【英语中国】中国将成为亚洲“盟主”

There has been much chatter about the “G2” lately. But the idea that the US and China can together, and semi-exclusively, take on the world's biggest problems is overdone. That day may come. For the moment, though, there are limits to how much an authoritarian government presiding over a relatively poor country can contribute to global problem-solving. For now, the rise of China and the relative decline of the US is more likely to mean a multi-polar than a bipolar world.

Yet China's growing economic weight and its more assured strut on the world stage is having a definite impact regionally. A recent editorial in South Korea's Chosun Ilbo newspaper struck an awestruck tone on the subject of “China's clout”. It described a meeting on the fringes of last month's Group of 20 summit in London in which Nicolas Sarkozy, France's president, told Hu Jintao, his Chinese counterpart, that Paris would not support Tibetan independence. Almost more important than what it termed the “white flag of surrender” over Tibet was the detail that Mr Sarkozy had to travel to Mr Hu's hotel for an audience. In Asia, etiquette is everything. Even Hillary Clinton, not usually known for her reticence, was said to have been quiet on human rights, Taiwan and Tibet. The editorial offered a simple explanation: “China owns $1,400bn [€10,530bn, £9,320bn] of US assets.”

There is a mixed sense of pride and trepidation at the rise of an Asian superpower. Especially when it comes to smaller nations in China's penumbra, there are signs that, like client states of old, countries are pragmatically paying tribute to Beijing. Take Nguyen Tan Dung, Vietnam's prime minister. He recently spent a week touring China, having, like Mr Sarkozy, travelled for the privilege of a hearing. He brought with him gifts of Vietnamese bauxite, the main raw material for aluminium, humbly beseeching China for investments of up to $15bn in what are the world's third largest reserves of the ore. Hanoi is understandably anxious to close its $11bn trade deficit with China through mineral exports.

Not everyone in Vietnam, a colony of China for 1,000 years, is happy about spreading out the investment welcome mat so readily. Dissenters have opposed Chinese bauxite investments on environmental grounds, one of the few safe avenues of protest in one-party Vietnam. The government has paid lip-service to those concerns, but has clamped down on at least one publication that risked Beijing's ire by drawing attention to well-known territorial disputes Vietnam has with China. Last year, Hanoi was powerless to stop Beijing warning off ExxonMobil from a deal with PetroVietnam in waters China considers its own.

South Korea, which has an altogether sturdier economy than Vietnam, does not have to pussyfoot around to the same extent. But small incidents are revealing. In mid-April, South Korea's finance ministry caused a low-level diplomatic stir by issuing a report called the “Beijing Consensus”, in which it said that China's growing influence over developing countries “could put Korea's diplomatic efforts to secure natural resources in peril”. Seoul, it said, should come up with measures to counter Beijing's expanding clout.

That report caused some embarrassment for South Korean diplomats stationed in Beijing, who scrambled to play it down. As one South Korean China-hand confided, the stakes are high. China is the only country with anything resembling leverage over North Korea and its rogue nuclear weapons programme. As with Vietnam, China is Korea's biggest trading partner. South Korean companies have invested $40bn in China and 5.8m people travel between the two countries each year, quite an increase from the 40,000 who made the short hop during the 1980s. “When the rooster crows in Shandong, you can hear it in Korea,” goes one saying. It must be particularly audible when the rooster in question is a member of the Communist party apparatus.

Taiwan is a third example of Beijing's magnetic pull. The island state, which recently bought $6.5bn of US arms to help defend itself from mainland China, has simultaneously been scrambling to patch up diplomatic and economic relations wrecked by the previous government's rhetoric about formal independence. The government of Ma Ying-jeou agreed last month to open up investment to Chinese companies and is likely to approve China Mobile's $533m purchase of a 12 per cent stake in Far EasTone, a Taiwanese mobile operator. Coincidentally, or not, Beijing has deigned to allow Taiwan observer status at the World Health Organisation's annual assembly, dropping its customary objection to the attendance of an island state it considers a mere province of China. Taiwan's stock market has jumped nearly 15 per cent in a few days at the prospect of closer ties.

The sort of sway Beijing exerts contrasts markedly with Tokyo's rather forlorn attempts at regional leadership. Certainly, postwar Japan has had a very real impact on Asian development from South Korea to Thailand (even China itself) through its trailblazing example and through its aid, investment and transfer of technology. But, hampered by its failure to heal wartime rancour,
Japan has struggled to translate its huge economic advantage into diplomatic influence. Now, Japan's economic lead is being eroded daily by China. Tokyo has never worn the mantle of regional leader all that convincingly. Beijing looks ready to don it as to the manor born.

最近有很多关于“G2”的谈论。但认为中国和美国在一起，能够半独立地承担全球最主要的问题，这种想法却是过头了。那一天或许会来。但眼下，一个掌管着相对贫穷国家的独裁政府能为解决全球性问题做出多大贡献仍然存在限度。目前而言，中国的崛起和美国的相对衰落，更可能意味的是一个多极世界，而不是两极世界。

不过，中国日益增强的经济实力及其在世界舞台上更为自信的步伐，在本地区产生了不容质疑的影响。韩国《朝鲜日报》(Chosun Ilbo)最近的一篇社论用敬畏的语气谈到“中国的影响力”。它描述了上个月伦敦20国集团(G20)峰会期间的一次会面：在会面过程中，法国总统尼古拉•萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)告诉中国国家主席胡锦涛，法国不会支持西藏独立。几乎比它称之为在西藏问题上“树白旗”更为重要的是一个细节：萨科齐不得不前往胡锦涛的酒店等候接见。在亚洲，礼节就是一切。据说，就连一向不以沉默寡言著称的希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)，也在人权、台湾和西藏问题上保持了沉默。这篇社论提出了一个简单的解释：“中国拥有1.4万亿美元的美国资产。”

对于一个亚洲超级大国的崛起，人们既自豪，又惊恐。尤其是对于受到中国势力影响的小国，有迹象表明，就像古时的附庸国一样，它们已开始务实地向中国朝贡。以越南总理阮晋勇(Nguyen Tan Dung)为例。他最近花了一周的时间访问中国，像萨科齐一样，目的就是得到被接见的特权。他带来了越南的铝矾土——铝的主要原材料——作为礼物，谦恭地恳求中国向世界第三大铝矾土储备投资不超过150亿美元。可以理解，越南政府急切渴望通过矿物出口，消除与中国的110亿美元贸易赤字。

在长达1000年的时间里，越南曾是中国的殖民地，不是所有的越南人都愿意如此欣然地铺开红地毯，欢迎中国的投资。持异议者则以环境为由对中国的铝矾土投资表示了反对——这是一党专政的越南为数不多的安全抗议途径之一。政府口头上赞成这些关切，却镇压了至少一家刊物——由于关注中越之间众所周知的领土争端，该刊物可能激起北京的愤怒。去年，中国警告埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)不要与越南国家石油公司(PetroVietnam)在中国认为是自己领海的水域内开展合作，越南政府却无力阻止。

韩国经济总体上比越南更强健，不必如此谨慎地行事。但一些小事却透露了实情。4月中旬，韩国财政部发布了一份名为“北京共识(Beijing Consensus)”的报告，引起了一场小小的外交骚动。报告称，中国对发展中国家的影响力不断增强，“可能会将韩国获取自然资源的外交努力置于危险之中”。报告表示，韩国政府应该拿出措施，遏制中国不断扩大的影响力。

这份报告使韩国驻京外交官陷入了尴尬境地，他们匆忙试图淡化此事。韩国的一名中国通坦言，筹码很高。中国是唯一有可能制约朝鲜及其流氓核武器项目的国家。和越南一样，韩国最大的贸易伙伴也是中国。韩国企业在中国的投资达400亿美元，每年有580万人在两国间往来，比上世纪80年代的4万人有了相当大的提高。有一句话是这么说的：“山东的公鸡一打鸣，韩国就能听得到。”如果这只公鸡是共产党机构的一名成员，声音一定听得尤其清楚。

台湾是北京吸引力的第三个例子。台湾最近向美国购买了65亿美元的武器，帮助防范来自中国大陆的攻击，但与此同时，它还忙着修补与大陆的外交和经济关系——前任政府关于正式独立的言辞破坏双方的关系。马英九领导的政府上个月同意向中国企业开放投资，并且有可能批准中国移动(China Mobile)以5.33亿美元购买台湾移动运营商远传电信(Far EasTone) 12%的股权。巧合的是（或者并非巧合），北京已惠允台湾以观察员的身份出席世界卫生组织(WHO)年度大会，放弃了反对它认为只是自己一个省份的台湾参加该大会的一贯姿态。两岸关系更加紧密的前景，推动台湾股市在几天内就上涨了近15%。

北京施加的影响与日本政府争夺地区领导力的无望尝试形成了鲜明对比。毫无疑问，通过带头示范作用以及援助、投资和技术转让，从韩国到泰国，甚至包括中国，战后的日本对亚洲的发展产生了非常真实的影响。但由于未能消除战时的仇恨，日本一直难以将巨大的经济优势转化为外交影响力。如今，日本的经济领先地位每天都受到中国的侵蚀。东京从未能完全令人信服地穿上地区领袖的外衣。北京似乎已准备好穿上这层外衣，就像天生就适合一样。

译者/何黎