【英语中国】中国经济实力是一把双刃剑

Why financial clout is a double-edged sword Power shifts have been a big theme of the past week, with much attention at the Davos business jamboree being focused on India and China. Yet it was striking, at a conference at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs on the changing dynamics of global financial power, that leading bankers were ill at ease talking about power in this context.

Part of the problem is that as globalisation increases interdependence, economic and financial power can only be used at the cost of damaging oneself as well as others. Consider China. Intervention in the foreign exchange market to hold down the yuan creates a phenomenal surge in exports, which have been growing at a 30 per cent annual rate. Given the much slower growth of imports and a big inflow of foreign capital, the country's official reserves have recently topped $1,000bn, equivalent to 40 per cent of gross domestic product, much of which is invested in US bonds.

One snag for China is that the return on this portfolio is much less than could be earned at home on, say, badly needed infrastructure investment. And as Andrew Smithers, the London-based economic commentator, points out, sterilisation of the funds required to buy the foreign exchange becomes more difficult as the scale of intervention rises – which is the economist's way of saying that it becomes harder to offset the expansionary domestic monetary consequences of the intervention.

In an underdeveloped financial system China has to do this by curbing banks' ability to lend. So funds then bypass the banking system and feed into the stock market, creating asset price inflation, and in due course into consumer inflation. If the interventionist exchange rate policy is then stopped, China incurs huge losses on its dollar reserves as the dollar declines and global imbalances start to unwind.

Meantime, China's trading partners have the boon of cheap goods and low inflation. But their industries have to cope with structural adjustment as a result of more intense competition. At the same time the Chinese trade surplus contributes to global liquidity, which in turn causes credit to be underpriced. That creates potential financial instability.

Clearly, as long as the Chinese economy grows fast, it can be used to strengthen China's military and strategic power. But the country's economic and financial power is such a double-edged sword that it is understandable that a banker might feel uncomfortable with the concept.






John Plender is chairman designate of Quintain plc

为什么说财政实力是一把双刃剑呢？上周的达沃斯(Davos)经济论坛，使许多人把注意力集中在了印度和中国身上，实力转移成为一个重要的主题。而引人注目的是，在伦敦的皇家国际事务研究所(Royal Institute of International Affairs)一次有关全球财政实力变化动态的会议上，一些大银行家们在这种背景下，心神不宁地讨论着有关实力的问题。





其中部分原因在于，随着全球化使各国之间的相互依存度提高，要动用经济和财政方面的实力，就必然同时损害自身和他方的利益。我们不妨想想中国的情况。中国通过干预外汇市场来压低人民币汇率，使其出口以每年30%的速度猛增。由于中国进口增速要缓慢得多，加之大量外国资本流入，使其官方外汇储备最近突破了1万亿美元——其中大部分投资于美国国债——相当于其国内生产总值(GDP)的40%。

中国所面临的问题之一，是上述资产的回报率，远低于在国内投资可能获得的收益，比如说，在国内急需的基础设施领域的投资。正如伦敦经济评论员安德鲁•史密瑟斯(Andrew Smithers)所指出的，随着干预规模的上升，冲销购买外汇所需资金的难度越来越大——这是经济学家的一种表述方式，意思是抵消干预行为所导致的扩张性本土货币后果的难度加大了。

由于金融系统尚不发达，中国必须通过控制银行贷款来达到上述目的。因此，资金绕过银行系统流入股市，导致资产价格上涨，继而引发通货膨胀。如果停止干涉主义的汇率政策，当美元下跌和全球贸易失衡状况开始好转时，中国的美元储备会蒙受重大损失。



与此同时，中国的贸易伙伴获得了廉价货物和低通胀的好处。但由于竞争更趋激烈，它们的产业不得不面临结构性调整。同时，中国的贸易顺差有利于提高全球流动性，继而致使信贷利率下降。这有可能导致金融动荡。



显然，只要中国经济迅速增长，就有利于增强其军事和战略实力。但是，中国在经济和财政方面的实力是一把双刃剑，无怪乎这一概念可能使银行家感到不安。

约翰•普伦德是Quintain plc下任董事长

译者/陈家易