【英语中国】中国劳资关系的转折点

Listen to the following statements about the strike at Honda's transmission plant in Guangdong province, one that has brought the Japanese company's car production throughout China to a juddering halt. The first goes like this: “The strike reflects the low wages the bosses are paying the workers . . . The system does not provide a legal base for collective bargaining.” The second, like this: “In the three decades of opening-up, ordinary workers are among those who have received the smallest share of economic prosperity. The temporary stoppage of production lines in the four Honda factories . . . highlights the necessity of organised labour protection in Chinese factories.”

The first speaker is Han Dongfang, a former railway electrician who, in 1989, tried to unite workers and students during the Tiananmen Square protests. He was jailed for his troubles, contracted tuberculosis in prison and had a lung surgically removed. Now living in exile in Hong Kong, he works as a trade union activist, monitoring workers' rights in mainland China.

The provenance of the second – almost identical – statement is more surprising. It is an editorial in the Global Times, a tabloid founded by the People's Daily. Chinese newspapers are not in the habit of writing about strikes, let alone endorsing them. Anything that smacks of an alternative pole of power or tarnishes China's image as a hassle-free investment destination has generally been taboo. In any case, strikes are rare since independent labour unions are banned and “official trade unions” rarely, if ever, organise industrial action.

So why are a leading dissident from Tiananmen Square and a newspaper with close ties to the Communist party speaking with one voice on such a delicate issue?

First, government authorities, through the media, are simply acknowledging reality. The years of an endless supply of cheap labour, on which the first three decades of China's economic lift-off was built, are coming to an end. That is partly demographic. Because of China's one-child policy, the supply of workers under 40 has dwindled by as much as a fifth. Fewer workers mean more bargaining power. Honda staff are demanding no less than a 50 per cent rise. Foxconn, a China-based Taiwanese contract manufacturer plagued by a recent spate of worker suicides, has just granted a 30 per cent wage increase.

Unlike the first wave of migrants who came to the cities in the 1980s and 1990s, the current batch has more options and higher aspirations. Many are not content to save money for a few years before returning home. They want to settle in the booming cities. That means they need higher wages. If they can't get them, there are opportunities at home. Under cost pressure, some factories have shifted inland, away from the factory towns on the east coast and the Pearl River Delta, and closer to the provinces from which most migrants come.

The second reason for the cautious sanction of industrial action is that the Communist party has a stake in better working conditions. Providing cheap Chinese labour to multinationals from Japan, the US and Europe was a means, not an end. Deng Xiaoping said it was glorious to get rich, not to make foreign-invested capital rich. As elsewhere, the share of labour in corporate profits has been falling. That runs contrary to the emphasis placed by China's leadership on a “harmonious society”. Chinese media coverage of the Honda strike, as well as of the Foxconn suicides, has been heavy with analysis of the widening income gap.

There are other signs that the scales may be tipping labour's way. In 2008, Beijing enacted the labour contract law, stipulating that workers be given written contracts. Coupled with growing wage pressure, this changed atmosphere has obvious implications for foreign investors grown accustomed to a low-wage, strike-free, hire-and-fire environment.

Yet few are likely to pull out. That is because China has ceased to be merely a low-cost production centre. For many companies, it is also becoming an important market and an integral part of their global supply chain. Walmart sources $30bn worth of goods from China each year. Japanese car manufacturers, such as Honda, have brought with them a network of components makers, and built ties with Chinese parts suppliers. What goes for cars goes for iPads, mobile phones, digital cameras and colour photocopiers. Such a clustering effect makes it almost impossible for manufacturers to pick up sticks and start afresh elsewhere.

For all these reasons, Beijing may continue to offer cautious support to an emboldened workforce, though it will keep a watchful eye on wage inflation. But on no account will it tolerate any hint of organised labour evolving into a political force. Even Mr Han, whose political activities in 1989 landed him in jail and exile, has reached the pragmatic conclusion that labour rights and political rights must be separate. “I'm trying my best to depoliticise the labour movement in China,” he says. When a Chinese labour activist wants to take the politics out of collective bargaining and official China is cheering on strikers, change is clearly afoot.

本田(Honda)位于广东省变速器厂的罢工，已经让这家日本公司在整个中国的汽车生产戛然停止。让我们听听有关此次罢工事件的言论。第一个是这么说的：“此次罢工事件反映出老板们付给工人的工资水平很低……中国的体制没有为集体议价提供法律基础。”第二个如下：“在改革开放的三十年中，普通工人从经济繁荣中分得的利益最少。4家本田工厂生产线的暂时停工……突显出，有必要在中国工厂实施有组织的劳工保护。”

第一个言论来自韩东方，原先是一名铁路电工，在1989年天安门抗议活动期间曾试图联合工人与学生，后来因此入狱，在狱中感染了肺结核，靠手术切除了一个肺。如今，他被流放于香港，是一名工会积极分子，监督中国大陆的工人权利。

第二个——几乎与第一个意见完全一致——的出处更令人吃惊。它是《人民日报》旗下《环球时报》上的一篇社论。中国报纸没有撰写罢工题材文章的习惯，更别说支持罢工。任何有支持另一极权力意味，或玷污中国作为无麻烦投资目的地形象的言论，通常被视为禁忌。无论如何，由于独立工会受到禁止，“官方工会”很少（如果有的话）组织劳工行动，罢工在中国非常罕见。

那么，为何在如此敏感的问题上，来自天安门的重要异见人士和与共产党关系密切的报纸会发出同样的声音？

首先，中国政府只是在（通过媒体）承认一个现实。帮助造就了中国过去三十年经济腾飞的多年廉价劳动力的无止境供给行将结束。这在一定程度上是因为人口结构的变化。由于中国的独生子女政策，40岁以下的工人供给已经减少了20%之多。工人减少意味着他们的议价能力增强。本田员工正要求不低于50%的加薪。富士康(Foxconn)刚刚同意给工人加薪30%——最近一系列工人自杀事件，令这家总部位于中国大陆的台湾合同制造商备受困扰。

与上世纪80年代到90年代来到城市的第一波农民工不同，当前这波农民工有了更多的选择与更高的期望。许多人并不满足于存几年钱，然后返回家乡。他们想在繁荣的城市中定居。这意味着，他们需要更高的工资。如果他们得不到更高的工资，他们还可以回家寻找机会。迫于成本压力，一些工厂已经从东部沿海地区及珠江三角洲工厂集中的工业重镇，转向了内陆，更加靠近大多数农民工的输出省份。

中国政府谨慎支持劳工行动的第二个原因是，改善劳动条件与共产党有利害关系。向日本、美国、欧洲的跨国公司提供廉价劳动力，是一种手段，而不是目标。邓小平曾经说过致富光荣，而没有说让外资致富光荣。与其它地方一样，劳动力成本在企业利润中所占比重近年在不断下降。这与中国领导层强调的“和谐社会”不符。中国媒体对本田罢工事件及富士康自杀事件的报道，充斥着对收入差距不断扩大的分析。

其它一些迹象也表明，局面可能会向有利于工人的方向转变。2008年，中国颁布了《劳动合同法》，要求雇主必须与工人签订书面合同。再加上工资压力不断增大，对于已习惯低工资、无罢工及随意解雇工人环境的外国投资者而言，这种气氛的转变有着明显的影响。

然而，几乎没有哪家公司会离开中国。这是因为，中国已经不再仅仅是成本低廉的生产中心。对于许多公司而言，中国已经变成了一个重要的市场，而且是其全球供应链的重要一环。沃尔玛(Walmart)每年从中国购买价值300亿美元的商品。本田等日本汽车制造商带来了零部件制造商网络，并与中国零部件供应商建立了合作关系。iPad、手机、数码相机、彩色影印机的情况与汽车一样。这样的集群效应，使得制造商几乎不可能搬离中国，到其它地方重新开始。

出于所有这些原因，中国政府可能会继续谨慎支持胆子大起来的劳工队伍，尽管它将继续警惕工资通胀。不过，它决不会容忍任何劳工组织发展成为政治势力的迹象。即使连韩东方——因1989年政治活动入狱并遭流放的异见人士——也得出了务实的结论：劳工权利必须与政治权利分离。他说：“我正竭尽全力让中国的劳工运动非政治化。”当一名中国劳工维权人士有意消除集体谈判中的政治因素，而中国官方为罢工者鼓劲，变化显然已在酝酿之中。

译者/何黎