【英语社会】要性、毒品与摇滚乐，还是要利润？

EMI, Britain's leading entertainment business, not only promoted the Beatles but pioneered computers, television and medical scanners. Today the company is struggling to avoid becoming the UK's highest-profile private equity failure.

Some people think the travails of EMI are a just rebuke to those who would treat media as merely another industry. Creative people need the love that bean counters cannot provide. And not just love: executives at Terra Firma, its private equity owner, were appalled to find a ￡200,000 budget for fruit and flowers.

So media businesses are not to be run by ordinary mortals, but require moguls – larger-than-life individuals like Sam Goldwyn, who chomp cigars while uttering mangled yet profound aphorisms, and have an uncanny capacity to identify talent and foster it. The most beautiful women in the world vie to jump into the mogul's bed. Many middle-aged corporate executives entertain this fantasy. Jean-Marie Messier was beyond parody: he attempted to turn a French water company into a global entertainment conglomerate – Vivendi – before being driven from office by the French elite and banned from US boardrooms.

The notion that media industries are different is challenged in a new book by Jonathan Knee, Bruce Greenwald and Ava Seave, The Curse of the Mogul. They observe the prevalence of the mogul: of the 15 largest US media businesses, 11 have complex share structures designed to sustain control in the hands of the current chief executive and his family. But judged by the ordinary standards of earnings and return on investment, the results have been dire. The farce of Vivendi followed the “worst deal in history”, the merger of Time Warner and AOL. But these are only the most extreme manifestations of the systematic destruction of shareholder value through the industry's frenetic rounds of acquisitions and disposals.

The moguls have justified this dealmaking with platitudes: the importance of globalisation, the necessity of convergence and the slogan that content is king. Mr Knee and colleagues demolish the business arguments derived from these banalities. Songs and films may be enjoyed globally, but the most consistently profitable media businesses are in market niches. Often these niches are defined by local geography – regional cinema chains and cable networks, newspapers in small towns. Convergence of media does not necessitate convergence of companies: the erosion of boundaries between activities is a threat to profitability, not an enhancement, because it reduces barriers to industry entry. There is truth in the claim that content is king, but content belongs to those, such as J.K. Rowling and Steven Spielberg, who create it and reap a large proportion of the rewards.

But such remonstrances will make no difference. The belief that a small number of talented individuals have a unique ability to understand how the complex industry will evolve and to create value for investors through their insight is firmly held, especially by those who believe they have such talent. There is just enough validity in the idea for it to stop short of mental derangement. A few business people, such as Rupert Murdoch, have indeed demonstrated a capacity to identify undervalued business opportunities. But not many.

Still, the fantasy of the strategic visionary is vigorously promoted by management consultants, investment bankers and analysts. Today's moguls are mobbed, not just by starlets anxious for parts, but by graduates of the finest business schools anxious for fees. With such people always at your side, a realistic appraisal of one's own abilities is hard to make.

The lifestyle of the mogul is an attractive one, but not for investors in their businesses. A fixation with revenues and costs, though more financially rewarding, is less glamorous than life with the stars. The lesson of EMI is not that media industries are unique, but that you can lose a lot of money if you overpay for a company with a broken business model, as you can in any other industry.

英国老牌娱乐集团百代公司(EMI)不仅捧红了披头士乐队(Beatles)，还是计算机、电视机和医学扫描仪领域的先驱。如今，该公司正竭力避免成为英国私人股本投资史上最大的败笔。

有人觉得，百代的苦难，对于那些把媒体仅仅当作一种行业看待的人，是最恰当的驳斥。创造性人才所需要的关爱是精打细算的高管们无法给予的。而且他们需要的不仅仅是关爱：百代所有者、私人股本公司泰丰资本(Terra Firma)的高管吃惊地发现，百代购买水果与鲜花的预算达到20万英镑。

因此，媒体企业不能由普通老百姓驾驭，而需要大人物坐镇——就像山姆?戈德文(Sam Goldwyn)这样具有传奇色彩的人物。他们一面嚼着雪茄，一面嘟囔着一些含混不清但又高深莫测的警世箴言，有着发现和培养人才的超凡能力。全世界最美丽的女人会争相跳上这类大人物的床榻。许多中年企业高管都心怀这种幻想。让-马利?梅西耶(Jean-Marie Messier)可谓是东施效颦：他试图将一家法国水务公司改造为一个全球性娱乐集团——威望迪(Vivendi)，但不久就被法国精英赶下了台，并被排除在美国企业的董事会之外。

但新书《大亨的诅咒》(The Curse of the Mogul)对媒体行业独一无二的这种理念提出了挑战。该书作者乔纳森?尼(Jonathan Knee)、布鲁斯?格林沃尔德(Bruce Greenwald)和艾娃?希芙(Ava Seave)注意到了大人物现象的普遍性：美国15大媒体企业中，有11家的股权结构经过了精心设计，目的是让公司的控制权留在现任首席执行官及其家族手里。但根据普通的收益及投资回报标准来衡量，它们业绩惨淡。威望迪的闹剧发生之前，还出现过“史上最糟糕交易”——时代华纳(Time Warner)与美国在线(AOL)的合并。但这些只是媒体行业一轮又一轮疯狂并购与分拆对股东价值造成系统性破坏的最极端表现。

大亨们为这些交易辩护的理由都是老生常谈：全球化的重要性，合并的必要性以及内容为王的口号。乔纳森?尼和他的同事推翻了由这种陈词滥调炎生出来的商业论断。歌曲与电影也许全世界都能欣赏，但盈利性最为持久的媒体业务身处利基市场。这些利基市场往往由当地的地理环境所决定——地方电影院线和有线网络，小城镇的报纸等等。媒体的趋同未必意味着公司应当合并：不同商业活动之间的界线受到侵蚀会威胁而不是增强盈利能力，因为这会降低行业准入门槛。内容为王的说法确实有道理，但内容属于像J?K?罗琳(J.K. Rowling)和斯蒂芬?斯皮尔伯格(Steven Spielberg)这些创造内容并收获大部分回报的人。

但此类谏诫不会起什么作用。一种观念已经根深蒂固：那就是一小撮天才拥有理解媒体行业的复杂演变方式，并能凭借自身远见为投资者创造价值的独特能力。这种观点尤其受到那些自认为拥有此种才能的人的追捧，但离精神错乱不过是一步之遥。没错，有些商人——例如鲁珀特?默多克(Rupert Murdoch)——确实显示出发掘被低估商业机会的才能。但这样的人为数不多。

尽管如此，战略空想家的幻想得到了管理顾问、投资银行家和分析师的推波助澜。大亨们如今身陷重围，滋扰他们的不仅有渴望得到角色的影坛新秀，还有迫切希望赚取费用的顶尖商学院毕业生。有这些人常伴左右，大亨们很难对自身能力进行切实评估。

大亨的生活方式非常诱人，但不是对其业务的投资者而言。注重收入和成本，尽管能获得更丰厚的经济回报，却不如有明星相伴的日子那么令人神往。百代的教训不在于媒体行业与众不同，而在于如果你为一个业务模式支离破碎的企业支付了过高的价格，就可能损失一大笔钱，和其它任何行业无异。

译者/管婧