【英语国际】美国是否走向财政大灾难？

Is the US (and a number of other high-income countries) on the road to fiscal armageddon? Are recent jumps in government bond rates proof that investors are worried about fiscal prospects? My answers to these questions are: No and No. This does not mean there is no reason for worry. It is rather that there are powerful arguments against fiscal retrenchment right now and strong reasons for welcoming recent moves in the bond markets.

Last week, the Financial Times carried two columns arguing that the US fiscal path was unsustainable, one by Stanford University's John Taylor and the other by the Harvard historian Niall Ferguson. The latter, in turn, was a comment on a debate with, among others, the New York Times columnist and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman at the end of April.

On one point all serious analysts agree: public debt cannot rise, relative to gross domestic product, without limit. To embark on fiscal stimulus in the short run, one must be credible in the long run.

So what is the disagreement? Prof Ferguson made three propositions: first, the recent rise in US government bond rates shows that the bond market is “quailing” before the government's huge issuance; second, huge fiscal deficits are both unnecessary and counterproductive; and, finally, there is reason to fear an inflationary outcome. These are widely held views. Are they right?

The first point is, on the evidence, wrong. The jump in bond rates is a desirable normalisation after a panic. Investors rushed into the dollar and government bonds. Now they are rushing out again. Welcome to the giddy world of financial markets.

At the end of December 2008, US 10-year treasury yields fell to the frighteningly low level of 2.1 per cent from close to 4 per cent in October (see chart). Partly as a result of this fall and partly because of a surprising rise in the yield on inflation-protected bonds (TIPS), implied expected inflation reached a low of close to zero. The deflation scare had become all too real.



What has happened is a sudden return to normality: after some turmoil, the yield on conventional US government bonds closed at 3.5 per cent, last week, while the yield on TIPS fell to 1.9 per cent. So expected inflation went to a level in keeping with Federal Reserve objectives, at close to 1.6 per cent. Much the same has happened in the UK, with a rise in expected inflation from a low of 1.3 per cent in March to 2.3 per cent. Fear of deflationary meltdown has gone. Hurrah!

It is true that spreads between conventional US bonds and bonds issued by Germany and the UK have narrowed (see chart). But US yields were extraordinarily depressed during the panic. Normality returns.

If inflation expectations are not worth worrying about, so far, what about the other concern caused by huge bond issuance: crowding out of private borrowers? This would show itself in rising real interest rates. Again, the evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary.

The most recent yield on TIPS is below 2 per cent, while that on UK index-linked securities is close to 1 per cent. Meanwhile, as confidence has grown, spreads between corporate bonds and treasuries have fallen (see chart). One can also use estimates of expected inflation derived from government bonds to estimate real rates of interest on corporate bonds. These have also fallen sharply (see chart). While riskier bonds are yielding more than they were two years ago, they are yielding far less than in late 2008. This, too, is very good news indeed.

Now turn to the fiscal policy. The argument advanced by opponents is either that fiscal policy is always unnecessary and ineffective or, as prof Ferguson suggests, redundant, because this is not a “Great Depression”. Monetarists argue fiscal policy is always unnecessary, since monetary expansion does the trick. Economists who believe in “Ricardian equivalence” – after the early-19th-century economist David Ricardo – argue fiscal policy is ineffective, because households will offset any government dis-saving with their own higher savings.

Economists disagree fiercely on these points. My approach is “Keynesian”: in extreme moments, the excess of desired savings over investment soars. Again, monetary policy, while important, becomes less effective when interest rates are zero. It is then wise to wear both monetary belt and fiscal braces.

A deep recession proves there is a huge rise in excess desired savings at full employment, as prof Krugman argues. At present, therefore, fiscal deficits are not crowding the private sector out. They are crowding it in, instead, by supporting demand, which sustains jobs and profits.

Prof Ferguson argues that fiscal expansion was unnecessary because this is only a mild recession. The question, however, is why it is only a mild recession, since precursors of a depression were surely present.

The answer, in part, is the aggressive monetary policies of central banks and the rescue of the financial system. But is that all? What would have happened if governments had decided to cut spending and raise taxes? One might disagree on how much deliberate fiscal loosening was needed. But one of the most important reasons this is not the Great Depression is that we have learnt a lesson from experience then, and in Japan in the 1990s: do not tighten fiscal policy too soon. Moreover, historically well-run economies are certainly able to support higher levels of public indebtedness very comfortably.

This, then, brings us to the last concern: the fear of inflation. This is essentially the question of how to exit from current extreme policies. People need to believe that the extraordinarily aggressive monetary and fiscal policies of today will be reversed. If they do not believe this, there could well be a big upsurge in inflationary expectations long before the world economy has recovered. If that were to happen, policymakers would be caught in a painful squeeze and the world might indeed end up in 1970s-style stagflation.

The exceptional policies used to deal with extreme circumstances are working. Now, as a result, policymakers are walking a tightrope: on one side are premature withdrawal and a return to deep recession; on the other side are soaring inflationary expectations and stagflation. It is irresponsible to insist either on immediate tightening or on persistently loose policies. Both the US and the UK now risk the latter. But their critics risk making an equal and opposite mistake. The answer is both clear and tricky: choose sharp tightening, but not yet.

美国（和其它许多高收入国家）是否走在财政大灾难的路上？近期政府债券收益率上扬是否验证了投资者对财政前景的担忧？我给这些问题的答案是：除了否定，还是否定。这并不意味着不存在担忧的理由。毋宁说，目前存在反对财政紧缩的有力论据，以及欢迎近期债券市场动向的强劲理由。

上周，英国《金融时报》(FT)开辟两个专栏，声称美国财政措施不可持续，一篇由斯坦福大学的约翰·泰勒(John Taylor)撰稿，另一篇由哈佛历史学家尼尔·弗格森(Niall Ferguson)执笔。后者是对四月底一场与他人论战的评论，论战对方是美国《纽约时报》(New York Times)的专栏作家、诺贝尔奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)。

严肃的分析人士在一个问题上是有共识的：相对于国内生产总值，公共债券不可无限制上升。想要实行短期财政刺激，必须具有长期信用。

那分歧又在何处呢？弗格森教授提出三点主张：首先，近期美国政府债券收益率上扬，表明债券市场面对政府大规模发债感到“恐慌”；其次，大规模的财政赤字不但没有必要，而且会产生反作用；最后，人们有理由担忧这会带来通胀后果。人们广泛持有这种观点，但正确吗？

有证据显示，第一个观点是错误的。债券收益率上扬是恐慌之后心态恢复正常的理想表现。投资者蜂拥投资于美元和政府债券。现在他们又大批涌出。欢迎回到金融市场多彩而迷乱的世界。

2008年12月底，美国10年期国债的收益率从10月的近4%跌至2.1%的恐慌性低位（见图表）。部分由于这样的下跌，部分由于通胀保护债券(TIPS)收益率飙升，暗示通胀预期已达到接近零的低点。通缩担忧则已变得太真切了。

发生的情况是一切突然间恢复常态：些许动荡之后，上周，传统美国政府债券收益率收于3.5%，通胀保护债券则跌至1.9%。因此，预期通胀达到了接近1.6%的水平，与美联储(Fed)目标值一致。英国的情况极其相似，预期通胀从3月份1.3%的低点上升至2.3%。通缩灾难的担忧终于消解。值得欢呼！

不错，传统美国债券和徳英两国政府发行的债券之间的利差已经缩小（见图表）。但美国债券收益率在经济恐慌期间尤其被打压。常态在恢复。



迄今为止，如果通胀预期不足为虑，那么，大规模债券发行引发的其它担忧又如何呢：大规模逃离私营部门的发债人吗？这将自我体现在实际利率的上升上。证据再一次不可抗拒地指向反面。

通胀保护债券最近的收益率低于2%，而英国指数挂钩证券的收益率接近1%。同时，随着信心的增长，公司债和国债之间的利差收窄了（见图表）。人们也可利用从政府债券衍生的预期通胀估值去估计公司债券的实际收益率。这些数据都已急剧下滑（见图表）。虽然风险更高的债券收益率高于两年前的水平，但其收益率远低于2008年末。其实，这同样是非常好的消息。

现在来谈谈财政政策。反对者提出的论据是，要么是财政政策总是不必要的且无效，要么如弗格森教授所说是多余的，原因在于目前不是“大萧条”。货币主义者辩称，由于货币扩张能起到作用，所以财政政策总是没有必要。信奉“李嘉图等价”定理（以19世纪经济学家大卫·李嘉图(David Ricardo)的名字命名）的经济学家认为，财政政策无效，因为对于政府的负储蓄，家庭部门将以提高自身储蓄加以补偿。

经济学家在这些论点上的分歧相当激烈。我的思路是“凯恩斯主义”的：在极端情况下，相对于投资意愿的过度储蓄意愿将大幅上升。此外，货币政策虽然重要，但利率为零时将变得不那么有效。这时，明智的做法是既系好货币政策的腰带，又用上财政政策的背带。

根据弗格森教授的观点，经济深度衰退就证明，在充分就业的情况下，过度储蓄意愿会有极大的提升。因此，目前财政赤字并未对私人部门造成挤出效应。相反，通过支撑需求，私人部门正在不断涌入，维持了就业和利润。

弗格森教授辩称，由于这只是温和经济衰退，因而财政扩张没有必要。但问题是，既然萧条的先兆已显露无疑，为何这仅仅是一场温和的衰退呢？

部分答案是各国央行激进的货币政策和对金融体系的拯救。但这就是全部吗？如果政府当初决定削减开支并提高税收，会出现怎样的情况呢？需要多少审慎的财政放松政策，人们或许存在分歧。但这之所以不是一场大萧条，重要原因之一是，我们已从当时以及20世纪90年代日本的经历中获得了教训：不要太快收紧财政政策。而且，历来经营有方的经济体必然有能力相当轻松地承受更高水平的公共债务。

这一点将我们带入最后一个关心的问题：通胀担忧。本质上这是如何从当前极端政策中退出的问题。人们必须相信，当前十分激进的货币和财政政策终将逆转。否则，远在世界经济复苏之前，就非常有可能出现通胀预期大飙升。这种情况一旦发生，政策制定者将陷入一场痛苦的政策挤压，世界或许真的终结于20世纪70年代式的通货滞胀。

用于对付极端情形的特殊政策在发挥作用。如今的结果是，政策制定者在走钢丝：一边是过早退出、回到深度衰退；一边是高昂的通胀预期和通货滞胀。无论坚持政策立刻收紧还是持久放松都是不负责任的。眼下美国和英国都有可能出现后者的情形。而它们的批评人士则在冒犯相同而又相反错误的风险。答案不仅明确而且巧妙：选择急剧收紧，但时机未到。

译者/红岭