【英语国际】中资企业应学会打美国官司

Dan Harris

Chinese investments and business dealings in the United States have a way of scaring up controversy among Americans, not least because the deep-pocketed, cheap-labored Chinese are seen as significant competitive threats to American companies. But in one arena, at least, it is becoming clear that Chinese companies face unexpected hurdles of their own when they go to the U.S.: the American legal system.

Anecdotal evidence at my firm and others suggests lawsuits in the U.S. against Chinese companies are increasing. Chinese companies face certain general disadvantages that will be hard for them to overcome anytime soon. For instance, many American jurors seem to reflect broader public unease about China as an economic threat, and are more likely to assume all of its companies engage in unscrupulous business tactics and produce shoddy products. And Chinese companies face the same problems that dog any company litigating outside its home country -- unfamiliar rules and the like.

But Chinese companies are needlessly putting themselves at an even deeper disadvantage by making basic mistakes. The first is a failure to do the planning necessary to avoid lawsuits in the first place. In the U.S., companies generally view lawyers as counselors whose job includes helping their clients prevent legal problems, while also making sure the company is best positioned if a lawsuit does pop up (for instance, by helping to draft precisely worded contracts). In China, executives tend to view lawyers as technicians whose job is simply to navigate the court system when a lawsuit arises, rather than as strategic legal planners. This has been a factor in the growing area of U.S. intellectual property litigation against Chinese companies, where often a competent American lawyer would have warned the Chinese manufacturer early on of potential IP problems with a product had the company sought counsel.

Meanwhile, Chinese companies are especially prone to making big mistakes that spring from their failure to learn even basic principles about an American system that is very different from what they have at home.

For example, litigants in the U.S. are required to provide relevant documents to the opposing party during an often lengthy pre-trial discovery process. In China, litigants are not required to show their cards to each other. When an American lawyer talks about providing the opposing party with documents that might hurt the Chinese client's case, the Chinese company tends to view the lawyer as naive. If, as too often occurs, the Chinese company second-guesses its American lawyer and fails to comply fully with the discovery process, it loses important credibility with the court. In one case, a judge ordered a Chinese company to hire my firm to ensure relevant documents stored in China were disclosed during discovery; the judge evidently had lost faith in the Chinese company and its lawyers back home to follow the rules and wanted extra assurance.

Once the parties move into the courtroom, there are more differences related to strategy. Appeals in China are usually de novo, meaning that if a trial-court judge disagrees with your version of the facts, you can make another attempt to tell your side of the story at the appellate level. But in the U.S., appeals courts take as a given the trial court's findings of fact and will hear only disputes about the trial judge's interpretation of legal questions. This means that in America you rarely get more than one chance to put forth your version of the facts, so you had better do it right the first time. In China the fight often begins only once a case hits the appeals court. Twice my firm has turned down business from Chinese clients who explicitly wanted to use this strategy. Alternately, Chinese companies might simply assume they can hire lackluster but cheap attorneys for the initial trial and then invest in bigger guns to win on appeal -- leaving themselves in for a rude surprise.

Then there are the complications when a Chinese litigant loses. The American system offers far more options for forcing a defendant to pay. Companies in China are notorious for shutting down their operations one day and then starting them again a few days later under a new name to avoid paying a judgment; Chinese courts are powerless against this tactic. But in the U.S., losers in litigation who seek to hide their assets from collection regularly face severe sanctions, ranging up to criminal liability. Courts can require judgment debtors to trace every single asset to ensure nothing is hidden -- a grueling and expensive process that can result in contempt-of-court proceedings if a defendant tries to cheat.

American companies understand the importance of avoiding litigation and of mounting a strong defense when sued. Now Chinese companies need to learn America's rules of litigation and how to play by them. Failing to do so is like going into a casino and gambling on a game you do not know.

（Mr. Harris, an attorney with Harris & Moure PLLC in Seattle, Washington, blogs about Chinese law at www.ChinaLawBlog.com.）

Dan Harris

资企业在美国的投资及公司并购活动，动辄引起美国人的争议，其中一个很重要的原因在于，中资企业既有钱，劳动力又偏宜，被认为对美国企业构成了很大的竞争威胁。但至少在一个舞台上，它们进入美国时遭遇的意外阻碍却是自己造成的，那就是美国的司法系统。

我公司和其他律师事务所遇到的一些经验证据表明，中资企业在美国遭遇的法律讼诉正在增多。中资企业面临着某些一般性的劣势，短时间内很难克服。例如，美国很多陪审员似乎表现出了公众的一种普遍不安，认为中国是一种经济威胁，而他们更有可能以为所有中资企业都不择手段，都生产假冒伪劣产品。另外，中资企业还面临着任何企业在国外打官司都会遇到的那些问题，比如不熟悉当地的法律法规等。

但中资企业也犯下了一些基本的错误，不必要地让自己处在更加不利的位置。第一个错误是一开始就没有为了免吃官司而做好必要的计划。在美国，企业通常是把律师当顾问，他们的职责包括帮助客户防范法律问题，同时保证公司在不可避免地遭到讼诉时已经做好了充足的准备（具体做法包括帮助客户起草措辞精准的合同）。在中国，企业经理人往往是把律师看成技术人员，认为他们的职责就是在官司打起来的时候帮助公司走程序，却不把他们当成战略性的法务规划人员来看待。美国针对中资企业提起的知识产权诉讼越来越多，这也是其中一个因素。如果是一位称职的美国律师，要是中国制造商向其咨询的话，其应当早就会向中国制造商警告说某件产品可能存在知识产权问题。

与此同时，美国司法制度跟中国国内存在很大的不同，而中资企业连它的基本原则都缺乏了解，所以很容易犯下重大错误。

比如在美国要提起讼诉，预审取证阶段常常很冗长，这期间诉讼当事人要向对方提供相关的材料。而在中国，诉讼当事人不必相互亮牌。当美国律师跟中国客户谈到向对方提供可能不利于己方的材料时，这家中资公司往往觉得律师很幼稚。如果像经常发生的那样，中资公司不信任它的美国律师，不能够完全遵守取证程序，那么它在法庭上就失去了至关重要的诚信。有一个案子，法官命令一家中资公司聘请我公司，确保存于中国的相关材料在取证阶段得到披露。法官明显已经失去了对这家中资公司及其中国律师的信任，不相信他们能够遵守规则，所以希望得到更多一层保证。

双方进入庭辩阶段后，相关策略与中国国内比起来还有更多的不同。在中国，上诉往往意味着一切从头开始，也就是说，如果初审法院的法官不同意你所陈述的事实，那么在上诉阶段，你可以重新陈述一遍。但在美国，上诉法院认可初审法院认定的事实，只会听取上诉人对初审法官法律问题解释的争议。所以在美国，你很少有一次以上的机会来陈述事实，最好是一开头就不要出问题。在中国，双方的较量常常是要等到案件进入上诉阶段后才开始。曾经有两次，有中国客户明确希望采用这种策略，但我公司拒绝做它们的业务。中资企业可能也会简单地以为，它们可以在初审阶段聘请业务不行但收费低廉的律师，然后在上诉阶段花钱请大腕来打赢官司──到头来只会大吃一惊。

当一家中国当事人输掉官司的时候，还会出现其他一些麻烦。美国司法系统要强制被告赔钱，办法比中国多得多。中国国内的公司有一个臭德性，某一天把公司关了，过几天又用一个新名字重新开张，从而避免缴纳判赔费用，对此于这种策略，中国法院也是无能为力。但在美国，输掉官司的一方如果要是隐瞒资产使之免于被执行，常常会面临严厉的制裁，最高要担负刑事责任。法院常常要求被判赔的一方弄清每一笔资产，以保证任何东西都不被隐瞒。这是一个繁重而费钱的过程，如果被告企图欺骗，则有可能引发藐视法庭的诉讼。

美国公司理解避免官司缠身的重要性，以及遭遇官司后进行强有力的辩护的重要性。现在中资企业需要学习美国的诉讼规则，以及怎样玩转这些规则。做不到这一点，就像是进赌场玩自己不了解的赌博游戏一样。


（本文作者为美国律师事务所Harris & Moure PLLC驻华盛顿州西雅图律师，在博客www.CHinaLawBlog.com撰写有关于中国法律的文章。）