【英语中国】中国股市动荡会波及全球吗?

It is now a decade since the phrase "Asian contagion" entered the lexicon. It is still relevant and describes a real risk. But there is no need to assume that it is the next pandemic.The phrase described what happened to world markets in 1997. The "tiger" economies in emerging Asia suddenly devalued their currencies. Over six months, the malaise spread throughout the region

This was truly "contagious". Once the devaluation had occurred, the already heavy foreign indebtedness of these economies became harder to finance. Meanwhile, foreign investors, faced with a sudden collapse in the value of their investments in one country, pulled assets from other countries. Hedge funds attacked the next vulnerable currency.

It added up to a collapse. The Morgan Stanley Capital International Far East index fell by two thirds in six months.

Fund managers dealing with losses from south-east Asia were obliged to move to less risky investments, a so-called "flight to quality." So the contagion spread to other "risky" assets.

As the collapse in currencies cut into Asian demand for western products, it was good reason to sell stocks in the US and Europe. During the six months of the collapse, the S&P 500 was flat, interrupting a protracted bull run. It took off again once the Asian countries troughed in early 1998.

Ten years on, a stock market bubble has formed in China, a far bigger economy than any of those involved last time. The Shanghai Composite has risen 253 per cent since the beginning of last year. The Nasdaq Composite "only" rose 227 per cent in the comparable period before the tech bubble burst in March 2000.

A correction will be needed before long. But this matters only to the many Chinese who have set up investment accounts in the last few months.

Even a 66 per cent correction, as happened to the "tigers" 10 years ago, would only take the Shanghai Composite back to where it was a year ago.

China is not a large market, as far as global investors are concerned. Judging by the Dow Jones Wilshire Global Total Market Index, which aims to capture all the stocks that are open to investors, China accounts for only 0.61 per cent of the world's free float. That makes it the world's 22nd largest market, between Finland at 21, and Singapore at 23. Foreigners have already pulled out of China. Emerging Portfolio Fund Research says they reduced holdings in mainland China funds by more than 10 per cent in the last five months.

The performance of the American Depositary Receipts of the larger Chinese companies, traded in the US, confirms that the Chinese stock phenomenon is local. The Bank of New York China ADR index is up a mere 77 per cent since the beginning of last year.

A sharp correction might have a negative "wealth effect" on the Chinese economy, by making new investors suddenly poorer, but this would mix with many other factors driving Chinese growth.

So why the talk of contagion? It comes down to the events of one day. On February 27, Shanghai fell 9 per cent. A day of global market mayhem ensued. But you cannot infer cause and effect from an accident of timing.

Shanghai's tumble coincided with Alan Greenspan's comment that there was a one in three chance of a recession, poor US data, and scary headlines about the US sub- prime lending debacle.

Shanghai immediately bounced back, while the turmoil went on for several weeks elsewhere. Its sell-off, we now can see, reflected a rise in aversion to risk that had its roots elsewhere.

On three other occasions this year when Shanghai went down, other markets were fine. This week the S&P 500 even hit an all-time high on a day Shanghai fell 6.5 per cent.

There are other differences from 1997. That was about the collapse of overvalued currencies. China is the opposite. Its trading partners claim that its currency is artificially undervalued.

In 1997 the "tigers" had been stagnating for years. In China, the risk is of overheating. The economy, already growing by more than 10 per cent per year, may grow so fast that the government loses control.

That is the real risk of Chinese contagion - from the Chinese economy, not its stock market. Clear signs of a Chinese crash could prompt wider selling of assets that benefit from global growth.

How would this risk show itself? Look at commodities. The four-year bull run in commodities, which started in 2002, was largely attributable to China and its demand for raw materials to feed its boom.

From 2002 to 2006, the CRB commodities index moved in line with the MSCI World index of stocks. They recovered together.

The commodities bull ran out of steam a year ago. Since August, the CRB is down 11 per cent, while the MSCI World is up 21 per cent. Many factors drive commodity prices, but they are signalling a risk of slowdown - which would likely emanate from China.

So if you are worried about Chinese contagion, examine its economy, not its stock prices. For clues, look at commodity prices.

“亚洲传染病”(Asian contagion)这个词问世距今已有10年时间了。它现在仍具有重要意义，反映了一种切实存在的风险。但如果把它假设成下一场流行病就没有必要了。“亚洲传染病”指的是1997年世界金融市场上发生的事件。亚洲新兴市场的经济“小虎”们纷纷将其货币贬值。在6个月时间里，这种传染病蔓延至整个亚洲地区。

这是真正的“传染病”。货币贬值后，已经负债累累的亚洲经济体的融资难度进一步上升。与此同时，外国投资者看到自己在一国的投资价值突然缩水后，纷纷将资产撤出其它亚洲国家。对冲基金趁机攻击下一个脆弱的币种。

上述诸多因素累积在一起导致了股市的崩溃。在6个月时间里，摩根士丹利国际(MSCI)远东指数下跌三分之二。

在东南亚损失惨重的基金管理公司不得不转向风险较低的投资，即所谓的“安全投资转移”(flight to quality)。因此，这种传染病也蔓延至其它“风险”资产。

由于亚洲货币崩溃降低了这些国家对西方国家产品的需求，因此投资者有充分理由出售美国和欧洲的股票。在亚洲货币崩溃的6个月里，标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)走势平平，一轮长期牛市出现了停滞。当亚洲国家股市在1998年初跌至谷底后，该指数再次快速上涨。

10年后，一个股市泡沫已经在中国形成。中国的经济规模比陷入亚洲金融危机中的任何一个国家规模都大。自去年年初以来，上证综合指数(Shanghai Composite)已经上涨253％，而相比之下，在2000年3月科技泡沫破裂前的同期，纳斯达克综合指数(Nasdaq Composite)的涨幅“仅为”227％。

中国股市不久就需要一次回调。但这仅关乎那些最近数月才开立投资账户的中国投资者。

10年前，亚洲经济“小虎”们的股市下跌了66％，但即使中国股市出现同样跌幅，上证综合指数也仅会回到1年前的水平。

对于国际投资者而言，中国股市的规模并不大。以道琼斯威尔希尔全球整体市场指数(Dow Jones Wilshire Global Total Market Index)——该指数旨在囊括所有对投资者开放的股票——衡量，中国股市仅占全球自由流通股票的0.61％。这使中国成为世界第22大市场，位居第21名的芬兰和第23名的新加坡之间。外国投资者已经开始撤出中国股市。新兴市场投资组合基金研究(Emerging Portfolio Fund Research)的数据显示，外国投资者过去5个月已经减仓逾10％。

在美国交易的大型中国企业美国存托凭证(ADR)的走势证明，中国股市的现象仅限于国内。自去年年初以来，纽约银行中国美国存托凭证指数(Bank of New York China ADR Index)仅上涨77％。

一次大幅回调会突然减少新股民的财富，从而可能对中国经济产生负面的“财富效应”，但这将与许多推动中国经济增长的其它因素结合起来。

那么，为什么要讨论“传染”问题呢？这要归结到数月前一天发生的事情。2月27日，上证综合指数暴跌9%，引发全球市场一整天的动荡。但你无法从时间上的巧合推断二者的因果关系。

上证综指暴跌之时，恰逢美联储前主席艾伦•格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)发表言论，称美国经济有三分之一的可能出现衰退。此外，美国当日公布的经济数据表现不佳，各大媒体还以头条报道了美国次级抵押贷款市场急剧下滑的恐慌性消息。

上证综合指数很快便出现反弹，但其它市场的动荡局面则持续了数周。我们现在可以认为，上证指数当时的下跌反映出投资者的风险厌恶情绪有所上升，而这种情绪则来源于全球其它市场。

当上证综合指数今年出现另外3次下低时，全球其它市场却运行良好。本周，在上证综指下跌6.5%的当天，标准普尔500指数甚至触及了历史高点。

与1997年相比，目前的情况还有其它方面的差异。1997年，危机的起因是汇率被高估的币种纷纷崩溃。中国现在的情况却恰好相反。它的贸易伙伴声称，人民币汇率被人为压低了。

到1997年，亚洲经济“小虎”们的经济停滞局面已经持续了数年。而在目前的中国，风险却是经济过热。过去数年，中国经济已经以每年逾10%的速度增长，过快的增速可能令政府对经济失去控制。

这才是中国“传染病”的真正风险——它来自于中国经济，而非中国股市。如果中国经济出现明显的衰退迹象，投资者可能会更大范围地抛售那些受益于全球经济增长的资产。

这种风险从何而见？看看大宗商品吧。自2002年开始，大宗商品经历了4年的牛市行情，这在很大程度上要归因于中国，及其为满足高速发展而对原材料产生的需求。

2002年至2006年，CRB大宗商品指数与摩根士丹利资本国际全球指数(MSCI World Index)同步运行，共同走出上涨行情。

大宗商品牛市于一年前走弱。自去年8月以来，CRB指数下跌了11%，而摩根士丹利资本国际全球指数则上涨了21%。大宗商品价格的驱动因素有很多，但它们表明，全球经济存在放缓的风险——而来源地可能是中国。

因此，如果你担心中国“传染病”，那就研究它的经济，而不是它的股价。至于线索，看看大宗商品价格吧。

译者/何黎