【英语中国】勿对中国投资非洲说三道四

A few years ago, Lukas Lundin, a mining executive, rode his motorbike 8,000 miles from Cairo to Cape Town. His journey, which took just five weeks, meandered through 10 countries, including Sudan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana. He was amazed to discover that 85 per cent of the roads he travelled were tarred and of high quality. Many had been built by Chinese companies.

That was 2005. Since then, China's interest in Africa has intensified. In November 2006, Beijing hosted a lavish Sino-African summit at which it promised more than 40 of the continent's leaders a new era of co-operation. Giant elephants and giraffes appeared on hoardings across the capital to mark the occasion.

Beijing has offered more than long-necked symbolism. In 2006 alone, it signed trade deals with African countries worth $60bn. Investments, which often include a resources-for-infrastructure element, have poured in thick and fast. China's stock of foreign direct investment has shot well past $120bn (€81bn, £74bn). In 2006, Angola temporarily overtook Saudi Arabia as China's main supplier of oil, and Africa now accounts for nearly 30 per cent of China's oil imports.

Nor is China's interest limited to oil and minerals. In 2007, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the biggest bank in the world by deposits, paid $5.6bn for a fifth of South Africa's Standard Bank. Only last month, at yet another Sino-African jamboree, this one in Egypt, Beijing pledged $10bn of new low-cost loans to Africa. It also promised to eliminate tariffs on 60 per cent of exports and to forgive the debt of several countries. Trade between Africa and China has already risen spectacularly: last year, it jumped 45 per cent to $107bn, a tenfold increase over 2000.

Beijing's engagement with Africa has caused much hand-wringing. Western donors decry Beijing's supposedly scruples-free approach to investing in countries such as Sudan. In some African countries, too, China's growing shadow has provoked anger. Nigerian radicals likened an attempt by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to secure 6bn barrels of oil to being attacked by locusts.

Such objections are overdone. They are often disingenuous. China is no philanthropist, but its rise may still represent Africa's best hope of escaping poverty. In the eight years to 2007, before the financial crisis, African countries were growing, on average, by more than 4 per cent a year, far higher than previously. That was thanks partly to better economic management, debt relief and increased capital flows (some from China), but also to the higher commodity prices driven by Chinese demand. Dambisa Moyo, the Zambian economist who riled western donors with her book Dead Aid, says: “China's African role is wider, more sophisticated and more businesslike than any other country's at any time in the postwar period.”

Much of the criticism of China's influence rings hollow. As Chinese – and Japanese – officials point out, the west's track record is less than exemplary. European contact with Africa can best be summed up as decades of naked rapaciousness followed by a spectacularly unsuccessful attempt to make amends. During the cold war western governments supported dictators and kleptomaniacs across the continent, from President Mobutu Sese Seko of what was then Zaire to Uganda's murderous British-trained Idi Amin. More recently, in the name of conditionality, benefactors have rammed frequently disastrous economic fads down the throats of hapless recipients. With donors like that, who needs enemies?

China's pragmatism may produce better results. First, an emphasis on infrastructure means that, even if deals are corroded by corruption, at least the recipient country ends up with a road, port or hospital. (OK, or perhaps a soccer stadium.) Much Asian growth, including that of China itself, was predicated on infrastructure. Officials in Tokyo often contrast Japan's own business-oriented approach to south-east Asia – where countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia benefited greatly from Japanese trade and investment – with dubious development strategies pushed by the west in Africa.

Second, China's approach is built on trade. Ms Moyo argues that genuine business opportunity is more likely to catalyse development than government-to-government aid that is prone to being siphoned off. Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, told the FT there was Chinese interest in helping to create low-cost manufacturing bases in Africa.

Third, and crucially, China is not alone in seeking opportunities on the continent. As well as the west, India, Brazil and Russia are also vying for business. That ought to give resource-rich African countries the ability to haggle for better terms, though of course there is no guarantee that increased funds will not simply line bigger pockets.

It would be wrong to be wide-eyed about China's investments. Some Chinese businesses are rightly condemned for lax safety standards and for shunning African labour. Critics are doubtless right that Chinese money has helped prop up unscrupulous regimes in Khartoum and Harare. Yet China is hardly alone in dealing with thieves and villains. Whatever its side-effects, a scramble to invest in Africa has got to be better than the European precedent; a scramble to carve it up.

几年前，矿业高管卢卡斯•兰登(Lukas Lundin)骑着摩托车，从开罗前往开普敦，行程8000英里，用时仅5周，途经10个国家，包括苏丹、埃塞尔比亚、马拉维、赞比亚和博茨瓦纳。他吃惊地发现，他走过的道路有85%都是柏油马路，路况很好。其中许多都是由中国公司修建的。

那是2005年。自那以来，中国对非洲更感兴趣了。2006年11月，北京主办了盛大的中非合作论坛北京峰会，在会上向非洲大陆的40多位领导人做出承诺，将开启中非合作的新纪元。北京到处都是大象和长颈鹿的招贴画，以示隆重。

中国政府提供的不仅仅是长远的象征。仅在2006年，中国就与非洲国家签署了价值600亿美元的贸易协议。投资纷至沓来，其中常常包含资源换基础设施的条款。中国的对外直接投资存量直线上升，迅速超过了1200亿美元。2006年，安哥拉暂时取代沙特阿拉伯，成为中国的主要石油供应国，非洲如今占中国石油进口的近30%。

中国的兴趣也仅仅局限于石油和矿产。2007年，存款额居全球之首的中国工商银行(ICBC)以56亿美元购入南非标准银行(Standard Bank) 20%的股权。就在上月，在埃及举行的另一次中非会议上，中国政府承诺再向非洲提供100亿美元的低息贷款。中国还答应免除非洲60%出口商品的关税，豁免几个非洲国家的债务。中非贸易已经出现大幅增长：去年，双边贸易额增长45%，达到1070亿美元，较2000年增长了10倍。

中国政府与非洲的接触让很多人极为苦恼。西方援助国谴责中国政府以似乎毫无顾忌的方式投资于苏丹等国家。包括在一些非洲国家，中国日益增强的影响力也激起了愤怒。尼日利亚激进分子把中海油(CNOOC)获取60亿桶石油的做法，比作蝗虫袭击。

这些异议夸大其词了。它们经常是别有用心。中国并非慈善家，但中国的崛起可能仍然是非洲摆脱贫困的最大希望。在截至2007年的8年里，此次金融危机前，非洲国家每年的平均经济增速超过4%，远高于以前的水平。这在一定程度上要归因于更优秀的经济管理、债务减轻和资金流入增加（部分来自中国），但也是因为中国需求推动了大宗商品价格上涨。赞比亚经济学家丹比萨•莫约(Dambisa Moyo)表示：“中国在非洲的角色比战后任何时期、任何其它国家都更广泛、更复杂、更认真。”莫约所著的《致命援助》(Dead Aid)一书激怒了西方援助国。

针对中国影响力的很多批评都相当空洞。正如中国（以及日本）官员所指出的，西方的记录不值得效法。对欧洲与非洲关系的最佳概括可能是：长达几十年赤裸裸的掠夺，然后是极不成功的修补尝试。冷战期间，西方政府支持非洲各地的独裁者和窃国者，从扎伊尔（现刚果民主共和国）总统蒙博托(Mobutu Sese Seko)，到英国训练出来的乌干达残忍的伊迪•阿明(Idi Amin)。再近一些，捐助国常常以限制条款的名义，将灾难性的经济时尚硬塞给不幸的受援国。有这样的援助国，谁还需要敌人呢?

中国的实用主义也许会带来更好的结果。首先，注重基础设施意味着，即便交易受到腐败的侵蚀，至少受援国最终会得到公路、机场或医院。（好吧，或者是一座足球场。）亚洲很多国家的增长（包括中国自己）都建立在基础设施上。日本政府官员经常把自己对东南亚采取的以商业为导向的方式——泰国、马来西亚和印尼等国从日本的贸易和投资中受益匪浅，与西方在非洲推行的冒险发展战略相对比。

其次，中国的模式建立在贸易的基础上。莫约表示，与容易被抽干的政府间援助相比，真正的商业机会更有可能促进发展。世界银行(World Bank)行长罗伯特•佐立克(Robert Zoellick)告诉英国《金融时报》，帮助非洲创建低成本的制造基地符合中国的利益。

第三，也是至关重要的一点，中国并非唯一在非洲大陆寻找机遇的国家。除了西方国家，印度、巴西和俄罗斯也在这里争夺业务。这应该会让资源丰富的非洲国家有能力争取更有利的条款，当然，这并不能保证增加的资金不会只是装进更大的口袋。

对中国对非投资感到吃惊将是错误的。一些中国企业理应因为放松安全标准和不雇用非洲劳动力而受到谴责。批评者的这种说法无疑是正确的：中国的资金帮助支持了肆无忌惮的苏丹和津巴布韦政权。不过，中国算不上是唯一一个与盗贼和罪犯打交道的国家。无论副作用是什么，争相投资非洲的结果必然会好于欧洲以前的做法；争相瓜分非洲大陆。

译者/梁艳裳