【英语中国】别给中国主权基金找麻烦

Globalisation was supposed to mean the worldwide triumph of the market economy. Yet some of the most influential players are turning out to be states, not private actors. States play a dominant role in ownership and production of raw materials, notably oil and gas. Now states are also emerging as owners of wealth. This is creating widespread concern. Does that narrow focus make sense? The broad answer is No. Fevered attention is currently focused on so-called “sovereign wealth funds”. As Standard Chartered shows in an intriguing analysis, carried out with input from Oxford Analytica*, these are not a new phenomenon: the oldest dates back to 1953. But today there are more funds, with far more money at their disposal than before. In all, they control some $2,200bn, with $2,100bn in the top 20 funds. The seven biggest belong (in order of estimated size) to Abu Dhabi ($625bn), Norway ($322bn), Singapore – GIC ($215bn), Kuwait ($213bn), China ($200bn), Russia ($128bn) and Singapore – Temasek ($108bn).

By definition, these funds exist because a country has a surplus of savings over investment that ends up in the hands of the government. In practice, this has happened for two reasons: ownership of commodity wealth (particularly oil and natural gas), and what amounts to forced savings from an export-oriented manufacturing economy, as in the cases of China and Singapore.

Where a country's natural resource wealth is large relative to the size of its population, the fund should be seen as a different way to hold that wealth, for the long term. In the case of Russia, however, the aim is stabilisation, which implies a shorter-term horizon. China's fund is a consequence of its massive reserve accumulations, which exceed the sums it can conceivably need for insurance. This has allowed the transfer of $200bn (maybe much more in future) to a new fund – the China Investment Corporation – with the goal of achieving a higher return than the miserably low one on the country's official reserves.

How large are these funds? They account for approximately 1.3 per cent of the world's stock of financial assets (stocks, bonds and bank deposits). But the total of $2,200bn is, notes the Standard Chartered report, bigger than the sums invested in hedge funds (at $1,000bn-$1,500bn) and private equity funds (at $700bn- $1,100bn). Nevertheless, it is dwarfed by the $53,000bn controlled by mature institutional investors (see chart).

The sovereign funds remain far smaller than official foreign currency reserves (approximately $5,600bn). But the expectation is that these funds will grow rapidly, possibly to exceed official currency reserves in a number of years. If recent growth were to continue, the total value would reach $13,000bn over the next decade. This might then be 5 per cent of total global financial wealth.

How is the money used? Here the report distinguishes funds by their transparency and by the active, or strategic, nature of their approach to investment (see chart). Norway's fund is conventionally invested (with widely distributed ownership) and transparent. Singapore's funds are defined as transparent, but look for large ownership positions. Qatar's fund is defined as non-transparent and strategic, as is China's. But Lou Jiwei, chairman of the China Investment Corporation, insists that the new fund will operate on commercial lines.

Is there any reason, then, to be concerned about the emergence and likely growth of such funds? As a general proposition, the answer is No. If a government operates a fund transparently and on normal commercial lines, with a wide range of investments and no dominant positions, as does Norway, one can only welcome its emergence as an investor. Questions should be raised only if a fund sought a controlling interest in a strategic company. Then two issues would arise, neither of them specific to sovereign funds: the first is whether the fund is a “fit and proper person” to control a company; the second is whether ownership might threaten a public interest.

Many sovereign wealth funds should raise no concerns whatsoever. The worrying ones are only those that do seek dominant positions or outright ownership of strategically important businesses. If the fund belonged to a government deemed potentially hostile, the concern must be bigger. It would be reasonable to keep control of companies operating in defence or high technology out of the ownership of funds belonging to any foreign government, let alone a potentially hostile one. But interesting questions arise elsewhere: what would people feel about Chinese government ownership of a big media operator?

In other respects, however, the concern with sovereign funds is too narrow. The big truth is that contemporary globalisation has brought players into the game that operate by different rules from those espoused by today's high-income countries: vast state-owned companies, such as Gazprom; billionaires who have gained fortunes by a mixture of force and fraud; and funds owned by governments. Of these, the last may well turn out to pose the smallest problems.

My broad recommendation, then, is to consider the emergence of these funds as part of the integration of countries that accept a bigger role of the state in markets than western countries do today. So be it. It is better for such countries to prosper inside the market system than glower outside it. It is absurd to take a country's exports of oil and refuse to allow it to buy assets, in return.

Yet not everything should be for sale. It is possible – indeed, necessary – to define a negative list of companies that are “off limits”. It is also reasonable to monitor the suitability of owners of large public companies. It would be wrong to exclude state-owned companies from bidding for such public companies. But it is quite reasonable to investigate how these have operated elsewhere. It is not unreasonable, after all, to believe that a state-owned company might not work on normal commercial lines. But it may do so, in which case no problem need arise.

Meanwhile, the owners of the sovereign wealth funds need to understand their own best interests. They should manage their money professionally and transparently. This is also the way to minimise friction with host countries. If they refuse to abide by these principles, they must expect trouble. Yet trouble should not go out of its way to look for them: far, far worse things can happen than for China to come to the west bearing the chequebook it has earned by its people's remarkable efforts.

* State Capitalism: The Rise of Sover- eign Wealth Funds, October 15 2007

按理说，全球化应该意味着市场经济在全球的胜利。但结果显示，一些最具影响力的参与者是国家，而非私营部门。国家在原材料（特别是石油和天然气）所有权和生产方面发挥着主导作用，如今还日益成为财富的所有者。这一点正引起广泛的担忧。这种狭隘的注重有意义吗？答案基本上是：没有。目前，人们的注意力正高度集中在所谓的“主权财富基金”上。渣打银行(Standard Chartered)根据牛津分析顾问公司(Oxford Analytica)的数据*，展开了一项饶有趣味的分析。正如分析报告所示，主权财富基金不是新现象，最早可以追溯到1953年。但目前出现了越来越多的基金，它们的可支配资金要比以前多得多。总体而言，这些基金大约控制着2.2万亿美元资金，其中排名前20位的基金控制着2.1万亿美元。最大的7只基金（按照估计规模排序）分别来自阿布扎比（6250亿美元）、挪威（3220亿美元）、新加坡——政府投资公司（GIC，2150亿美元）、科威特（2130亿美元）、中国（2000亿美元）、俄罗斯（1280亿美元）和新加坡——淡马锡（Temasek ，1080亿美元）。

顾名思义，这些基金之所以存在，原因是一国的储蓄在用于投资以外还有盈余，而这些资金掌握在政府手中。实际上，这种情况的发生是出于两个原因：一是拥有大宗商品财富（特别是石油和天然气），二是出口导向型制造业经济体的强制储蓄，例如中国和新加坡。

当一个国家的自然资源财富相对于其人口规模较大时，长期而言，基金应被视为持有这些财富的另外一种方式。不过，俄罗斯设立基金目的是为了稳定，这代表着一种更短线的视野。中国的基金是其庞大外汇储备积累的结果。其外汇储备规模超过了它为防范意外所需的水平。因此，中国已将2000亿美元外汇储备（今后或许还会多得多）转移给一只新基金——中国投资有限责任公司(China Investment Corporation)，其目标是取得比官方外汇储备低得可怜的收益水平更高的回报率。

这些基金的规模有多大？它们在全球金融资产存量（股票、债券和银行存款）中所占比例约为1.3%。但渣打银行的报告指出，2.2万亿美元总额超过了对冲基金（1万亿至1.5万亿美元）和私人股本基金（7000亿美元至1.1万亿美元）吸引的投资总和。不过，与成熟的机构投资者控制的53万亿美元相比，它们仍显得微不足道。

主权财富基金的规模仍然远远小于官方外汇储蓄（约5.6万亿美元）。但有关人士预计，这些基金将迅速增长，可能在数年内超过官方外汇储备。如果这些基金延续近来的增长趋势，未来10年，其总规模将达到13万亿美元，届时可能占到全球金融财富总值的5%。

如何使用这些资金？渣打银行的报告根据透明度和投资方式的积极或战略性质，对这些基金进行了划分。挪威基金的投资方式颇为传统（所有权分布广泛），也很透明。报告给新加坡基金的定义是运作透明，但寻求大股东地位。对卡塔尔基金的界定是不透明且具战略性质；中国的基金也一样。但中投公司董事长楼继伟强调，这只新基金将坚持商业化运作。

那么，我们有任何理由担心此类基金的崛起和可能的发展吗？总的来说，答案是否定的。如果一个政府以透明的方式并根据正规商业规则来运作基金，投资范围非常广泛，且不占主导地位（像挪威那样），那么，人们只会欢迎它们作为投资者的崛起。如果一只基金寻求某家战略性企业的控股权，那就应该提出问题了。由此带来的两个问题并非特指主权基金：第一个问题是，该基金是否是控股一家公司的“适当人选”；第二个问题是，其所有权是否可能威胁到公共利益。

许多主权财富基金应该不会引发什么担忧。令人担忧的基金，只是那些确实在具有战略重要性的企业寻求主导地位或全资控制的基金。如果该基金隶属于一个存有潜在敌意的政府，那么，人们的担忧一定会加剧。合理的做法是，避免让那些国防或高科技企业的控股权落入任何外国政府基金手中，更别说存有潜在敌意的政府了。但在其它方面会出现一个有意思的问题：人们会怎么看待中国政府对一家大型传媒运营商的所有权呢？

不过，从其它方面来看，对主权财富基金的担忧过于狭隘。一个重要的事实是，当前的全球化使得参与者身处一场基于新规则的游戏中，而这个游戏规则与当今高收入国家支持的规则不同：规模实力庞大的国有企业，例如俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom)；以权势加欺骗的方式获取财富的亿万富翁；以及政府拥有的基金。其中，最后一个因素造成的问题很可能是最小的。

因此，我的基本建议是将这些基金的崛起视为全球一体化的一部分，接受一些国家在市场上扮演比当前西方国家更重要的角色。接受现实吧。这些国家在市场体系内繁荣发展，总好于它们在市场体系外愤愤不平。购买一个国家出口的石油，反过来又不准它收购资产，这种做法颇为荒谬。

不过，并非所有资产都可以出售。确定“禁止收购”企业的限制名单，不仅可能，事实上也很必要。监督大型上市公司的所有者是否合适，这一点也很合理。不让国有企业竞购此类上市公司是错误的。但调查这些企业在其它地方的运作方式，则相当合理。毕竟，认为国有企业可能不会按照正规商业规则运作，这种想法尚属合理。但如果它们按规则行事，那就没有质疑的必要了。

同时，主权财富基金的所有者必须知道它们自身的最大利益是什么。它们应该专业和透明地管理其资金。这也是最大限度减少与东道国摩擦的一种方式。如果拒绝遵循这些原则，它们肯定会遭遇麻烦。不过，人们不应花费过多精力去找主权基金的麻烦：与中国政府带着中国人民辛勤创造的财富到西方来相比，有许多可能发生的事情要糟糕得多。

*《国家资本主义：主权财富基金的崛起》(State Capitalism: The Rise of Sover- eign Wealth Funds)，2007年10月15日

译者/刘彦