【英语中国】中国能接过需求接力棒吗

Never before have emerging economies been in such a good position to sustain demand during a global downturn. Never before, too, has this been more important for the whole world. But the fact that a line of action is feasible and desirable does not mean it will happen. Optimists believe the emerging economies have decoupled at last. But such optimism may yet prove unhinged.The cheerful view rests on two propositions: first, the slowdown in US demand will be quite mild; and, second, emerging market economies – and particularly the largest among them – are strong enough to respond effectively. As a result, the world is going to see a passing of the demand baton from the US and, so, benign adjustment of “global imbalances”.

On the prospects for the US, the September issue of Consensus Economics was optimistic: 2 per cent growth this year, followed by a recovery to 2.4 per cent in 2008. Goldman Sachs forecasts 1.8 per cent growth next year. But this pessimism is not universal: JPMorgan forecasts 2.6 per cent in 2008. The big point is that prospects have become uncertain: the impact of the credit freeze may be mild, but may also be severe. US policymakers do, however, have room for manoeuvre: lower interest rates and even a fiscal boost would follow economic weakness.

Now turn to the emerging economies. Singapore-based DBS group notes that Asian growth has recently been accelerating while US growth has been weak (see chart). Furthermore, adds Goldman Sachs, emerging markets are far more resilient to external shocks than ever before. This view is shared in the markets: look at the buoyancy of emerging market equities and the modest widening in spreads on emerging market bonds, despite recent shocks to the credit markets of the US and other high-income countries.

The evidence on emerging market resilience is impressive: external debt has fallen sharply as a share of aggregate gross domestic product; many of these countries have been running current account surpluses and have, as a result, accumulated vast foreign currency reserves; even Latin America has become a net creditor; inflation has fallen to low levels, despite the recent surge in prices of commodities, including oil; and the proportion of non-performing loans in lending by banks based in a large sample of emerging economies has, says Goldman Sachs, fallen to just 5.8 per cent in 2006, down from 13 per cent in 2002 (see charts).

For the first time, emerging markets are a safe haven during a global financial shock emanating from the world's hegemonic economic power. How times have changed and how, indeed, have the mighty fallen!

Ironically, today's financial strength in emerging economies is a mirror image of US weakness. Charles Dumas of London-based Lombard Street Research brings this point out in an analysis with which I have great sympathy.* The global balance of payments sums to zero. If emerging economies have chosen to run huge current account surpluses, partly because they bear deep scars from the financial crises of the 1990s and partly because they wish to conserve revenue from the soaring prices of the commodities many of them export, then someone else must run deficits.

In the 2000s, that someone has largely been the US. This has entailed fast growth of domestic debt and debt service, chiefly among households. Falling house prices and the “subprime” debacle have now derailed this debt-accumulation machine.

The good news, then, is that what has made the US vulnerable is also precisely what has made it easier for emerging market economies to cope with a US-generated shock. True, this is not the case for all emerging economies: Turkey and several central European countries (Hungary, for example) have large current account deficits and so are in no position to expand demand. These economies are, accordingly, vulnerable to shifts in external credit. But such constraints are now relatively rare among significant emerging economies.

The bad news, however, is that the emerging market economies will indeed have to adjust, probably aggressively. It seems unlikely that growth of demand will now accelerate in western Europe and Japan. The opposite is, alas, more likely. More important is the fact that China's surging current account surplus, forecast by the World Bank to reach $380bn this year, up from $250bn in 2006, is extracting demand from the rest of the world to the tune of ? per cent of the latter's aggregate GDP. China's forecast surplus – an amazing 12 per cent of GDP – is twice as big, relative to GDP, as Japan's has ever been.

The analytical point is that offsetting any slowdown in US demand requires faster growth of demand in the rest of the world. This is still more true if, as seems quite likely (and also desirable), US demand growth slows, relative to growth of GDP, and so the US current account deficit shrinks further. In that case, the rest of the world's demand must rise relative to its output and, ideally, must grow faster than potential output, to ensure full employment of resources. But that is exactly the opposite of what China – vastly the most important of emerging market economies – is now doing.

The conclusion, then, is simple and disturbing. Yes, emerging economies are, with a few exceptions, in a better position to offset a US slowdown and tightening of global credit conditions than ever before. But they are almost certainly going to have to do just that. The difficulty they face, however, is that neither western Europe as a whole, nor Japan, nor, not least, the giant among them, is likely to help the rest very much. China, in particular, is now exporting a big net contraction, not expansion, in demand to the rest of its world, because its supply is growing far faster than its domestic demand. The difference this year alone is 2.5 per cent of GDP. If US demand slowed substantially and China, Japan and western Europe remained on their present courses, the world economy would surely slow far more than the optimists now hope.

What matters at such times is changes in demand relative to supply. From this point of view, China's current mix is a disaster. Rebalancing towards stronger domestic demand and a smaller current account surplus has long been domestically desirable. In an era of weaker US demand, it has become a global necessity. China is about to have economic leadership thrust upon it. What happens now will depend heavily on how the Asian giant responds to this great challenge.

* The bill from the China shop is arriving, Monthly Review, September 2007, www.lombardstreetresearch.com

新兴经济体从未处在现在这样一个如此有利的位置：在全球经济低迷时期维系需求。而对于整个世界来说，这一点也从未像现在这么重要。但这种情况既可行又是大家想要看到的，却并不意味着它就会出现。乐观人士认为，新兴经济体终于与美国脱钩了。但事实可能会证明，这种乐观想法不过是异想天开。上述乐观看法基于两点：首先，美国需求的放缓将十分温和；而其次，新兴市场经济体（特别是其中规模最大的经济体）足够强大，可以进行有效地应对。其结果是，美国将交出全球需求的“接力棒”，而“全球失衡”也将由此得到良性的调整。

对于美国的经济前景，共识经济学公司(Consensus Economics)9月份发布的预测颇为乐观：今年美国经济将增长2%，2008年则反弹至2.4%。而高盛(Goldman Sachs)则预计明年美国经济增长率为1.8%。但这种悲观看法并不普遍：摩根大通(JPMorgan)对2008年美国经济增长率的预期为2.6%。重要的是，美国的经济前景已变得不确定：信贷紧缩的影响或许很温和，但也可能会很严重。不过，美国决策者的确拥有行动的空间：在经济走软后下调利率，甚至施行财政刺激措施。

现在来谈谈新兴经济体。总部位于新加坡的星展集团(DBS Group)指出，近来亚洲的经济增长不断提速，而美国经济增长则一直疲弱（见图表）。此外，高盛补充称，目前新兴市场在外部冲击面前的抗跌性比以往任何时候都强。这一观点得到了市场的认同：尽管最近美国及其它高收入国家的信贷市场受到冲击，但新兴市场股市仍十分活跃，新兴市场债券利差也不断温和扩大。

新兴市场抗跌性方面的证据令人瞩目：其外部债务占总体国内生产总值(GDP)的比例明显下降；其中许多国家一直保持经常账户盈余，其结果是，它们积累了庞大的外汇储备；甚至连拉丁美洲也成为了净债权方；尽管近来包括石油在内的大宗商品价格飙升，但（这些国家的）通胀已降至较低水平；高盛表示，对新兴市场进行的大量抽样调查结果显示，2006年银行不良贷款比例已降至仅5.8%的水平，低于2002年时的13%（参见图表）。

在占据主宰地位的全球经济大国带来全球金融冲击之际，新兴市场首次成为了“避风港”。时代已发生了何其巨大的变化！的确，经济强国何以衰败至此！

具有讽刺意味的是，新兴经济体当前的金融实力恰恰反射出了美国经济的疲弱。伦敦朗伯德街研究(Lombard Street Research)的查尔斯•杜马斯(Charles Dumas)在一篇分析中提出了上述观点，对此我深有同感。*全球收支平衡是零和的结果。如果新兴经济体选择保持巨额经常账户盈余，那么其它某些国家肯定会出现经常账户赤字。新兴经济体之所以要保持巨额经常账户盈余，原因之一在于它们在上世纪90年代的金融危机中遭受重创，另一个原因则是它们希望保留来自大宗商品价格不断飙升中的收入。许多新兴经济体都是大宗商品出口国。

在本世纪初，这个“某些国家”一般来说是指美国。这已造成了国内债务和债务利息（主要是家庭）迅速增长的结果。目前，不断下跌的房价和“次级抵押贷款”危机，已导致这部累积债务的机器出现了问题。

那么，好消息是，使美国易受冲击的因素，也正是让新兴市场经济体更容易应对美国引发的冲击的因素。诚然，这并不适用于所有新兴经济体：土耳其和几个中欧国家（例如匈牙利）存在巨额经常账户赤字，所以它们不能扩大需求。因此，这些经济体容易受到外部信贷变化的冲击。但在举足轻重的新兴经济体中，目前这些限制因素相对而言非常少。

但坏消息是，新兴市场经济确实需要调整，而且幅度可能很大。从目前看，欧洲和日本的需求增长似乎不太可能加速。相反，放缓的可能性倒是更大一些。更为重要的是，中国急剧增长的经常账户盈余，正在从世界其它地区抽取高达它们GDP总和0.75％的需求——世界银行预计，中国今年的经常账户盈余将从2006年的2500亿美元升至3800亿美元。中国的经常账户盈余预期与GDP之比高达12％，是日本该比例历史上最高水平的两倍。

分析的观点是，抵消美国需求放缓的影响，需要世界其它地区的需求以更快速度增长。如果美国需求增长相对于GDP的增速有所放缓（这种可能性看起来非常大，而且也是人们希望看到的），而美国的经常账户赤字进一步减少，情况就更是这样。在这种情况下，要想确保资源的充分利用，世界其它地区的需求必须相对于产出有所增长，而理想状态是增速必须超过潜在产出。但在中国——全球最重要的新兴市场经济体——目前的情况却恰恰相反。

因此，结论简单而令人忧虑。诚然，除了少数例外情况之外，新兴经济体比以往任何时候都更能够抵消美国经济放缓和全球信贷环境收紧的影响。但它们几乎也必须要这样做。然而，它们面临的难题是，西欧、日本和它们之中的大国，都不太可能给予其它国家太多帮助。尤其是中国，由于目前供给增长远远超过国内需求，中国正在大规模抽取世界其它地区的净需求，而非扩张它们的需求。仅在今年，两者之间的差额就占GDP的2.5％。如果美国需求显著放缓，加之中国、日本和西欧继续现在的做法，世界经济的放缓幅度必定会远超乐观主义者目前的期望。

在当前的情况下，重要的是相对于供给的需求变化。从这点来看，中国目前的局面是一场灾难。长期以来，中国国内方面一直希望看到有利于增强国内需求及缩小经常账户盈余的重新调整。在这个美国需求转弱的时代，它已成为全球的一项当务之急。中国即将被迫扮演引领全球经济的角色。局面的发展，很大程度上将取决于这个亚洲大国如何应对这一巨大挑战。

*The bill from the China shop is arriving，《月度回顾》(Monthly Review)，2007年9月，www.lombardstreetresearch.com

译者/何黎