【英语国际】英国石油：都是成本惹的祸？

Early on June 5, 2008, a piece of steel tubing ruptured on BP PLC's vast Atlantis oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The tubing was attached to a defective pipeline pump that BP had put off repairing, in what an internal report later described as 'the context of a tight cost budget.'

The rupture caused a minor spill, just 193 barrels of oil, but BP investigators identified bigger concerns.

They found the deferred repair was a 'critical factor' in the incident, but 'leadership did not clearly question' the safety impact of the delay. The budget for Atlantis -- one of BP's most sophisticated facilities -- was 'underestimated,' resulting in 'conflicting directions/demands.'

As investigators were questioning Atlantis' lean operation, top executives were praising it.

In an internal communication in early 2009, Neil Shaw, then-head of BP's Gulf of Mexico unit, lauded Atlantis' operating efficiency, saying it was '4% better than plan' in its first year of production. It was part of a success story that Mr. Shaw said had enabled BP to become the No. 1 oil producer in the Gulf.

The budget squeeze on one of the British oil giant's most challenging projects underscores a tension at the heart of BP under Chief Executive Officer Tony Hayward.

Until the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf, Mr. Hayward repeatedly said he was slaying two dragons at once: safety lapses that led to major accidents, including a deadly 2005 Texas refinery explosion; and bloated costs that left BP lagging rivals Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Exxon Mobil Corp.

A Wall Street Journal examination of internal BP documents, legal filings, official investigations and reports by federal inspectors, as well as interviews with regulators, shows a record that doesn't always match Mr. Hayward's reports of safety improvements.

Since Mr. Hayward took over, BP has continued to spar with regulators over the same issues that got it into trouble before his tenure as CEO. Some of its refineries still get poor marks for safety. And four years after one of Alaska's worst oil spills, BP's pipelines there have continued to leak.

'They claim to be very much focused on safety, I think sincerely,' says Jordan Barab, deputy assistant secretary at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 'But somehow their sincerity and their programs don't always get translated well into the refinery floor.'

BP insists it has turned a page on safety. 'BP's absolute No. 1 priority is safe and reliable operations,' said spokesman Andrew Gowers. In the past five years, 'significant effort and investment' have been devoted to improving safety, he said, and great progress has been made on all important metrics, with reduced injury frequency and fewer incidents involving equipment breakdowns.

Savings have been achieved through 'reduced corporate overheads and a simpler corporate structure,' he said, not by economizing on safety. Indeed, extra dollars and staff have flowed into operations.

On Atlantis specifically, BP said it identified a problem with vibration in certain pumps but decided it 'was not in itself a cause for safety or environmental concern,' and deferred repairing some pumps until the following budget year.

Mr. Hayward took the helm in May 2007, saying he would focus 'like a laser' on safety and simultaneously improve BP's operations.

In October 2007, he created a management system designed to enforce safety standards consistently across the organization.

Obstacles soon emerged. A 2007 internal document setting out the safety policy spoke of an industry shortage of engineers and inspectors that could endanger plans to implement new standards for inspecting and maintaining critical equipment. An internal presentation in May 2009 cited a shortage of experienced offshore workers and said more training was required to 'maintain safe, reliable and efficient operations.'

The same month he revamped the safety structure, Mr. Hayward said he would streamline BP. An internal presentation to staff showed how problems such as less efficient operations had created a 'growing gap between us and Shell.'

Over the next three years, Mr. Hayward shed 7,500 jobs and pruned costs -- $4 billion in 2009 alone. Buoyed by soaring oil prices, BP made record profits of $25.6 billion in 2008. BP soon rivaled Shell as Europe's most valuable oil company.

Mr. Hayward sought to move beyond BP's troubled past. In October 2007, the company agreed to pay $373 million to settle charges arising from the Texas City blast, oil spills in Alaska and allegations that BP traders manipulated the propane market.

BP went on to invest more than $1 billion upgrading the Texas City refinery. Earlier this year, it said its recordable injury rate there had declined every year since 2005, and that the refinery's 2009 safety performance ranked among the industry's leaders.

But OSHA, the federal overseer of workplace safety, tells a different story.

After a six-month inspection of the Texas City refinery last year, OSHA hit BP with an $87 million fine, the biggest in the agency's history. About $57 million was what OSHA describes as 'failures to abate' hazards similar to those that caused the 2005 explosion, which killed 15 people. BP has contested the fines and says it is now in 'constructive' discussions with OSHA.

The agency had inspected a refinery in Toledo, Ohio, which BP now jointly owns with Husky Energy, in 2006, uncovering problems with pressure-relief valves. It ordered BP to fix the valves. Two years later, inspectors found BP had carried out requested repairs, but only on the specific valves OSHA had cited. The agency found exactly the same deficiency elsewhere in the refinery. OSHA ordered more fixes and imposed a $3 million fine.

'There was clear knowledge of these problems . . . and yet they hadn't been addressed' in other parts of the refinery, said Mr. Barab.

BP's Mr. Gowers said BP has 'worked cooperatively with OSHA' to resolve problems at the refinery. BP said when OSHA imposed the fine that the Toledo refinery had made 'measurable improvement in matters of process safety.'

OSHA's Mr. Barab says because of BP's safety record, the agency scrutinized it more closely than other refiners and imposed tougher penalties because it deserved 'a bit more attention on refinery safety than anyone else.'

Thousands of miles to the northwest, BP was addressing safety issues on its Alaska pipelines. A corroded conduit sprang a large leak in 2006, fouling the tundra.

By the end of 2008, BP had invested $500 million to replace 16 miles of oil-transit lines at Prudhoe Bay, scene of the spill, and install a new leak-detection system.

But BP has continued to experience leaks. Last year, a civil filing by the state against BP said the company's 'poor maintenance practices' have resulted in several spills since 2006. For example, some 1,000 barrels of crude oil, water and gas mixture poured onto the tundra after a 2-foot gash formed in a pipeline in November 2009.

BP said that about a third of its Alaska capital budget of between $800 million and $850 million this year is for safety and integrity projects. It said that since 2006, it has tripled the number of pipeline-corrosion inspections, to more than 100,000 a year.

Relations with Alaska's regulators remain strained, however. In September 2008, a high-pressure natural gas pipeline operated by BP ruptured, sending two segments of pipe flying 900 feet across the tundra. No one was hurt, but the official state report said the incident could have been catastrophic.

'We were able to tie it down to procedures that either were not in place or had not been fully implemented at BP in their management system,' said Allison Iversen, a coordinator at Alaska's Petroleum Systems Integrity Office.

In February 2009, Ms. Iversen sent BP a letter saying it had failed to inspect the stretch of pipeline for more than a decade before it broke. A scheduled 2003 inspection was never performed because the pipe was covered in snow and the company never returned to do it. The state also said it was 'deeply concerned with the timeliness and depth of the incident investigation' conducted by BP. It took four months to provide a report that other oil companies typically submit in two weeks.

BP said it is implementing a plan to address the backlog of pipeline checks and ensure any missed inspections are flagged.

In the Gulf of Mexico, BP hadn't suffered a safety disaster until the Deepwater Horizon. But there had been concerns that one might occur.

An internal BP presentation from December 2007, early in Mr. Hayward's tenure, noted that there had been 10 'high potential' incidents at BP facilities in the Gulf since the start of that year, including one December case in which a worker suffered an electric shock but survived. A common theme, the report found, was a failure to follow BP's own procedures and an unwillingness to stop work when something was wrong.

'As we enter the last two weeks of 2007, we are experiencing an unprecedented frequency of serious incidents in our operations,' Richard Morrison, vice president for Gulf of Mexico production, wrote in an email to staff. 'We are extremely fortunate that one or more of our co-workers has not been seriously injured or killed.'

Mr. Morrison listed five near-miss incidents in November and December, including one in which natural gas escaped from a pipe aboard BP's Pompano platform, threatening an explosion.

BP said it wouldn't comment on this or any other internal communications, and declined to make Mr. Morrison available.

Meanwhile, company officials continued hammering home the message on costs. Mr. Shaw, the Gulf of Mexico head, made the point at a meeting for top managers in Phoenix in April 2008. His aim, according to an internal BP communication, was to instill a 'much stronger performance culture' in the organization, based on strictly managing costs and 'this notion that every dollar does matter.' BP declined to make Mr. Shaw available for comment.

A former BP engineer who retired last year said the Gulf of Mexico operation under Mr. Shaw became focused on meeting performance targets, which determined bonuses for top managers and low-level workers alike. The engineer says even small costs got targeted: BP no longer provided food at lunch meetings, and eliminated the fruit bowls that were offered as part of a healthy-living drive a few years earlier.

In a statement, BP said its cost-cutting should be seen in the context of the sharp fall in oil prices in 2008, which squeezed all oil companies' profits. BP says executives are judged on the safety record of their units, not just on financial or production criteria.

The month after the Phoenix meeting, Mr. Shaw told his staff that efficiency was improving in the drilling and completing of wells.

The number of days it took to drill 10,000 feet was 6% below plan. Idle time had fallen to 24% of total rig days, from 34% in 2007. In May 2009, he said in another memo that BP's output in the Gulf had reached a record 500,000 barrels a day, a year ahead of schedule.

The improvements continued. According to an internal presentation on Gulf drilling performance dated April 13 of this year -- a week before the Deepwater Horizon blast -- BP's estimate for 2010 capital spending on wells in the Gulf fell by $221 million to $2.03 billion.

Some goals were more elusive. A safety steering committee worried that the 'Total Recordable Incident Rate' -- normally measured as total number of incidents resulting in injury or illness for every 200,000 man-hours worked -- was higher than it should be.

The rate was 0.97 for the Gulf drilling unit, over the target of 0.62, say minutes of an August 2009 meeting. 'In order to meet the target will need some zero months,' the minutes say.

BP declined to comment on the memo's specifics but said it showed the company 'continually evaluating the safety of its operations.'

Some think the cost drive affected safety. Workers had 'high incentive to find shortcuts and take risks,' says Ross Macfarlane, a former BP health and safety manager on rigs in Australia who was laid off in 2008. 'You only ever got questioned about why you couldn't spend less -- never more.' BP vigorously denies putting savings ahead of safety.

At a strategy update for investors this March, BP targeted large savings in its drilling operations. BP spends nearly $4 billion a year drilling oil wells. Management said it could slash $500 million off that figure by improving efficiency.

In that regard, the Gulf of Mexico well being drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was an outlier. Deepwater Horizon was the least efficient of the rigs working for BP in the Gulf: A BP chart showed at least 44% of its rig days were nonproductive, a much higher figure than any other vessel.

That pushed up costs, putting Horizon $29 million over budget for 2010, the largest deficit in BP's Gulf fleet.

BP says the amount of down time wouldn't have directly affected total spending on Deepwater Horizon, which was operating under a long-term, fixed-rate contract.

The April 20 explosion on the rig raised questions among congressional investigators about whether BP had cut costs too much. BP denies cost-consciousness played any role in the tragedy.

In a different context, BP had questioned the impact of its cost-cutting in the Gulf. After the 2008 incident on the Atlantis platform, BP's internal report warned of lax safety oversight and tight budgets.

It concluded: 'A key question to ask, especially with apparently minor and disconnected defects, is 'What's the worst thing that could happen?''

Associated Press英国石油得克萨斯城炼油厂在2005年曾发生爆炸，导致15人死亡。图为，这家炼油厂2004年一场大火后的状况。早在2008年6月5日，英国石油公司(BP PLC)位于墨西哥湾的巨型钻井平台──亚特兰蒂斯(Atlantis)上的一根钢管破裂。这根钢管与一个发生故障的管线泵相连。英国石油公司推迟了对这个泵的维修，据内部报告后来描述，其原因在于“成本预算紧张”。

这个裂口导致平台发生小型漏油事故，虽然仅漏油193桶，但英国石油公司的调查者却发现了更大的问题。

他们发现推迟维修是导致事故发生的关键原因，但领导层未明确质疑推迟维修对安全方面的影响。作为英国石油公司最精密的设施之一，亚特兰蒂斯平台的预算被低估，导致总方向与需求发生冲突。

Associated Press2006年，一名英国石油工作人员在阿拉斯加普拉德霍湾清理漏油。当调查者质疑亚特兰蒂斯平台运营不当时，高管们却在赞扬它的运营。

在2009年初的一份内部通信中，时任英国石油公司墨西哥湾分部负责人的尼尔•肖(Neil Shaw)称赞了亚特兰蒂斯平台的运营效率，称其第一年的生产比计划的好4%。他说，在英国石油公司成功成为墨西哥湾第一大石油生产商的过程中，亚特兰蒂斯平台功不可没。

作为这家英国石油巨头最具挑战性的项目之一，亚特兰蒂斯平台的预算被削减彰显了一个问题，即，在首席执行长唐熙华(Tony Hayward)的领导下，英国石油公司在核心问题上出了岔子。

在位于墨西哥湾的深水地平线(Deepwater Horizon)钻井平台于4月20日发生爆炸之前，唐熙华一再表示他正在同时处理两项艰巨的任务：导致出现重大事故（包括2005年得克萨斯炼油厂爆炸亡人事故）的安全隐患；导致英国石油公司落后于竞争对手荷兰皇家壳牌有限公司(Royal Dutch Shell PLC)和埃克森美孚公司(Exxon Mobil Corp)的臃肿成本。

尽管唐熙华的报告称安全情况得到改善，但《华尔街日报》研究了英国石油公司的内部文件、法律文件以及联邦检查员的正式调查和报告，并对监管者进行了访问，结果并不总是与其相符。

在唐熙华出任CEO之前，英国石油公司便因这些问题惹上了麻烦。在他接任之后，英国石油公司继续与监管者就相同的问题出现争执。旗下的一些炼油厂在安全方面的评分仍然较差。在发生阿拉斯加最严重漏油事故四年之后，英国石油公司在当地的管线仍在继续漏油。

美国劳工部负责职业安全与健康管理局(Occupational Safety and Health Administration，下文简称OSHA)的副助理部长巴拉布(Jordan Barab)说，他们声称非常关注安全问题，我认为这是真心话。但不知为什么，他们的真诚与他们的计划在实际的炼油厂里却体现不出来。

英国石油公司坚持认为他们在安全方面翻开了新篇章。公司发言人高尔斯(Andrew Gowers)说，安全、可靠的运营绝对是英国石油公司排在第一位的首要任务。过去五年，为了改善安全情况，公司做出了重要的努力，投入了巨额的资金，在各重要方面均取得了巨大的进展，降低了伤人事件的发生频度，与设备故障有关的事故也有所减少。

他说，通过降低公司运营成本和简化公司结构，而非在安全方面偷工减料，公司达到了节省开支的目的。的确，公司在运营方面投入了更多的财力和人力。

就亚特兰蒂斯平台而言，英国石油公司说发现某些泵存在震动问题但认为它本身不会造成安全或环境问题，并把维修的工作推迟到了下一财年。

2007年5月，唐熙华成为英国石油公司CEO。他说将像激光一样地紧盯安全问题，并同时改善公司的运营情况。

2007年10月，他创立了一个旨在坚持强化全公司安全标准的管理体系。

但很快遇到了障碍。2007年一份展示安全政策的内部文件提到，石油行业内工程师和检查员人手不足可能危及公司实施新的关键设备检修标准的计划。2009年5月的内部报告提到缺少有经验的近海作业员工，并说需要更多的训练以保持安全、可靠、高效的运营。

唐熙华后来更新了公司的安全架构，并在同一个月说将简化英国石油公司的架构以提高效率。供员工观看的内部报告显示了运营效率低下之类的问题如何使英国石油公司与壳牌石油公司之间的差距越来越大。

Reuters纽约Houston街上一个英国石油加油站的标牌被涂抹。在此之后的三年时间里，唐熙华裁减了7,500个工作岗位并减少了支出，仅2009年便减少了40亿美元的支出。2008年，在油价飙升的助推下，英国石油公司创造了256亿美元的利润，打破了公司纪录。英国石油公司迅速超过壳牌公司，成为欧洲市值最高的石油公司。

唐熙华试图摆脱英国石油公司过去的麻烦，开创新的未来。2007年10月，公司同意支付3.73亿美元以和解由得克萨斯城爆炸和阿拉斯加漏油事故引发的官司以及对英国石油公司交易员操纵丙烷市场的指控。

英国石油公司继续投资10多亿美元升级得克萨斯城炼油厂。今年早些时候，该公司说，自2005年以来在得克萨斯城可纪录的伤亡率连年下降，该炼油厂2009年的安全表现位于行业前列。

不过，负责监管劳动安全的联邦机构OSHA却有另外一种说法。

在去年对得克萨斯城炼油厂进行了六个月的检查后，OSHA给英国石油公司开出了一张8,700万美元的罚单，是该机构有史以来开具的最大数额的罚单。其中约有5,700万美元是OSHA所说的“没能减少”与导致2005年爆炸类似的危险；当时的爆炸造成15人死亡。英国石油公司对罚款进行了争辩，表示现在正在与OSHA进行“积极的”讨论。

2006年时，该机构曾检查过俄亥俄州托雷多(Toledo)的一家炼油厂，发现减压阀存在问题。现在英国石油公司和赫斯基能源(Husky Energy)联合拥有这家炼油厂。OSHA下令英国石油公司解决减压阀的问题。两年后，检查人员发现英国石油公司进行了它所要求的修理，不过只是针对OSHA所提到的那些阀门。该机构发现炼油厂的其他地方存在同样的不足。OSHA下令进行更多的维修，并开出了300万美元的罚单。

OSHA的巴拉布说，公司很清楚这些问题的存在，然而炼油厂其他部分的类似问题却没有解决。

英国石油公司的高尔斯说，该公司以合作的态度与OSHA一起解决炼油厂存在的问题。英国石油公司说，当OSHA开出罚单时，托雷多炼油厂在过程安全问题上取得了相当的改善。

OSHA的巴拉布说，鉴于英国石油公司的安全纪录，该机构对它的监管比其他炼油厂更严格，处罚也更严厉，因为它应该在炼油厂安全问题上比其他企业多得到一些关注。

就在西北方向的数千英里外，英国石油公司正在应对阿拉斯加管道的安全问题。2006年，一条受到腐蚀的管道裂开了一个大口子，石油污染了那里的冻土。

2008年底前，英国石油公司已经投资5亿美元替换了漏油地区普拉德霍湾(Prudhoe Bay)长达16英里的输油管道，安装了一个新的漏油探测系统。

不过，英国石油公司继续发生石油泄漏。去年，阿拉斯加州对英国石油公司提起民事诉讼，称该公司糟糕的维护导致2006年以来发生了数起漏油事故。举例来讲，2009年11月一条输油管道出现了一条两英尺长的裂口，约有1,000桶原油、水和天然气的混合物倾泻到冻土上。

英国石油公司说，今年在阿拉斯加8亿到8.50亿美元的资本预算中约有三分之一是用于安全和漏油防治项目的。该公司说，自2006年以来，公司将管道腐蚀检查的次数增加了两倍，至每年10万多次。

不过，英国石油公司与阿拉斯加监管机构的关系仍很紧张。2008年9月，英国石油公司运营的一条高压天然气管道破裂，两块管道碎片飞到了冻土上900英尺远的地方。没有人员受伤，不过州里的官方报告说，事故可能是灾难性的。

阿拉斯加石油系统安全监督办公室(Petroleum Systems Integrity Office)协调人艾弗森(Allison Iversen)说，我们可以将此归因于英国石油公司管理制度中缺漏的程序，或没有去贯彻执行。

2009年2月，艾弗森致函英国石油公司说，在管道破裂之前，管道已经有10多年没有进行检查了。2003年预定的一次检查没有进行，因为管道被雪覆盖，该公司没有再回去进行检查。阿拉斯加州还说，对英国石油公司进行的事故调查的及时性和深度感到深切担忧。该公司花了四个月的时间提供了一份报告，而其他公司通常只要两周时间。

英国石油公司说，正在实施一项计划，来解决管道检查工作的积压，确保任何错过的检查都得到了关注。

在墨西哥湾，英国石油公司在“深水地平线”事故前并没有发生安全灾难。不过曾有这样的担心。

2007年12月唐熙华上任早期，英国石油公司内部的一份报告指出，那一年年初以来，英国在墨西哥湾的设施发生了10起“潜在高危”事故，包括12月的一次事故，事故中一名工人受到了电击，不过幸存了下来。该报告发现，一个常见的问题是其没能遵守英国石油公司自己的程序，在发生问题的时候不愿停工。

负责墨西哥湾生产的副总裁莫里森(Richard Morrison)在写给员工的电子邮件中说，当我们步入2007年最后两周的时候，我们在运营中经历了前所未有频繁的严重事故；我们很幸运，我们的同事没有受重伤或丧生。

莫里森列出11和12月五次死里逃生的事故，其中一次天然气从英国石油Pompano平台泄露，几乎发生爆炸。

英国石油表示，不会对这一或其他内部沟通发表评论，并拒绝让莫里森露面。

与此同时公司高层人士不断向公司内部发出关于成本的信息。掌管墨西哥湾业务的尼尔•肖在2008年4月凤凰城举行的高层管理人员会议上指出了这点。根据内部沟通信息，他的目的是基于严格的管理成本和每一块钱都应物有所值的理念，在公司内部灌输更强业绩的文化。但英国石油拒绝让肖发表评论。

英国石油一位去年退休的前工程师说，肖领导下的墨西哥湾业务关注是否达到表现目标，这决定了高层管理人士及低层工人的奖金水平。该工程师说，即使是小成本也成为目标：英国石油不再在午餐会议上提供食物，并省去了几年前作为健康生活运动一部分的果盘。

英国石油在声明中表示，削减成本一事应该放在2008年油价大跌的背景下来看，油价暴跌挤压了所有石油公司的利润。英国石油说，高层人士以他们所在部门的安全纪录会受到评判，而不仅仅是财务或生产标准。

凤凰城会议后一个月，肖对下属说，油井钻探和完工的效率正在提高。

钻探10,000米所需天数较原计划少6%。空闲时间在钻探总天数中所占比例从2007年的34%降至24%。2009年5月，他在另一份备忘录中说，英国石油在墨西哥湾的日产量已达到创纪录的50万桶，比计划提前一年。

改善在不断涌现。根据日期为今年4月13日的墨西哥湾钻探表现内部演示稿，即深水地平线钻井平台爆炸前的一周，英国石油预计2010年对墨西哥湾油井的资本支出将下降2.21亿美元至20.3亿美元。

一些目标更是难以捉摸。一个安全管理委员会担心“总可纪录事故率”高于应有的水平。这个比率代表着每20万工时的事故或致病次数。

2009年8月一次会议的记录显示，墨西哥湾钻探部门的事故率为0.97，高于0.62的目标，会议记录显示，为了达到这一目标，需要有几个月事故率为零。

英国石油拒绝对备忘录细节发表评论，但说这显示公司在不断评估运营的安全性。

一些人认为成本因素影响了安全。英国石油负责澳大利亚钻井的健康和安全经理麦克法兰（Ross Macfarlane）说，工人们很愿意抄捷径，而这样就会冒险。你只会就你为什么没有花得更少而受到质问，而不管其他。但英国石油极力否认较之安全，更重视节约。麦克法兰于2008年遭到解雇。

今年3月公司向投资者提交了最新策略，英国石油目标是在钻探业务中节省大量资金。英国石油一年在钻探油井上花费至少40亿美元。管理层表示，将通过提高效率，把支出减少5亿美元。

在这方面，一直在墨西哥湾钻探的深水地平线是个异数。深水地平线是英国石油在墨西哥湾效率最低的钻探设备：英国石油一份图表显示，至少44%的钻探天数该平台是不产油的，远高于任一其他钻探平台的水平。

这推高了成本，使深水地平线较2010年预算高出2900万美元，是英国石油墨西哥湾钻探平台中最大笔的财政赤字。

英国石油说，停机时间不会对深水地平线的总体支出产出直接影响。深水地平线基于长期固定费率合同运作。

4月20日的爆炸使国会调查小组怀疑英国石油是否削减成本太甚。英国石油否认成本意识在这次灾难中发挥了任何作用。

在另一场合，英国石油曾经质疑过削减成本对墨西哥湾的影响。2008年亚特兰蒂斯平台发生事故以后，英国石油的内部报告对安全监管疏松和预算紧张发出了警告。

该报告总结道，要问的主要问题是，尤其是在有明显的瑕疵和非连续性缺陷情况下，可能会发生的最糟糕的事情是什么？