per cent during the course of Wednesday – will help them: they sent Japanese stock prices up by 2.4 per cent. But any succour will surely be short-lived.

Foreign exchange interventions are more likely to stick if deployed in co-ordination with other countries and when they target speculative bets rather than fundamental market forces. As long as the Japanese allow chronically lower inflation than their trading partners, they must get used to irrepressible upward pressure on their nominal exchange rate. As fattening trade surpluses and historical comparisons show, the real exchange rate is hardly overvalued.

Nor should Tokyo expect a sympathetic hearing in foreign capitals. Countries praying that trade will compensate for sickly domestic demand will not take kindly to Japan’s export-snatching manoeuvres. In Washington, where the China-bashing season has now opened with congressional hearings on Beijing’s currency peg, the Japanese move will sour the mood further. Determined optimists may at least hope Tokyo will have steeled determination to deal with global imbalances at the G20 summit in Seoul.

The greatest benefit intervention could bring would be if it signalled that the Bank of Japan was more willing to fight deflation. Though the central bank does the finance ministry’s bidding in the currency market, it resists pressure for domestic monetary policy to be more forceful. Prolonged non-sterilised intervention would bring much-needed inflationary pressure – presumably not the goal. But if it is the only way to reinflate Japan, we should take what we can get.

这或许是胜利者“绕场一周”之类的举动。在执政的日本民主党党内领导挑战以首相菅直人(Naoto Kan)胜出而了结的一天后，日本政府出手干预汇市，以压低日元汇率。尽管相对于东京方面的政策瘫痪而言，此举是一个可喜的转变，但其政治上的意义要大于经济意义。

指示日本央行(Bank of Japan)抛售日元，将会赢得小泽一郎(Ichiro Ozawa)支持者的赞成，这名曾挑战菅直人领导地位、但最终落败的民主党重量级人物，在竞选党魁期间曾强烈主张干预汇市。对民主党来说，更重要的是此举有望提高该党的支持率，自该党一年前高票赢得大选以来，其支持率不断下滑。日元兑美元汇率稳步上涨（本周二突破1美元兑83日元的15年高位），令出口商感到不安。

企业主似乎认为，压低日元汇率（周三日元下跌3%）将为他们提供帮助：日本股市应声上涨2.4%。但是，任何喘息空间都将肯定是短暂的。

汇市干预在两种情况下更有希望发挥作用：一是与其它国家协同进行，二是干预的矛头指向投机行为，而非根本的市场力量。只要日本方面允许本国的通胀长期低于贸易伙伴，他们就必须习惯日元名义汇率难以阻挡的上行压力。正如不断扩大的贸易顺差和历史比较所显示的，实际汇率算不上高估。

东京方面也不应期望外国政府会表示同情。正在企盼贸易将补偿内需不振的各国，不会乐意接受日方争夺出口的动作。在华盛顿的“敲打中国”季节刚刚开始、国会就中国的汇率制度举行听证会之际，日本的举动将进一步恶化气氛。坚定的乐观主义者也许至少希望，东京方面将下定决心，在首尔举行的20国集团(G20)峰会上对付全球失衡。

干预汇市能够带来的最大效益在于，此举是否表明了日本央行抗击通缩的意愿增强。尽管日本央行按照日本财务省的意思干预汇市，但它顶住了加大国内货币政策力度的压力。持续的非冲销式干预，将形成日本亟需的通胀压力——想必这不是目标。但如果这是使日本实现通货再膨胀的唯一途径，我们应满足于我们所能够得到的。

译者/和风