【英语国际】美国股市见底了？（下）

The problem with these arguments is that on all the occasions when the market was about to hit its "resistance" line, there has been external intervention of one kind or another from the Fed. Thus these strong days may indicate a response to news, rather than telling anything about the internal forces of the market.

There is evidence - notably from a Merrill Lynch survey last week - that many fund managers have high cash balances that they are keeping on the sidelines. This would provide the fuel for a rally.

Valuation also offers some glimmers that an end to the crisis is in sight. Price/earnings multiples are low: for the S&P, they are currently at about 20, compared with an average since 1990 of about 24, according to Bloomberg. But thanks to falls in earnings, multiples have actually risen since last August.

However, the most popular method for valuing stocks is to compare them with the yields on bonds. If bonds are cheap, offering a high risk-free yield, the traditional theory holds that stocks become less attractive. Recently, bond yields have dropped to very low levels as investors seek low-risk assets during the crisis. On that basis, equities do indeed look under-valued.

Unfortunately, again, this argument is not as persuasive as it sounds. Bonds tend to have a low yield for a reason - the likelihood of a recession. If economic activity slows down, more people buy bonds, and yields fall, but that is still bad news for stocks.

Another issue concerns earnings. Analysts entered the year with what appeared to be wildly optimistic estimates for the profits US companies could make. That has dramatically reversed in recent weeks, at least as far as the current quarter is concerned. While analysts expected S&P 500 companies' earnings to grow at 5.7 per cent at the turn of the year, that has now turned into a forecast for a decline of 7.8 per cent, year on year.

However, this is concentrated in the financial sector, where Wall Street is braced for a fall of 49 per cent in profits. It is debatable whether valuations yet reflect the risks a recession would pose for the earnings of companies beyond banks and brokers.

Finally, optimists dismiss the notion that stocks will have to fall because credit is in the midst of a renewed sell-off. Throughout the market drama of the past few months, stocks have tended to follow credit downwards, with a lag of a few weeks.

Optimists point out that the credit market now implies almost unprecedented levels of default. According to Deutsche Bank, prices available in the credit market imply that European investment-grade companies will default at the rate of about 16 per cent over the next five years. The worst default rate in any five-year period since 1970, according to Moody's, is 2.4 per cent.

Implicit default rates for the UK and the US are even higher. Thus, either the world's economy is heading for a recession without parallel since the second world war, or prices in the credit market are being driven more by the lack of liquidity - as nobody is willing to buy credit - than by the fundamentals.

If the story of the credit market is about lack of liquidity, it should recover once confidence returns. On this argument, it is the price of credit that needs to increase to be in line with stocks, not the other way around.

Pessimists have an array of arguments against the case that the worst is over.

First, the Fed has completely changed the way it goes about lending in the past few weeks. Trust between banks has broken down, and problems in the money markets show that this is not improving. The view is taking hold that this crisis is a turning point that will lead to fundamental changes in the way the financial system works, rather than another downturn in an established cycle.

If this is right, the crisis could have a long way to run. Even if it is wrong, so many people currently fear this kind of scenario that no lasting recovery will be possible until the uncertainty has been put to rest.

There is also a fear that the weaker stock market will at some point become self-reinforcing. Americans have savings concentrated in equities, generally in vehicles (such as 401(k) pension plans) whose value is very transparent. When receiving valuations mon- thly, they are acutely aware of the damage done to their wealth. That could affect spending.

But the biggest problem is that almost all optimists ignore the central issue: the housing market. There is ample evidence that house prices have further to fall. That will be bad for the economy and will also inflict fresh damage on the credit market.

The uncertainty caused by concerns over US house prices is one reason why equity investors who are used to picking out undervalued companies are finding this hard to do. "The actual fundamentals [on many retail stocks] haven't been that bad, but the investor sentiment is so bearish," says Whitney Tilson, founder of T2 Partners. "If you're investing in anything related to the US consumer, you'd certainly want to be following what's going on in the housing markets. The macro factors are what is driving the stock prices and it doesn't matter if our individual stock level analysis is right."

Mr Tilson expects "at least" two more years of falling home prices and very high rates of mortgage default and foreclosure.

Jeffrey Rosenberg, credit strategist at Bank of America, says: "The inability of the Fed to directly impact the underlying source of uncertainty - the erosion in housing - may lead to only a temporary reprieve in market uncertainty."

Perhaps the most convincing argument that we are not yet at the bottom is that so many people think that we are. The clamour to call an end to the crisis in recent weeks in itself shows that optimism has not been extinguished. History's worst bear markets have been punctuated by many rallies when people thought the worst was over.

The collapse of the Dow Jones Industrial Average after 1929, and of the Nasdaq Composite after 2000, saw falls of about 80 per cent over three years. And yet both saw several "bear market rallies" when the index recovered by 20 per cent or more. Hope springs almost eternal.

In both cases the declines ended with the markets bumping along for a while, and then making advances that went unremarked at first. As Ian Harnett of Absolute Strategy puts it: "We'll know we've hit the bottom when we look and see that share prices are a lot higher than they were a few months ago - we won't know at the time."

The case for a bear market rally in the next few weeks looks strong, provided the market can avoid more bad news on the credit front. But it looks hard to call a bottom. One sceptical analyst says: "The bottom will come when everyone at last gives up ever trying to find it." That moment, unfortunately, is not yet in sight.

上述观点的问题在于，在所有情况下，当市场即将触及其“支撑”位时，总会出现来自美联储这样或那样的外部干预。因此，那些市场走强的日子可能是对消息的反应，而没有揭示任何关于市场内部力量的东西。

有证据表明——特别是美林最近的调查发现，许多基金经理备有大量现金余额。这将为股市反弹提供动力。

估值也提供了一些迹象，表明危机结束指日可待。彭博(Bloomberg)的数据显示，目前市盈率处于低位：标准普尔指数市盈率目前为20倍左右，而自1990年以来，其平均市盈率约为24倍。但由于收益下降，自去年8月以来，其市盈率实际上一直在上升。

然而，最受欢迎的股票估值衡量方法，是将其与债券收益率进行比较。如果债券价格低，提供较高的无风险收益率，那么根据传统理论，股票的吸引力就下降了。最近，因为投资者在危机中寻求低风险资产，债券收益率已降至非常低的水平。根据这个理论，股票看上去确实被低估了。

不幸的是，这一看法并不像听上去那样具有说服力。债券收益率往往因某种原因（例如经济衰退的可能性）而处于低位。如果经济活动放缓，更多人会购买债券，收益率将随之下跌，但这对于股市而言仍是一个坏消息。

另一个问题与盈利有关。今年年初，分析师对美国企业利润作出了似乎极为乐观的预测。最近几周，这一情况出现巨大逆转——至少当前季度如此。今年年初，分析师预测标普500指数成分股企业的盈利将增长5.7%，而如今的预测则是较去年同期下降7.8%。

然而，这一问题集中在金融领域，而华尔街已做好了利润减少49%的准备。目前存在争议的问题是，目前的估值是否反映了经济衰退将对银行和经纪公司之外的公司盈利所构成的风险。

最后，乐观主义者并不认为，因为信贷价格再次处于下跌行情，股市将不得不下跌。在过去几个月的市场行情中，股市往往追随信贷价格下行趋势，时间通常滞后几周。

乐观主义者指出，信贷市场如今暗示，违约率几乎达到空前水平。德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)的数据显示，信贷市场目前的价格暗示，未来5年，欧洲投资级公司违约率约为16%。而穆迪(Moody’s)的数据显示，自1970年以来的任何一个5年期，最为糟糕的违约率为2.4%。

英国和美国的隐含违约率更高。因此，要么全球经济将走向衰退，自二战以来没有任何可对比的时期，要么信贷市场价格更多因为流动性不足（因为没有人希望购买信贷）而非基本面因素。

如果信贷市场的情况是流动性不足，那么一旦信心回归，信贷市场就应复苏。根据这一论据，信贷价格需要与股票一同上涨，而非相反。

悲观主义者有很多论据反对危机已然结束的观点。

首先，过去几周，美联储完全改变了其贷款方式。银行之间的信任已然崩塌，货币市场的问题表明，情况没有得到改善。一个站得住脚的观点是，这场危机是一个转折点，将彻底改变金融体系运转的方式，而不是现有周期中的一个低迷阶段。

如果这种观点是正确的，那么，这场危机可能还要延续很长时间。即便这种观点是错的，许多人目前也担心这种前景：只有消除了不确定性，才有可能出现持续的复苏。

人们还担心，下跌的股市将在未来某个时间产生自我加强的效应。美国人的储蓄集中在股市，通常为估值非常透明的工具（例如401(K)养老金计划）。当美国人每月收到估值报表时，他们非常明白这对他们财富的影响。这可能影响他们的支出。

但最大的问题在于，几乎所有的乐观主义者都忽视了一个中心问题：住宅市场。有充足的证据表明，住宅价格将继续下跌。这将不利于经济的发展，并将对信贷市场造成新的损害。

有些股市投资者过去习惯于选出价值被低估公司，但他们发现现在这样做很难，对美国住宅价格的担心所引发的不确定性是原因之一。“（许多零售类股的）真正基本面因素并非那么糟糕，但投资者人气非常悲观，”T2 Partners创始人惠特尼•蒂尔森(Whitney Tilson)表示，“如果你正投资于与美国消费者相关的产品，你肯定希望追随美国住宅市场的走势。宏观因素是股价的推动因素，如果我们对个股价格水平的分析正确，那宏观因素就没有关系。”

蒂尔森预测，住宅价格不断下跌、抵押贷款违约率和抵押赎回权丧失率处于非常高水平的现象将“至少”持续两年多时间。

美国银行(Bank of America)信贷策略师杰弗里•罗森伯格(Jeffrey Rosenberg)表示：“美联储无法直接影响不确定性的根本来源（住宅市场低迷），可能仅会暂时缓和市场的不确定性。”

认为我们迄今尚未触底，最具说服力的论据可能是：许多人认为我们已经触底。最近几周，很多人高呼这场危机即将结束，这些喧嚣本身表明，乐观主义尚未熄灭。在历史上最糟糕的熊市时期，当人们认为最糟糕的情形已经结束时，市场出现过很多反弹。

1929年，道琼斯指数(DJIA)暴跌；2000年，纳斯达克综合指数(Nasdaq Composite)崩盘。它们在随后3年内的跌幅约为80%。但两个指数均出现了几次“熊市反弹”，当时指数反弹了20%或更多。人们总是抱有希望。

在这两个例子里，股指下跌最后都出现了一段时期的上下震荡，随后股指上涨，但最初并不被人注意。就像绝对战略公司(Absolute Strategy)的伊恩•哈尼特(Ian Harnett)所说：“当我们发现股价远远高于几个月前时，我们会知道我们已经触底——但当时我们不会知道。”

未来几周，如果市场能够避免信贷市场的更多坏消息，熊市反弹的理由看上去非常充分。但看上去这很难被称作底部。一位持怀疑态度的分析师表示：“当所有人最后都放弃寻找底部的时候，底部就出现了。”不幸的是，那个时刻迄今尚未出现。

译者/何黎

链接：美国股市见底了？（上）