【英语中国】中国经济崛起催生蓝水海军

In 1888, Qing Dynasty China splashed out some 1,350 tonnes of silver to buy its North Sea Fleet, which almost overnight became the world's eighth largest navy and, supposedly, the most formidable in Asia. That fiction was dramatically exposed just six years later when China's shiny new armada was crushed by the much better organised Imperial Navy of Japan in the Battle of the Yalu River. The humiliating defeat accelerated the decline of China and the rise of Japan, a shift in power cemented a decade later by Japan's stunning naval victory over Russia.

The rebirth of China's modern navy, which celebrates its 60th anniversary today in the north-eastern port of Qingdao, is an inevitable by-product of the country's economic renaissance. China's navy may not yet quite match that of Japan, though it has a better name: the People's Liberation Army Navy (which, in English, sounds like a revolutionary clothing store) versus Japan's Maritime Self Defence Force. Yet the trend is clear enough. Japan's military spending is limited – by postwar pacifist convention, if not by law – to 1 per cent of gross domestic product. Defence analysts estimate that China spends roughly 4 per cent of a smaller but far faster-growing GDP on its military, of which the navy is an increasingly prestigious part.

Unhappily, Japan was pointedly excluded from the list of 14 nations whose ships were invited to Qingdao. Last June, a Japanese destroyer was allowed to dock in the Chinese port of Zhanjiang, the first time in more than 60 years that a naval vessel bearing the Rising Sun flag was permitted within firing range of China's coast. But attending a ceremony to mark the 1949 anniversary, when ships belonging to the Kuomintang nationalists defected to the Communist party, was evidently an act of reconciliation too far.

The US was more favoured. Soured military relations over Washington's recent decision to sell more arms to Taiwan notwithstanding, Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, was asked to participate. His host, Admiral Wu Shengli, even invited him to fly by military aircraft from Beijing to Qingdao.

Such niceties aside, the US has expressed anxiety over China's efforts to build a blue-water navy capable – at least theoretically – of projecting power far beyond Chinese shores. A Congressional Research Services report, updated in November 2008, said China aimed, by as early as 2010, to build a force capable of deterring or preventing US access to the Taiwan Straits in the event of a conflict over an island state Beijing regards as its own. In the medium term, the report speculated, other strategic objectives could include “displacing US regional military influence”, with the possible eventual goal of encouraging US withdrawal from the Pacific; pursuing maritime territorial disputes; and protecting sea lanes for China's imports of oil and other minerals. Both Washington and Tokyo have consistently expressed concern at what they say is lack of transparency in Beijing's military spending.

It is only natural that Washington and Tokyo should watch the rise of China's navy with some nervousness. It may be decades before Beijing has a navy to match that of the US. But when that day approaches, it will raise awkward questions of a postwar balance of power in the Pacific that has been kept largely thanks to the US presence. Both the US and Japan must be hoping that, when that time arrives, they are dealing with a more democratic Beijing – even if this rests on the uncertain premise that democracies are less likely to throw their weight around than authoritarian states.

China, of course, insists it has no bellicose intentions. Major General Qian Lihua, director of the ministry's foreign affairs office, told the FT last year: “Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike another country we will not use it to pursue global deployment or global reach.”

One does not need to swallow this hook, line and sinker (no maritime pun intended) to acknowledge that, as China becomes more deeply embedded in global trade, it will feel the need to protect its interests.

Ni Lexiong, a military expert with the Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law, told the South China Morning Post: “China has joined the web of the global economy. The new mission of the PLA navy is to protect our national interests in coastal areas and the high seas, not to engage in an arms race.” Though some still dreamt of the navy becoming a world-class force capable of “wiping the humiliation” of colonialism away, he said, that was not the main purpose.

Mikkal Herberg, director of the Asian energy security programme at the National Bureau of Asian Research, agrees that Beijing's main purpose in developing a navy may well indeed be to protect its trade flows. “China's jugular is, at this stage, controlled by the US navy,” he says. The example of pre-war Japan shows that is never a good thing. It was at least partly its sense of vulnerability to blockade that led it to embark on its tragic and ruthless rampage across Asia.

If only for that reason, the rise of China's navy may actually be a good thing. As China turns seawards, after centuries of looking inwards, it would be foolish to imagine there were no dangers. But it would be equally unwise to ignore the fact that a more powerful navy is an almost inevitable consequence of China's growing integration into the global economy. That too carries risks. But on balance, it is surely something to be welcomed.

1888年，北洋水师宣告成立。此前中国清政府为此耗费了大约1350吨白银购置军舰。几乎一夜之间，北洋水师成为世界第八大海军，并且照理也是亚洲最强大的舰队。但这一幻觉仅在6年后就被戏剧性地击碎了。这支耀眼的新舰队在中日甲午海战中，被更为组织有方的日本帝国海军打得全军覆没。这场耻辱的失败，加速了中国的衰落和日本的崛起。10年后，日本在日俄海战中令人震惊地获胜，巩固了这一实力转移。

昨日，中国海军在青岛庆祝成立60周年。现代化海军的重生，是中国经济复兴的必然产物。中国海军的实力可能还是比不上日本海军，尽管有一个更好听的名字：中国人民解放军海军（在英语里，这听上去像一家革命性的服装店），而日本称作海上自卫队(Maritime Self Defence Force)。但趋势是相当明显的。受战后和平公约的约束（即便不是法律限制），日本军费开支最多只能达到国内生产总值(GDP)的1%。而国防分析人士估计，中国军费开支约占GDP的4%（中国GDP虽小于日本，但增速快得多），海军在中国军队成为日趋显赫的军种。

遗憾的是，在应邀访问青岛的14国海军中，日本被刻意排除在外。去年6月，一艘日本驱逐舰获准访问中国湛江港，这是60多年来中国首次允许悬挂太阳旗的海军舰艇靠近中国海岸线。但在中方看来，让日本参加纪念中国海军成立的庆典活动，作为一种和解举动显然有点过头。1949年，一些国民党军舰投奔共产党，由此诞生了解放军海军。

美国则得到了更好的对待。尽管由于华盛顿近期决定向台湾增售武器，两军关系有所恶化，但美国海军作战部长、海军上将加里•罗海德(Gary Roughead)仍应邀参加庆典。东道主中国海军司令员吴胜利甚至邀请他搭乘军用飞机从北京飞至青岛。

但在这些礼遇之外，对于中国构建一支“蓝水海军”的努力，美国已表示焦虑。至少在理论上，这样的“蓝水海军”将有能力在远离中国海岸线的地方投射实力。美国国会研究服务部(Congressional Research Services, CRS)去年11月更新的一份报告表示，中国的目标是最早在2010年就达到这样的军力，即一旦在北京视为中国一部分的台湾问题上爆发冲突，中国军队能够吓阻或防止美军进入台湾海峡。该报告还推测，中期而言，中国的其它战略目标可能包括：“取代美国的区域军事影响力”，最终目标可能是鼓励美军撤离太平洋地区；在海上领土纠纷中捍卫自身利益；为中国进口石油和其它矿物保护海上航道。美日两国一向对于他们眼中的中国军费开支缺乏透明度表示忧虑。

美日带着一定的紧张心情关注中国海军的崛起，纯属自然。中国可能还要数十年时间才能赶上美国的海军实力。但是，当那一天逼近时，它将对战后太平洋地区的均势提出棘手的问题，迄今这一均势在很大程度上是由于美军的存在而得到保持的。美日两国肯定希望，当那一天到来时，它们面对的会是一个更加民主的中国——即使这是基于一个不可靠的假定，即与威权国家相比，民主国家不太可能滥用武力。

当然，中国坚称自己绝无好战意图。中国国防部外事办公室主任钱利华少将去年告诉英国《金融时报》：“即便有一天，我们拥有了一艘航空母舰，与别的国家不同，我们不会将其用于推行全球部署或全球影响力。”

人们不必要完全相信这一说法才会承认，随着中国更深地融入全球贸易，它将感到有必要保护自身利益。

上海政法学院(Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law)军事专家倪乐雄告诉《南华早报》(South China Morning Post)：“中国已融入全球经济网络。中国人民解放军海军的新职责是保护我们在沿海地区和公海的国家利益，而不是投入军备竞赛。”他表示，尽管一些人仍梦想着中国海军成为一支世界级海军，有能力“抹去殖民的耻辱”，但这不是主要目的。

全美亚洲研究所(National Bureau of Asian Research)亚洲能源安全项目主管米克尔•赫伯格(Mikkal Herberg)也承认，中国发展海军的主要目的，很可能确实是为了保护其贸易流动。“眼下，中国的咽喉为美国海军所控制，”他表示。战前日本的例子表明，这绝非好事。正是这种不堪封锁的脆弱性，至少在一定程度上导致日本走上了悲剧性和残忍的肆虐亚洲之路。

如果只是为了这个原因，那么中国海军的崛起也许真的是件好事。千百年来，中国一直向内看，现在，随着它把眼光投向海上，如果认为这毫无危险性，那将是愚蠢的。但同样不明智的是忽视这样一个事实，即一支更强大的海军，是中国日益融入全球经济的几乎不可避免的结果。这也带有风险。但总体而言，这无疑是应该受到欢迎的。

译者/何黎