【英语社会】为何制造恐慌？

Do you remember swine flu? Or the millennium bug? The dangers of salmonella in eggs or of cheese made from unpasteurised milk? These scare stories played for a time and were then forgotten: but cost large amounts of money and caused anxiety and loss to many individuals.

Some scares catch on: others do not. It is nonsense to claim that the dangers of the credit expansion of 2003-07 could not have been foreseen; those who did foresee problems could not attract public attention or political support for their views. Those warning of the danger of easy availability of nuclear technology and of poor control of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons have experienced something similar.

Successful promotion of a scare requires that some interest group benefits. Sometimes this is the scare-promoters themselves. Scientists have learnt that exaggerated claims are a route to a media profile and research funding. There is little downside in predicting disaster: if it does not materialise they can claim to have been instrumental in staving it off. Scares that thrive, such as the millennium bug and swine flu, have commercial interests that benefit from their propagation. Naysayers in the credit boom, by contrast, were trampled in the rush to share the riches available to those who denied or disregarded the dangers.

The regulator, or politician, confronted with warnings of danger faces twin pressures of commercial interest and public opinion. Industries are a permanent lobbying presence. Public concern, by contrast, is fickle: it may be strong when aroused, but unless supplied with a string of newsworthy events – dead bodies, corporate collapses, scandalous exposures – it soon fades.

When public and commercial interests operate in the same direction, the outcome is clear, but not when they conflict. That is why swine flu produced an exaggerated response but no action was taken to restrain the credit boom (the creation of a new collateralised debt obligation was never newsworthy).

The tension between commercial and public interest can lead to tipping points. The problem of bovine spongiform encephalopathy – mad cow disease – was at first unjustifiably minimised; but then greatly exaggerated. In the early phase, the issue was managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which represented the farming industry; later, the Department of Health, whose concerns were for patient and medical interests, took over.

Public anger at bankers is now so great that it threatens to overwhelm even their legendary lobbying capabilities. When Gordon Brown, the UK prime minister, last weekend accused Goldman Sachs of moral bankruptcy, it was not because the US bank's behaviour had changed.

The most dramatic tipping point was September 11: a period, before the attacks, in which those who pointed to the threat from al-Qaeda had been marginalised was followed by one in which the threat was used as a rationale for repressive actions including invading foreign countries.

The politician or regulator has the impossible job of steering a way through these conflicting pressures. “The safety of the public must always come first” is a compelling mantra – but only if the public really believe their safety is in jeopardy. “No one could possibly have anticipated this disaster” is another common line of defence.

We want our experts to talk certainties, not assess probabilities. The explanation “we thought an event might occur but underestimated its likelihood or severity” is never acceptable: but that outcome does, and should, happen often to people who make nuanced decisions in complex environments. The political and regulatory incentives are either to downplay risks or exaggerate them – or to do each at different times.

So if, like me, you find yourself stranded by the grounding of Europe's aircraft, pity the poor regulators. Would you rather appear on television to explain why you had disrupted the holiday and business plans of an entire continent, or to tell viewers why you had failed to respond to a well-publicised danger?

还记得猪流感或千年虫吗？你对鸡蛋中的沙门氏菌或未消毒牛奶所制奶酪造成的危险还有印象吗？这些引起恐慌的事件在轰动一段时间后便被人们遗忘，但它们消耗了大量的金钱，还导致许多人忧心忡忡并遭受损失。

有些恐慌传播开了，有些则没有。有人声称2003-07年信贷扩张的危险不可预见，这纯属无稽之谈。那些在当时预见到问题的人，无法吸引公众注意力，也无法让政界支持自己的观点。那些曾对核技术获取之轻易和前苏联核武控制之糟糕的危险发出警告的人，有过与此类似的经历。

成功宣扬某种恐慌的必要条件之一，是某个利益集团会从中得益。有时候，受益的利益集团就是恐慌宣扬者自己。科学家们已懂得，夸大其词是获得媒体亮相机会和研究经费的一条捷径。预言灾难几乎毫无坏处：如果灾难没有出现，他们可以声称预言对防止灾难起到了重要作用。对千年虫和猪流感等传播甚广的恐慌来说，有商业利益集团从恐慌传播中受益。相比之下，在信贷繁荣时期，人们争相瓜分为否认或不理会危险者准备的财富，唱反调者则被视若无物。

那些面对危险警告的监管者或政界人士，面临着商业利益和民意两方面的压力。产业界的游说永远存在。相比之下，公众的关注则变幻无常：这类关注在被唤醒之时可能很强烈，但假若没有一连串具有新闻价值的事件予以支撑——例如死尸、企业倒闭、丑闻曝光——便会很快消退。

当公众利益和商业利益彼此一致时，结果是明确的；而当它们彼此冲突时，结果就难说了。这便是为何猪流感引发了夸张的回应、而人们却未采取任何行动来遏制信贷繁荣（新债务抵押债券(CDO)的创建从未成为具有新闻价值的事件）。

商业利益和公众利益之间的紧张可能导致事态逆转。牛海绵状脑病（疯牛病）问题最初被毫无道理的极力淡化，但随后又被极力夸大。在前期，管理该问题的是代表农业的英国农渔食品部(Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food)；后来，代表患者利益和医疗利益的英国卫生部(Department of Health)接管了该问题。

如今，公众对银行家的怒火极为强烈，连后者那传奇般的游说能力似乎也抵挡不住。英国首相戈登?布朗(Gordon Brown)最近指责高盛(Goldman Sachs)道德沦丧，并不是因为这家美国银行的所作所为与以往不同。

最具戏剧性的逆转点是“9/11”：在袭击发生之前那段时期，那些指出基地组织之威胁的人遭到边缘化；而在袭击发生之后那段时期，这一威胁却被当作展开打击行动的一项理由，这些行动包括入侵外国。

政界人士或监管者有一项不可能完成的任务，就是在上述彼此冲突的压力中找出一条路来。“必须始终把公众的安全放在首位”是一句颇有说服力的口号——但前提是公众真的相信自己的安全受到了威胁。“没人能预见到这场灾难”则是一个常见的辩护理由。

我们希望我们的专家谈谈确定之事，而不是去评估可能之事。“我们认为某事可能发生，但对它的发生几率或严重性估计不足”，这样的解释永远是不可接受的：但那些在复杂环境中做细微决定的人，却的确（也应当）经常遇到这一结果。政治方面和监管方面的激励要么会淡化风险，要么会夸大风险——要么这次淡化、下次夸大。

所以，如果你像我一样发现自己被欧洲航班停飞所困，那就体谅一下可怜的监管者们吧。你是愿意在电视上解释为何扰乱了整个欧洲大陆的度假及商务计划，还是愿意告诉观众，自己为何未能对一项广泛报道的危险做出反应？

译者/汪洋