【英语社会】奥巴马金融计划为何会失败

Has Barack Obama's presidency already failed? In normal times, this would be a ludicrous question. But these are not normal times. They are times of great danger. Today, the new US administration can disown responsibility for its inheritance; tomorrow, it will own it. Today, it can offer solutions; tomorrow it will have become the problem. Today, it is in control of events; tomorrow, events will take control of it. Doing too little is now far riskier than doing too much. If he fails to act decisively, the president risks being overwhelmed, like his predecessor. The costs to the US and the world of another failed presidency do not bear contemplating.

What is needed? The answer is: focus and ferocity. If Mr Obama does not fix this crisis, all he hopes from his presidency will be lost. If he does, he can reshape the agenda. Hoping for the best is foolish. He should expect the worst and act accordingly.

Yet hoping for the best is what one sees in the stimulus programme and – so far as I can judge from yesterday's sketchy announcement by Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary – also in the new plans for fixing the banking system. I commented on the former last week. I would merely add that it is extraordinary that a popular new president, confronting a once-in-80-years' economic crisis, has let Congress shape the outcome.

The banking programme seems to be yet another child of the failed interventions of the past one and a half years: optimistic and indecisive. If this “progeny of the troubled asset relief programme” fails, Mr Obama's credibility will be ruined. Now is the time for action that seems close to certain to resolve the problem; this, however, does not seem to be it.

All along two contrasting views have been held on what ails the financial system. The first is that this is essentially a panic. The second is that this is a problem of insolvency.

Under the first view, the prices of a defined set of “toxic assets” have been driven below their long-run value and in some cases have become impossible to sell. The solution, many suggest, is for governments to make a market, buy assets or insure banks against losses. This was the rationale for the original Tarp and the “super-SIV (special investment vehicle)” proposed by Henry (Hank) Paulson, the previous Treasury secretary, in 2007.

Under the second view, a sizeable proportion of financial institutions are insolvent: their assets are, under plausible assumptions, worth less than their liabilities. The International Monetary Fund argues that potential losses on US-originated credit assets alone are now $2,200bn (€1,700bn, £1,500bn), up from $1,400bn just last October. This is almost identical to the latest estimates from Goldman Sachs. In recent comments to the Financial Times, Nouriel Roubini of RGE Monitor and the Stern School of New York University estimates peak losses on US-generated assets at $3,600bn. Fortunately for the US, half of these losses will fall abroad. But, the rest of the world will strike back: as the world economy implodes, huge losses abroad – on sovereign, housing and corporate debt – will surely fall on US institutions, with dire effects.

Personally, I have little doubt that the second view is correct and, as the world economy deteriorates, will become ever more so. But this is not the heart of the matter. That is whether, in the presence of such uncertainty, it can be right to base policy on hoping for the best. The answer is clear: rational policymakers must assume the worst. If this proved pessimistic, they would end up with an over-capitalised financial system. If the optimistic choice turned out to be wrong, they would have zombie banks and a discredited government. This choice is surely a “no brainer”.

The new plan seems to make sense if and only if the principal problem is illiquidity. Offering guarantees and buying some portion of the toxic assets, while limiting new capital injections to less than the $350bn left in the Tarp, cannot deal with the insolvency problem identified by informed observers. Indeed, any toxic asset purchase or guarantee programme must be an ineffective, inefficient and inequitable way to rescue inadequately capitalised financial institutions: ineffective, because the government must buy vast amounts of doubtful assets at excessive prices or provide over-

generous guarantees, to render insolvent banks solvent; inefficient, because big capital injections or conversion of debt into equity are better ways to recapitalise banks; and inequitable, because big subsidies would go to failed institutions and private buyers of bad assets.

Why then is the administration making what appears to be a blunder? It may be that it is hoping for the best. But it also seems it has set itself the wrong question. It has not asked what needs to be done to be sure of a solution. It has asked itself, instead, what is the best it can do given three arbitrary, self-imposed constraints: no nationalisation; no losses for bondholders; and no more money from Congress. Yet why does a new administration, confronting a huge crisis, not try to change the terms of debate? This timidity is depressing. Trying to make up for this mistake by imposing pettifogging conditions on assisted institutions is more likely to compound the error than to reduce it.

Assume that the problem is insolvency and the modest market value of US commercial banks (about $400bn) derives from government support (see charts). Assume, too, that it is impossible to raise large amounts of private capital today. Then there has to be recapitalisation in one of the two ways indicated above. Both have disadvantages: government recapitalisation is a bail-out of creditors and involves temporary state administration; debt-for-equity swaps would damage bond markets, insurance companies and pension funds. But the choice is inescapable.

If Mr Geithner or Lawrence Summers, head of the national economic council, were advising the US as a foreign country, they would point this out, brutally. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, IMF managing director, said the same thing, very gently, in Malaysia last Saturday.

The correct advice remains the one the US gave the Japanese and others during the 1990s: admit reality, restructure banks and, above all, slay zombie institutions at once. It is an important, but secondary, question whether the right answer is to create new “good banks”, leaving old bad banks to perish, as my colleague, Willem Buiter, recommends, or new “bad banks”, leaving cleansed old banks to survive. I also am inclined to the former, because the culture of the old banks seems so toxic.

By asking the wrong question, Mr Obama is taking a huge gamble. He should have resolved to cleanse these Augean banking stables. He needs to rethink, if it is not already too late.

巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)作为总统是否已经失败？在正常时期，这会是个可笑的问题。但目前是非常时期，是面临巨大危险的时期。现在，美国新政府可以声明对继承的政策“遗产”不负责任；但在不远的将来，它将必须负责。现在，它可以提供解决方案；将来，它自己将变成问题。现在，它掌控着时局；将来，它将被时局掌控。如今，做得太少远比做得太多更危险。如果奥巴马未能果断行动，他将遭受翻船的危险，就像其前任一样。若又一位美国总统失败，无法想象美国乃至世界将要付出的代价。专注和坚决

那么奥巴马需要做些什么？答案是：专注和坚决。如果他不能解决这场危机，那么他任内的所有期望都将落空。而如果他做到了，他就可以重塑议程。凡事都往好处想很愚蠢。他应做最坏的打算，并采取相应行动。

不过，不论是先前的经济刺激方案，还是美国财长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)2月10日宣布的修复银行业体系的新计划，人们从中看到的是，政府总在把事情往最好的方向想。上周，我已就前者撰文发表评论。在此我仅补充一点：一位深得人心的新总统，面对80年一遇的经济危机，竟然允许国会去敲定刺激方案的最终版本，这是极不寻常的。

银行业修复计划似乎是过去一年半失败的政府干预的又一个产物：乐观且优柔寡断。如果这个“第二代问题资产救助计划(Tarp)”失败，奥巴马将会丧失可信度。目前是采取看上去万无一失能够解决问题的行动的时候；然而，这份计划看上去并不是。

关于金融体系的症结所在，自始自终有两种截然对立的观点。第一种认为，这从根本上讲是一种恐慌。第二种认为，这是是否资不抵债的问题。

根据第一种观点，一批特定“问题资产”的价格已被压至其长期价格以下，有时已没有出售的可能性。许多人认为，解决办法是让政府活跃市场，购买资产或为银行损失承保。这正是Tarp初始计划和前任财政部长汉克•保尔森(Hank Paulson)2007年提议的 “超级结构性投资工具”(super-SIV)的思路。

根据第二种观点，相当一部分金融机构都丧失了偿付能力：依照可信的假设，它们的资产价值低于负债。国际货币基金组织(IMF)认为，目前，仅源自美国的信贷资产潜在损失就高达2.2万亿美元，而就在去年10月份这个数字还只有1.4万亿美元。这与高盛(Goldman Sachs)最新的估计几乎完全一致。RGE Monitor主席、纽约大学(NYU)斯特恩商学院(Stern School)教授鲁里埃尔•鲁比尼(Nouriel Roubini)近期对英国《金融时报》发表评论时估计，源自美国的资产损失最高可达3.6万亿美元。对美国而言幸运的是，其中半数损失将落至海外。不过，世界其它地区将进行回击：随着全球经济从内部塌垮，主权债务、住房贷款和企业债务方面的巨额海外损失，无疑将最终落到美国机构头上，产生可怕的后果。

资不抵债才是问题

就个人而言，我毫不怀疑第二种观点的正确性，而且随着全球经济日益恶化，它将更加明显。但这并非问题的本质。本质在于，面对这种不确定性，依据最乐观的期望来制定政策是否合适。答案很清楚：理性的政策制定者必须做最坏的打算。如果这被证明过于悲观，他们最多只会拥有资本过于充足的金融体系。而如果这被证明过于乐观，那么他们将会有僵尸银行和一个丧失信用的政府。这无疑是一个显而易见的选择。

只有当首要问题是缺乏流动性的时候，新的计划才似乎有意义。提供担保，购入一部分问题资产，同时将新注资规模限制在Tarp计划剩下的不足3500亿美元资金里——这无法解决许多了解情况的观察员眼中资不抵债的问题。实际上，通过购买或担保问题资产来救助资金不足的金融机构，注定是一种不起作用、效率低下且不公平的手段：不起作用是由于政府必须以过高的价格购买大量可疑资产，或者提供过于慷慨的担保，才能使丧失偿付能力的银行重获偿付能力；效率低下是由于巨额注资或债转股才是对银行资本重组的更好方法；而不公平是由于巨额补贴将落入破产机构和不良资产的私人买家之手。

这种怯懦令人沮丧

那么，政府为何在犯这种看似愚蠢的错误？原因可能是它凡事都往最好处想。但它似乎也向自己提出了错误的命题。政府没有问，要对一种解决办法有把握，自己应该做些什么。相反，它问自己，在三项人为确立的、自我施加的限制条件下（不许国有化；不许债券持有人遭受损失；国会不许追加投资），自己能做到的最好是什么。但面对严重的危机，新政府为何不设法改变一下辩论的框架呢？这种怯懦令人沮丧。通过对受救助机构施加挑剔的条件，来设法弥补这一错误，只可能加剧而非减轻错误。

假设问题在于丧失偿付能力，且美国商业银行谨慎估计的市值（约4000亿美元）得自政府支持。另外，假设目前不可能筹得大量私人资本。那么，必须从上述两种方法中选择一种进行资本重组。二者都有缺点：政府资本重组是为债权人纾困，涉及暂时的政府管治；债转股将损害债券市场、保险公司和养老基金。但必须从中做出选择。

如果盖特纳或国家经济委员会(National Economic Council)主席劳伦斯•萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)像针对外国一样为美国提出建议，他们会无情地指出这一点。IMF总裁多米尼克•斯特劳斯-卡恩(Dominique Strauss-Kahn)上周六在马来西亚非常温和地表达了同样的观点。

立即宰杀僵尸银行

正确的建议与上世纪90年代美国向日本和其它国家提出的一样：承认现实，重组银行，而最重要的是立即宰杀僵尸机构。至于正确解决方式究竟是创建新的“好银行”，让过去的坏银行消亡，就像我的同事威廉姆•比特(Willem Buiter)所建议的那样，还是创建新的“坏银行”，让被清理过的老银行得以幸存，是一个重要但非首要的问题。我也倾向于前者，因为老银行的文化似乎毒性太强。

由于问了错误的问题，奥巴马正投入一场豪赌。他本来应当下决心清理银行业中这些龌龊之处。他必须反思，如果还不算太晚的话。

译者/陈云飞