【英语中国】央行行长要敢讲话

Will no one rid me of this turbulent central banker? Gordon Brown, the UK's prime minister, may be asking just that when he learns of yet another critical comment from the governor of the Bank of England. For Henry II, king of England in the 12th century, the troublemaker was Thomas Becket, his own choice as archbishop of Canterbury. For Mr Brown, it is Mervyn King, whom he has reappointed to an equally impregnable position. The parallel is clear: central bankers are cardinals in the cult of monetary stability.

Becket was murdered. Mr King will not suffer that fate. But a later king of England brought the church and his archbishops to heel. Could the Bank suffer a similar fate?

Indeed, one of the results of this crisis is to imperil central bank independence, not just in the UK. This is so for three reasons: at close to zero official interest rates, the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy erodes; governments are running huge fiscal deficits, particularly in the UK and the US, which threaten monetary stability; and, finally, those in charge wish to divert blame for the disaster.

Indeed, Mr King is not the only central banker to be under attack. US legislators savaged Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, over his role in Bank of America's takeover of Merrill Lynch. Astonishingly, Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, has directly attacked unconventional policies, including those pursued by the European Central Bank.

Turbulent times produce turbulent central bankers and turbulence over central banking. The question, particularly in the UK, where central bank independence is so fragile, politics so tumultuous and times so tough, is how central bankers should act. My view is: with caution, but not under a vow of silence.

Mr King has made four points, all critical of the government: first, contrary to the views of the Treasury, “if banks are thought too big to fail, then . . . they are too big”; second, the Bank of England has “a new statutory authority for financial stability . . . [But] it is not entirely clear how the Bank will be able to discharge its new statutory responsibility if we can do no more than issue sermons or organise burials”; third, he has not been consulted on the forthcoming financial services white paper; and, last, as he told the Commons Treasury committee: “If the economy were to recover along the path assumed in the Budget projections of GDP then I think the time over which deficits need to be reduced is likely to have to be faster than was implied by [the Budget] projection.”

Let us start with a simple question: is the governor correct on the substance? The answers are: yes, yes, yes and yes. While size is not the sole consideration, private businesses must not operate freely if they are not subject to the fear of bankruptcy. Similarly, it is not only necessary for power to align with responsibility, but the Bank of England, the body whose focus is on the economy as a whole, is best suited to exercise “macroprudential” controls over the financial system.

Again, if true, it seems incredible that the governor of the Bank should not have been consulted on the forthcoming white paper. Above all, only Mr Brown and those closest to him deny what is obvious: the fiscal position, with a deficit of 14 per cent of gross domestic product forecast by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for 2010, is radically unsustainable. Big spending cuts and tax increases, relative to GDP, are inevitable.

So the issue is whether it is the business of the governor to make his views public, particularly on such politically sensitive terrain. Should he not be “economical with the truth”, following Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Fed, in studied ambiguity? In normal times, the answer is yes. But in the dire circumstances of the day, it is surely better to have the big disagreements out in the open than buried.

True, the politicisation of the independent central bank is potentially very dangerous. The Bank's still-limited independence may be compromised or even overturned. Moreover, at a time when co-operation among the authorities is essential, the appearance of disarray is itself damaging to confidence. Yet, against these powerful considerations, a responsible public official has to decide whether a particular issue has become so important that bringing his views into the open has become the only patriotic thing to do.

In the case of the UK's fiscal position at least, it surely is. We are not talking here of modest deficits, but of a yawning chasm, one that could well compromise monetary stability. Furthermore, the UK no longer has credible fiscal rules or procedures, while the prime minister is denying the implications of his own government's fiscal projections.

Given this irresponsible behaviour, the governor should be allowed to speak. The prime minister may well hate his turbulent central banker. But the country is no politician's property. Central bankers should always be careful. But this does not mean they should never speak out. Today, they have a duty to do so.

难道没人能给我撵走这个吵吵嚷嚷的央行行长吗？在闻听英国央行(Bank of England)行长又一次发表批评言论时，英国首相戈登•布朗(Gordon Brown)可能会这样问。对于12世纪英格兰国王亨利二世(Henry II)而言，找麻烦的是他钦点的坎特伯雷大主教托马斯•贝克特(Thomas Becket)。给布朗添乱的则是默文•金(Mervyn King)，他受布朗二度任命，地位与贝克特一样稳固。两者的相似之处显而易见：在人们对货币体系稳定性的顶礼膜拜中，央行行长就是红衣主教。

贝克特后来被人谋杀。而默文•金不会落得这种下场。但亨利二世的继任者终令教会及其大主教俯首称臣。英国央行是否会遭遇同样的命运呢？

实际上，此次危机的后果之一，就是危及央行的独立性，而且不止是在英国。这是出于三方面的原因：在官方利率接近于零的情况下，货币与财政政策的界限变得模糊；各国政府——特别是英国和美国政府——的巨额财政赤字，对货币体系的稳定性构成威胁；还有最后一条原因：掌权者希望推卸造成灾难的责任。

事实上，金并不是唯一一位遭到抨击的央行行长。美联储(Fed)主席本•伯南克(Ben Bernanke)因其在美国银行(Bank of America)收购美林(Merrill Lynch)一案中所扮演的角色，遭到了美国国会的猛烈抨击。令人惊愕的是，德国总理安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)曾直接批评包括欧洲央行(ECB)在内的各家央行所推行的非常规政策。

动荡时代会产生吵吵嚷嚷的央行行长,以及围绕央行职能的众说纷纭。问题是，央行行长们该如何行事？特别是在央行独立性如此岌岌可危、政坛如此混乱、形势如此严峻的英国。我的观点是：谨慎行事，但不应一味沉默。

金提出的四点意见，无一不是对政府的批评：首先，与美联储的观点相反，“如果银行被认为大到不能倒，那么……它们过于庞大”；第二，英国央行拥有“法律新赋予的、维护金融体系稳定的职权……（但）如果我们所能做的仅限于布道或安排葬礼，那么我们就不太清楚，央行将如何履行其新近被赋予的法定责任”；第三，政府并未就即将出台的金融服务白皮书征询他的意见；最后，正如他在下议院财政委员会(Commons Treasury committee)讲话时所言：“如果预算案在预测GDP时所假定的经济复苏轨迹与现实情况相符，那么我认为，我们削减赤字的进度，可能必须快于（预算案）预测所暗示的进度。”

让我们从一个简单的问题着手：这位央行行长四点意见的主旨是否正确？答案是：正确，全部正确。虽然规模不是唯一考虑的因素，但如果私营企业不用担心破产，它们就不应该自由运作。同样，不仅有必要让权力与责任相匹配，而且，作为关注焦点是总体经济状况的机构，英国央行最适于对金融体系施加“宏观审慎的”控制。

此外，政府竟然未就即将出台的白皮书征询英国央行行长的意见，这种说法如果属实，就又是一个看上去令人难以置信的问题。最重要的是，只有布朗及其亲信才会否认以下这个显而易见的事实：（英国的）财政状况根本就难以维系——经合组织(OECD)预测，到2010年，英国的财政赤字将占到国内生产总值(GDP)的14%。大幅削减开支在GDP中所占比例，同时提高税收在GDP中所占比例，是不可避免的。

因此问题在于，英国央行行长是否应该公开发表个人意见，尤其是在话题颇具政治敏感性的情况下。他是否应该“有保留地说出真相”，像美联储前主席艾伦•格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)那样故作高深？在正常时期，答案是肯定的。但在当前的严峻形势下，将主要分歧公开，显然要强于避而不谈。

诚然，把央行的独立问题政治化，存在很大的潜在危险。央行本来有限的独立性可能被削弱，甚至被颠覆。此外，在权力机构的彼此合作至关重要之际，混乱迹象本身就会损及信心。然而，尽管考虑到这些强有力的理由，一位负责任的公共官员必须做出判断，即某个特定问题是否已重要到这种程度：公开发表个人意见成为了唯一称得上爱国的行为。

至少就英国的财政状况而言，上述问题的答案显然是肯定的。我们不是在讨论适度的赤字，而是一个令人瞠目的缺口，它很有可能危及货币体系的稳定性。此外，英国的财政规定或程序已不再可信，而与此同时，对于自己领导下的政府所做出的财政预测的含义，英国首相正矢口否认。

鉴于这种不负责任的行为，应该允许央行行长开口说话。首相很可能会对这位吵吵嚷嚷的央行行长怀恨在心，但这个国家不是政客的财产。央行行长始终应谨慎行事，但这并不代表他们应该一味沉默。如今，他们有责任打破沉默。

译者/章晴