【英语国际】漏油事件处理过程曝光 美国政府表现迟钝

On May 19, almost a month after BP PLC's Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, the White House tallied its response to the resulting oil spill. Twenty thousand people had been mobilized to protect the shore and wildlife. More than 1.38 million feet of containment boom had been set to trap oil. And 655,000 gallons of petroleum-dispersing chemicals had been injected into the Gulf of Mexico.

That same day, as oil came ashore on Louisiana's Gulf coast, thousands of feet of boom sat on a dock in Terrebonne Parish, waiting for BP contractors to install it. Two more days would pass before it was laid offshore.

The federal government sprang into action early following the vast BP oil spill. But along the beaches and inlets of the Gulf, signs abound that the response has faltered.

A Wall Street Journal examination of the government response, based on federal documents and interviews with White House, Coast Guard, state and local officials, reveals that confusion over what to do delayed some decision-making. There were disagreements among federal agencies and between national, state and local officials.

The Coast Guard and BP each had written plans for responding to a massive Gulf oil spill. Both now say their plans failed to anticipate a disaster threatening so much coastline at once. The federal government, which under the law is in charge of fighting large spills, had to make things up as it went along.

Federal officials changed their minds on key moves, sometimes more than once. Chemical dispersants to break up the oil were approved, then judged too toxic, then re-approved. The administration criticized, debated and then partially approved a proposal by Louisiana politicians to build up eroded barrier islands to keep the oil at bay.

'We have to learn to be more flexible, more adaptable and agile,' says Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen, the federal government's response leader, in an interview. Because two decades have passed since the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, he says, 'you have an absence of battle-hardened veterans' in the government with experience fighting a massive spill. 'There's a learning curve involved in that.'

It is unclear to what extent swifter or more decisive action by the government would have protected the Gulf's fragile coastline. The White House's defenders say the spill would have overwhelmed any defense, no matter how well coordinated.

President Barack Obama, in his address to the nation Tuesday night, said that 'a mobilization of this speed and magnitude will never be perfect, and new challenges will always arise.' He added: 'If there are problems in the operation, we will fix them.'

Under federal law, oil companies operating offshore must file plans for responding to big spills. The Coast Guard oversees the preparation of government plans. In the event of a spill, the oil company is responsible for enacting its plan and paying for the cleanup, subject to federal oversight. If the spill is serious enough, the government takes charge, directing the response.

BP's plan, submitted to the Minerals Management Service, envisioned containing a spill far larger than government estimates of the Gulf spill. Among other things, it said it would hire contractors to skim oil from the water, spray chemical dispersants on the slick and lay boom along the coast.

The Coast Guard's spill-response plan for the area around New Orleans, updated in August 2009, said that laying boom would be one of the main ways to protect the coastline.

When Adm. Allen took charge of fighting the BP spill, he found that both sets of plans were inadequate for such a large and complex spill.

'Clearly some things could have been done better,' says a BP spokesman about the company's response, which he says has been 'unparalleled.'

President Obama first heard of the problem the night of April 20, when a senior National Security Council aide pulled him aside to tell him a drilling rig 50 miles off the Louisiana coast had exploded. It would be 'potentially a big problem,' the aide said.

Adm. Allen, then the Coast Guard's commandant, was dispatched to the scene; he later said he knew right away the spill would be serious. The next day, Interior Department Deputy Secretary David Hayes flew to Louisiana to set up a command center, leaving Washington in such haste that he had to buy a change of underwear at a Louisiana K-Mart.

On April 22, the day the rig sank, the president convened his first Oval Office meeting on the disaster, with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar and others. As far as they knew, no oil was leaking.

Two days later, the White House received word that oil was escaping into the Gulf. White House science adviser John Holdren, an environmental scientist, pulled aside two top security officials, White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan and National Security Council chief of staff Denis McDonough. He pressed them on what secret technology the government had-a submarine, for example-that could help, Mr. McDonough recalls.

The answer was none.

On the evening of April 28, the NSC's Mr. McDonough and a White House aide interrupted a meeting in the White House's secure situation room. Oil was gushing faster than previously believed. Officials now expected the oil sheen to reach the Louisiana coast the next day.

The federal government's priority was to keep the oil offshore, partly by laying boom. The coast has hundreds of miles of inlets, islands and marshes, which makes that strategy difficult. 'There's not enough boom in the world to boom from Texas to Florida, so we're doing triage,' Benjamin Cooper, a Coast Guard commander, told shrimpers and other residents in Dulac, La., in mid-May.

There were problems from the start. The first weekend in May, when the president made his initial trip to the region, the water was rough. Contractors hired by BP to lay boom off St. Bernard Parish, east of New Orleans, mostly stayed ashore, says Fred Everhardt, a councilman. Shrimpers took matters into their own hands, laying 18,000 feet of boom that weekend, compared to the roughly 4,000 feet laid by the BP contractor, Mr. Everhardt says. BP did not respond to requests for comment about the incident.

Edwin Stanton, the Coast Guard official in charge of the New Orleans region, says workers overseen by the government had laid tens of thousands of feet of boom the first week of the spill. But he acknowledges problems getting it to the right place. He says the Coast Guard decided it needed to accommodate local parish presidents, who all demanded boom even though they all didn't equally need it. Without the competing demands, he says, 'we might have been able to use what boom we had to greater effect.'

To make matters worse, the government didn't have the right kind of boom. Boom built for open ocean is bigger and stronger than that made for flat, sheltered water. The bigger boom is expensive and was in short supply, Mr. Stanton says.

'We really didn't have the appropriate boom sizes,' he says. 'I think we would have liked to put out open-water boom at the big passes, but we just didn't have enough.'

As the oil spread east, Alabama Gov. Bob Riley wanted to stop it from crossing into Perdido Bay, a key to Alabama and Florida's fishing and tourism industries. In mid-May, the governor and Coast Guard officials worked out a plan to hold the oil back using heavy boom built for open ocean. Alabama authorities scoured the globe for the boom they needed, says a spokesman for the governor.

In late May, they found it in Bahrain and flew it to the Alabama coast. Days later, the Coast Guard gave it to Louisiana.

Mr. Riley was furious. The Coast Guard and Alabama authorities instead deployed lighter boom. On June 10, oil breached Perdido Bay.

'This isn't a fight between Louisiana and Alabama, it's not between governors,' the governor's spokesman says. 'But it is incredibly disappointing to have those resources taken from us.'

A spokesman for Adm. Allen says the boom was needed to protect a bay in Louisiana, and was taken 'well before oil was in sight off Alabama.'

Louisiana officials, frustrated that the boom wasn't working, proposed building sand 'berms' along the coast to block oil from reaching shore. Dredges would suck sand from the sea floor and spray it in a protective arc along barrier islands. On May 11, state officials asked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for an emergency permit to build some 130 miles of berms.

Several federal agencies criticized the proposal. In written comments to the Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency said the berms might not be built in time to stop oil from hitting shore. It worried the process might spread oil-tainted sand and change the water's flow, possibly hurting marshes. White House officials also were skeptical.

Frustrated by the delay, Louisiana's Republican governor, Bobby Jindal, sent the Louisiana Army National Guard to plug gaps in barrier islands, for which the state had legal authority.

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson was worried about another threat: the use of dispersants, chemicals designed to break oil into particles that can be digested by bacteria. BP was using unprecedented amounts-about 1.3 million gallons so far, according to federal officials.

According to EPA data, one dispersant, Corexit 9500, is especially toxic to the shrimp and fish used in tests. But it was available in large quantities, so that's what BP was using.

On May 10, with the boom and berm plans foundering, Ms. Jackson met about 25 Louisiana State University scientists to discuss the spill. Most of the scientists urged her not to let BP spray dispersants directly at the leaking well without more research, recalls Robert Carney, one of the LSU professors. Ms. Jackson responded that the EPA was 'under extreme pressure from BP' to approve the move, Mr. Carney recalls. An EPA official confirmed Ms. Jackson met with the LSU scientists.

Five days later, the EPA said it would let BP spray the dispersant on the wellhead.

In mid-May, large globs of oil started washing ashore.

The EPA, under pressure from scientists and environmental groups, abruptly turned against using the dispersant Corexit. On May 20, a day after Ms. Jackson was grilled by lawmakers, the EPA said it had given BP until that night to find a less-toxic alternative or explain why it couldn't. 'We felt it was important to ensure that all possible options were being explored,' Ms. Jackson said.

BP responded in a letter that makers of other dispersants wouldn't be able to supply large volumes for 10 to 14 days. It said it intended to keep using Corexit, which it said 'appears to have fewer long-term effects than other dispersants.'

In Terrebonne Parish, BP contractors still hadn't installed the boom, angering Coast Guard officials. 'I could just see the fury in their eyes,' Michel Claudet, parish president, says of the Coast Guard officials. The poor coordination with BP contractors, he says, 'was just a common occurrence.' Boom installation finally began on May 21.

Interior Secretary Salazar lit into BP on a trip to Louisiana, threatening to 'push them out of the way' and let the government take over ground-level operations. He was contradicted by the Coast Guard's Adm. Allen, who suggested the government didn't have the technical know-how to fight the spill alone.

On May 24, the EPA's Ms. Jackson said the agency wouldn't stop BP from using Corexit, after all, given the lack of alternatives. She said BP would have to 'significantly' cut the amount it was using while it and the EPA looked for a better approach.

Louisiana's Gov. Jindal was losing patience. That same day, Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano traveled to Gulf and poured cold water on Louisiana's berm plan. The administration, she said, was looking into 'some responses that would be as effective' without the environmental risks.

Standing by Ms. Napolitano, Mr. Jindal didn't disguise his frustration. 'We know we have to take action and take matters into our own hands if we are going to win this fight to protect our coast,' he said.

On May 27, the administration changed course on the berms. The Corps of Engineers authorized construction of about 40 miles of the 130 miles of berm proposed by Louisiana. Complicating matters, Adm. Allen ordered BP to pay for only a small portion of the 40 miles, to 'assess' their effectiveness.

Mr. Obama got an earful when he met state and parish officials the next day on a visit to Grand Isle, a barrier island south of New Orleans. BP crews had arrived prior to the president's arrival and worked feverishly to tidy up the beaches. They left after he flew out.

Before leaving, the president ordered Adm. Allen to look into building more berms. On June 1, Adm. Allen convened a meeting in New Orleans, where Gov. Jindal and parish chiefs demanded BP pay for more berms. The next day, Adm. Allen said the administration was ordering BP to pay for all 40 miles authorized. The work began Sunday.

5月19日，在英国石油公司(BP PLC)的深水地平线号石油钻井平台爆炸近一个月后，白宫盘点了它对爆炸所引发石油泄漏的应对之策：有两万人被动员起来去保护海岸和野生动植物；设置了超过138万英尺的拦油栅来遏制油污；将655,000加仑用于分散油污的化学制品注入了墨西哥湾。

John Dooley/Sipa Press华尔街日报调查显示，美国联邦、州和地方政府的犹豫和分歧延缓了对墨西哥湾漏油的控制。就在那一天，当油污向路易斯安那州墨西哥湾沿岸地区靠近时，却有数千英尺长的拦油栅仍堆放在特利勃区(Terrebonne Parish)的一处码头，等待英国石油公司的承包商去安设它们。又过了两天这些拦油栅才被放置到海上。

虽然早在英国石油公司的海上钻井发生大规模原油泄漏之后美国联邦政府就迅速采取了行动，但在墨西哥湾沿岸的海滩和港湾，仍随处可以看到政府对此次灾难应对缓慢的迹象。

《华尔街日报》基于联邦政府的文件、对白宫以及美国海岸警卫队官员、州和地方政府官员的采访，考察了美国政府对事故的应对情况，发现茫然不知所措一定程度上拖延了决策速度。联邦政府各机构之间，以及联邦、州和地方官员之间，对于如何应对漏油事故往往无法达成一致。

美国海岸警卫队和英国石油公司都曾制定过应对墨西哥湾原油大规模泄漏的计划。但它们现在说，事先制定的计划都未能预料到一次漏油灾害会同时威胁到墨西哥湾沿岸如此广阔的地区。联邦政府依据法律要负责应对大规模石油泄漏事故，但它这一次却不得不在灾难发生后手忙脚乱地紧急拼凑各种应对措施。

联邦官员们在重要行动上往往会改变主意，有时还不止一次改变。他们曾批准向海中注入化学品以分散油污，但接下来又认定这些化学制品的毒性太大，可后来还是再度批准了这么做。对于路易斯安那州当地政界人士提出的一项应对举措，联邦政府先是指责，接下来是展开辩论，后来还是予以部分批准了。这项建议是修建一些屏障岛，以阻挡油污蔓延。

美国海岸警卫队司令艾伦(Thad Allen)在接受采访时说，我们不得不学得更灵活、更有适应力、更敏捷。他负责牵头美国联邦政府各机构来应对此次漏油事故。艾伦说，由于埃克森石油公司(Exxon)瓦尔狄兹号油轮(Valdez)在阿拉斯加发生的漏油事故已经过去了20年，政府内部缺乏曾应对过大规模漏油事故的老手，在这方面政府要有一个学习的过程。

不清楚的是，政府在应对此次漏油事故时的迅捷性和决断性需提高到何种程度，墨西哥湾地区脆弱的海岸线才不至于像现在这样受到破坏。为白宫辩解的人士说，无论政府各机构协调得多么好，也不足以完全防止此次事故所造成的损害。

美国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)周二晚间向全国发表讲话时说，目前的救灾动员速度和动员规模远远不能让人满意，新的挑战随时都会出现。他还说，如果救灾过程中出现问题，我们将解决它们。

根据联邦法律，那些从事海上石油开采的公司，必须提交应对大规模漏油事故的预案。海岸警卫队则负责监督政府制定此类应急计划。当发生漏油事故时，石油公司有责任在联邦政府监督下实施自己的应急计划，并承担清除油污的费用。如果漏油事故足够严重，联邦政府将负起责任，全面指导救灾应对工作。

英国石油公司提交给美国矿产资源管理局(Minerals Management Service)的救灾应急计划，其设想的最大漏油规模远比联邦政府估计的此次墨西哥湾原油泄漏规模要大。该公司称，它采取的救灾行动将包括，雇佣承包商将石油从海水中撇去，在油污上喷化学散油剂，以及沿着海岸设置拦油栅。

美国海岸警卫队曾于2009年8月更新了在新奥尔良周围地区应对石油泄漏事故的计划，该计划称设置拦油栅是保护海岸线地区的主要措施之一。

当海岸警卫队司令艾伦接手负责应对英国石油公司此次漏油事故时，他发现英国石油公司和美国海岸警卫队制定的上述计划都不足以应对像此次这样大规模和复杂的漏油事故。

英国石油公司的发言人在谈到该公司对漏油事故的应对时说，显然有些事原本可以做得更好些。他说英国石油公司此次救灾行动的规模是空前的。

奥巴马总统是4月20日夜晚首次听说墨西哥湾此次漏油事故，当时国家安全会议(National Security Council)的一名高级助手把奥巴马拉到一边，对他说离路易斯安那州海岸50英里的一个石油钻井平台发生爆炸。这位助手说，这“有可能是个大事故”。

当时已担任美国海岸警卫队司令的艾伦被派到事发现场考察情况；他后来说，自己马上就意识到此次漏油事故会很严重。第二天，美国内政部副部长希斯(David Hayes)飞往路易斯安那州设立了指挥中心。他离开华盛顿时是如此匆忙，以致于不得不在路易斯安那的K-Mart连锁超市购买了一套换洗的内裤。

在钻井平台沉没的4月22日，奥巴马召集了有关这场灾难的第一次于椭圆形办公室举行的会议，与会者包括国土安全部部长纳波利塔诺(Janet Napolitano)、内政部部长萨拉查(Ken Salazar)等人。据他们所知，当时并没有出现任何石油泄漏。

两天过后，白宫接到报告说，有石油正在流进墨西哥湾。国家安全委员会(National Security Council)办公室主任麦克唐纳(Denis McDonough)回忆，当时环境科学家、白宫科学顾问霍尔德伦(John Holdren)把两位安全高官──白宫反恐顾问布瑞南(John Brennan)和麦克唐纳本人──叫到一边，追问他们政府有什么秘密技术可以帮忙，比如潜艇之类。

答案是没有。

4月28日晚间，国家安全委员会的麦克唐纳和一位白宫幕僚打断了白宫战情室里一场正在进行的会议。石油的涌出速度比原来想象得更快。此时，官员们预计油膜会在第二天抵达路易斯安那州的海岸。

联邦政府的首要任务是防止石油上岸，部分具体措施就是设置拦油栅。海岸线拥有数百英里长的水湾、岛屿和湿地，使这个策略难以实施。海岸警卫队指挥官库柏(Benjamin Cooper)在5月中旬对路易斯安那州Dulac的捕虾人和其他居民说，全世界也没有那么多拦油栅能从得克萨斯一直铺到佛罗里达，所以我们正在做（区分灾情轻重缓急的）“验伤”工作。

问题在一开始就存在。在奥巴马于5月份的第一个周末首次前往灾区时，就出现了一些不顺利的情况。英国石油聘用承包商在新奥尔良东部的St. Bernard Parish附近海岸铺设拦油栅，但市议员埃弗哈特(Fred Everhardt)说，承包商多数时间都呆在岸上不动。埃弗哈特说，捕虾人亲自出马，在那个周末设置了18,000英尺长的拦油栅，相比之下，英国石油聘请的承包商只铺了4,000英尺长。英国石油没有回应就此事件的置评请求。

负责新奥尔良地区的海岸警卫队官员斯坦顿(Edwin Stanton)说，在石油泄漏的第一个星期，政府管辖的工作人员就设置了数万英尺长的拦油栅。但他承认存在配置失当的问题。他说，尽管各地区的实际需求不尽相同，但各地方都要求获得拦油栅，于是海岸警卫队决定都要照顾到。斯坦顿说，如果没有这些互为竞争的要求，我们或许能够让手中的拦油栅发挥更大的效用。

雪上加霜的是，政府没有合适型号的拦油栅。斯坦顿说，用于开阔海域的拦油栅比用于平静且有遮拦水面的拦油栅更大、更结实，但价格昂贵，供应不足。

他说，我们其实并没有合适尺寸的拦油栅，我觉得我们该把用于开阔海域的拦油栅放在大的出海口，但手头的这种拦油栅就是没有那么多。

在漏油向东扩散之际，亚拉巴马州州长利雷(Bob Riley)决定阻止这些石油渗入珀迪多湾(Perdido Bay)，这个海湾对于亚拉巴马和佛罗里达的渔业、旅游业都非常重要。5月中旬，利雷和海岸警卫队制定了一套方案，准备利用开阔海域专用的重型拦油栅把石油阻挡在外。利雷的发言人说，亚拉巴马州有关部门满世界搜寻他们需要的拦油栅。

5月下旬，他们在巴林找到了这种拦油栅，并空运到亚拉巴马州的海边。几天后，海岸警卫队将其交给了路易斯安那州。

利雷甚为恼怒。海岸警卫队和亚拉巴马州有关部门转而设置了更轻型的拦油栅。6月10日，石油冲进了珀迪多湾。

利雷的发言人说，这不是路易斯安娜州和亚拉巴马州之间的争斗，不是州长之间的争斗，但这批资源从我们手里被拿走，实在是令人失望到难以置信。

艾伦的发言人说，那批拦油栅需要用来保护路易斯安那州的一处海湾，而被拿走的时候，石油离漂到亚拉巴马州还有很久。

拦油栅不起作用，路易斯安那州的官员很失望，于是他们提出沿着海岸线修建沙堤，以防止石油冲上海岸。按照这个计划，要用采沙船从海床挖沙子，将其铺洒在一条沿着屏障岛屿而建的弧型区内。5月11日，州政府官员请求美国陆军工兵部队(Army Corps of Engineers)发放紧急许可，允许修建约130英里长的沙堤。

多家联邦专业机构对这一方案给予批评。环境保护署(Environmental Protection Agency)在写给陆军工兵部队的书面评论中说，这些沙堤的修建可能来不及阻止石油上岸。该署担心这个工程可能让受石油污染的沙子四处扩散并改变水流流向，进而有可能给湿地造成损害。白宫官员也持怀疑态度。

路易斯安那州的共和党籍州长金达尔(Bobby Jindal)对联邦政府的拖延感到沮丧，他派遣路易斯安那的国民警卫队去堵上各屏障岛间的缺口，该州有权这样做。

美国环境保护署署长杰克逊(Lisa Jackson)则对使用化学分散剂感到担忧，这些化学品旨在将石油裂解成能被细菌消化的微小粒子。据美国联邦政府官员说，英国石油公司迄今已使用了约130万加仑化学分散剂，数量之大史无前例。

环境保护署的数据显示，经测试，一种名为Corexit 9500的分散剂对鱼虾尤其有毒。但由于这种分散剂能大量供应，因此正在被英国石油公司使用。

5月10日，由于设置拦油栅和沙堤的计划日渐失败，杰克逊与路易斯安那州立大学(Louisiana State University)的约25位科学家开会讨论此次漏油事故。当时与会的该校教授卡尼(Robert Carney)回忆说，大多数科学家敦促杰克逊说，在进行更多研究之前不要让英国石油公司在发生泄漏的油井处直接撒播分散剂。据卡尼回忆，杰克逊回应说，环境保护署受到“来自英国石油公司的巨大压力”要批准这一举动。美国环境保护署的一位官员证实，杰克逊曾会晤过路易斯安那州立大学的科学家们。

环境保护署五天后表示，它将让英国石油公司在发生泄漏的油井处撒播分散剂。

到了5月中旬，大团的油污开始冲上美国海岸。

环境保护署在科学家们和环保团体的压力下，突然开始反对使用Corexit这种分散剂。5月20日，在杰克逊接受国会质询的次日，环境保护署称它已限令英国石油公司在当天晚间之前要么找到一种毒性较轻的分散剂来替代Corexit，要么解释它为何找不到替代品。杰克逊说，我们觉得有必要确保所有可能选择都经过尝试。

英国石油公司在一封信中回应说，生产其他种类分散剂的厂家不能提供10至14天的巨大用量。该公司称，它打算继续使用Corexit，并说这种分散剂与其他分散剂相比“长期影响似乎较低”。

在特利勃区，英国石油公司的承包商们依然未能设立起拦油栅，这令美国海岸警卫队的官员们愤怒。特利勃区区长克劳德特(Michel Claudet)在谈到海岸警卫队官员们时说，我分明能从他们眼睛里看到愤怒。他说，与英国石油公司承包商协调不力的事经常发生。拦油栅设置工作终于在5月21日开始。

美国内政部长萨拉查在一次视察路易斯安那州时向英国石油公司发了火，威胁说要“把他们推到一边”，让政府接管现场运作。他这一表态与美国海岸警卫队司令艾伦的态度大相径庭，后者暗示说政府没有单独应对石油泄漏的专门技术。

5月24日，杰克逊说环境保护署将不会阻止英国石油公司使用Corexit，因为毕竟缺乏其他可替代的分散剂。她说，在英国石油公司和环境保护署寻找更好解决办法的同时，该公司必须大幅削减Corexit的使用量。

路易斯安那州州长金达尔正在失去耐心。美国国土安全部部长纳波利塔诺来到墨西哥湾地区，并给路易斯安那州修筑沙堤的计划泼了冷水。她说，美国政府希望能找到既有同样拦油效果又没有环境风险的办法。

面对纳波利塔诺，金达尔没有掩饰自己的沮丧之情。他说，“我们知道，如果我们想打赢这场保卫我们海岸的战斗，我们就必须采取行动，把主动权掌握在我们自己手里。”

5月27日，联邦政府在沙堤问题上改变了态度。美国陆军工兵部队同意，有关路易斯安那州修筑130英里沙堤的提议，准许其修建约40英里。让事情更加复杂的是，美国海岸警卫队司令艾伦下令英国石油公司只出钱修筑这40英里沙堤的一小部分，以便“评估”修筑沙堤造成的影响。

5月28日，当奥巴马视察新奥尔良南部的屏障岛Grand Isle时，会晤的州和区一级官员都向他大吐苦水。英国石油公司的人员赶在总统到达前来至这里，热火朝天地清理海滩，在总统飞走后他们又离开了。

奥巴马在离开前命令美国海岸警卫队司令艾伦考虑修建更多沙堤。艾伦6月1日在新奥尔良召集了一次会议，金达尔州长和路易斯安那州的区长们要求英国石油公司出钱修建更多沙堤。艾伦在6月2日表示，美国政府将命令英国石油公司出钱修筑那全部40英里沙堤。修筑工作于6月13日开始。

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