【英语中国】中国脱钩论不足为信

In 2008 stock markets in the developing world were savaged. Last year they saw record inflows that look set to continue. In part, the reversal in sentiment reflects the fact that while some emerging market economies were severely hit by the economic crisis, the overall picture was less bad than expected. Yet the renewed enthusiasm for emerging markets in the second half of 2009 was also spurred by a return of the questionable decoupling theory. This asserts that emerging markets have freed themselves from export dependence on developed world demand and can safely forget about global imbalances.

The euphoria is not entirely nonsensical, at least in the short term. There is a widespread perception that China, with a trade surplus of nearly seven per cent of gross domestic product in 2008, is heavily dependent on export-led growth, as are many other emerging markets. Yet as Eswar Prasad points out in the latest issue of Finance and Development, the direct contribution of net exports to Chinese GDP growth amounted to only 1.1 percentage points a year over 2000-08, or just a 10th of overall GDP growth, because the country is also a huge importer.

Over the same period, the share of investment in GDP rose by about eight percentage points, providing the main driver of growth, while private consumption declined dramatically from 46 per cent to 35 per cent. The composition of China's GDP helps explain why it managed to expand at a rapid, if lower, rate last year while the global economy was shrinking. Likewise why many Asian exporters quickly bounced back, since China became a more important market for them than the US.

The question decouplers have to confront, though, is whether a Chinese growth model based on excess savings and huge investment is sustainable, since these reflect big distortions in the economy. While the Chinese, who lack a proper social safety net and developed financial markets, are naturally thrifty, it is often overlooked that the corporate sector has been as important a driver of savings growth over the past decade.

With an underdeveloped financial system, companies depend more on retained profit, or savings, to finance investment, while state-owned companies were not until recently required to pay dividends. Since real interest rates in the banking system are negative, companies understandably like to recycle retained profits into new investment, which also enjoys state subsidies. The outcome is that growth is increasingly reliant on companies investing in sub-optimal projects.

This is not a game that can go on for ever. So unless China finds a way of promoting private consumption growth, it will become more dependent on exports to countries in the developed world that are trying to shrink their trade deficits, as will Asian exporters that have hitherto milked the Chinese investment boom. Decoupling may thus prove temporary, while the problem of global imbalances will continue to nag away as trade friction mounts.

The silver lining, if there is one, is that China's interest (and that of much of the rest of Asia) probably lies in addressing its own domestic imbalances by reversing the decline in private consumption. As Mr Prasad points out, its investment-oriented growth model has resulted in limited employment growth of barely one per cent a year in a country that has been growing at more than 10 per cent.

For an economy with such a vast labour force and serious underemployment, the implications for economic and social stability must worry policymakers. Increasingly profitless growth in the corporate sector will ultimately rebound on the public finances.

A more flexible exchange rate and a retreat from excessive reserve accumulation would obviously help rebalance the economy. So, too, would a financial system operating on something closer to market principles. For one of the ironies of the current crisis is that while many are preoccupied by the lack of social utility in sophisticated Western banking, the damage inflicted on the Chinese economy and the Chinese people by financial underdevelopment is considerable.

John Plender is an FT columnist

2008年，发展中国家股市受到沉重冲击。去年，流入这些市场的资金达到创纪录水平，而且看来还会持续下去。在一定程度上，市场人气的转变反映了如下事实：尽管一些新兴市场经济体受到经济危机的重击，但总体形势并没有预期的那样糟糕。不过，投资者在2009年下半年对新兴市场重燃热情，也受到了值得商榷的脱钩论卷土重来的推动。该理论断言，新兴市场已摆脱了对发达国家需求的出口依赖，从此能安心地不再理会全球失衡问题。

这种兴奋感并不全是无稽之谈，至少是在短期内。人们普遍认为，像其它许多新兴市场一样，2008年贸易顺差几乎达到国内生产总值(GDP) 7%的中国，严重依赖于出口拉动型增长。但正如埃斯瓦•普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)在最新一期《金融与发展》(Finance and Development)中所指出的，2000年至2008年，净出口对中国GDP增长的直接贡献每年仅有1.1个百分点，相当于总体GDP增长的十分之一，因为中国也是一个庞大的进口国。

同期，投资在GDP中所占比重增加了大约8个百分点，成为增长的主要驱动力，而个人消费则从46%直线下降至35%。中国GDP的构成有助于说明，为何去年全球经济都在萎缩，中国经济却能快速扩张——尽管增速较以往有所放缓。此外，众多亚洲出口国之所以能很快复苏，是因为对它们而言，中国已成为比美国更重要的市场。

不过，脱钩论者必须面对这样一个问题：中国建立在过度储蓄和巨额投资基础上的增长模式是否是可持续的，因为这些反映了经济的严重变形。尽管缺乏可靠社会保障体系和发达金融市场的中国人生性节俭，但人们常常忽视了，过去10年，企业也是储蓄增长的重要的驱动因素。

由于金融体系欠发达，中国的企业更加依赖留存利润（即储蓄）来为投资筹措资金，同时，直到最近，国有企业才被要求派息。由于银行业体系的实际利率为负，因此不难理解，企业为何愿意将留存利润用于还将享有国家补贴的新投资。其结果就是，中国的经济增长越来越依赖企业投资于那些并非最理想的项目。

这种游戏无法永远上演下去。因此，如果找不到促进个人消费增长的办法，中国就会愈加依赖对正设法收窄贸易逆差的发达国家的出口，从中国投资热潮中捞了不少好处的其他亚洲出口国亦无法幸免。因此，脱钩可能只是暂时的，随着贸易摩擦升温，全球失衡问题将继续困扰各国。

如果说存在一线希望，那就是中国（及亚洲其它大多数地区）可能正着手通过扭转个人消费领域的颓势，解决国内失衡问题。正如普拉萨德所言，由于采用了投资导向型增长模式，在经济年增幅超过10%的中国，就业年增长率仅有区区的1%。

中国劳动力数目庞大，未充分就业形势严峻，这些问题对经济及社会稳定的影响必定会让决策者感到忧虑。企业增长的利润越来越薄，最终将影响到公共财政。

采取更具弹性的汇率制度，停止过度的储备积累，会对经济再平衡起到显著的促进作用。金融体系的运作更接近于市场原则，同样会有所助益。本轮危机的一个讽刺之处在于，尽管许多人全神贯注于西方成熟银行业中社会效用的缺失，但金融欠发达对中国经济和中国人民带来的损害也不容小觑。

译者/何黎