【英语中国】全球为何关切中国汇率

A country's exchange rate cannot be a concern for it alone, since it must also affect its trading partners. But this is particularly true for big economies. So, whether China likes it or not, its heavily managed exchange rate regime is a legitimate concern of its trading partners. Its exports are now larger than those of any other country. The liberty of insignificance has vanished.

Naturally, the Chinese resent the pressure. At the conclusion of a European Union-China summit in Nanjing last week, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, complained about demands for Beijing to allow its currency to appreciate. He protested that “some countries on the one hand want the renminbi to appreciate, but on the other hand engage in brazen trade protectionism against China. This is unfair. Their measures are a restriction on China's development.” The premier also repeated the traditional mantra: “We will maintain the stability of the renminbi at a reasonable and balanced level.”

We can make four obvious replies to Mr Wen. First, whatever the Chinese may feel, the degree of protectionism directed at their exports has been astonishingly small, given the depth of the recession. Second, the policy of keeping the exchange rate down is equivalent to an export subsidy and tariff, at a uniform rate – in other words, to protectionism. Third, having accumulated $2,273bn in foreign currency reserves by September, China has kept its exchange rate down, to a degree unmatched in world economic history. Finally, China has, as a result, distorted its own economy and that of the rest of the world. Its real exchange rate is, for example, no higher than in early 1998 and has depreciated by 12 per cent over the past seven months, even though China has the world's fastest-growing economy and largest current account surplus.

Do these policies matter for China and the world? Yes, is the answer. Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of Canada, notes in a recent speech, that “large and unsustainable current account imbalances across major economic areas were integral to the build-up of vulnerabilities in many asset markets. In recent years, the international monetary system failed to promote timely and orderly economic adjustments.”* He is right.

What we are seeing, as Mr Carney points out, is a failure of adjustment to changes in global competitiveness that has unhappy precedents, notably during the 1920s and 1930s, with the rise of the US, and, again, during the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of Europe and Japan. As he also notes, “China's integration into the world economy alone represents a much bigger shock to the system than the emergence of the US at the turn of the last century. China's share of global gross domestic product has increased faster and its economy is much more open.”

Moreover, today, China's managed exchange rate regime is quite different from those of other big economies, which was not true of the US when it rose to prominence. Thus, China's managed exchange rate is shifting adjustment pressure on to other countries. This was disruptive before the crisis, but is now worse than that in this post-crisis period: some advanced countries, notably Canada, Japan, and the eurozone, have already seen big appreciations of their currencies. They are not alone.

Unfortunately, as we have also long known, two classes of countries are immune to external pressure to change policies that affect global “imbalances”: one is the issuer of the world's key currency; and the other consists of the surplus countries. Thus, the present stalemate might continue for some time. But the dangers this would create are also evident: if, for example, China's current account surplus were to rise towards 10 per cent of GDP once again, the country's surplus could be $800bn (€543bn, £491bn), in today's dollars, by 2018. Who might absorb such sums? US households are broken on the wheel of debt, as are those of most of the other countries that ran large current account deficits. That is why governments are now borrowers of last resort.

For the external deficit countries, the concern is how to lower fiscal deficits without tipping their economies back into recession. That will be impossible unless they are either able to get their private sectors spending and borrowing as before, or they enjoy rapid expansion in net exports. Of the two, the latter is the safer route to health. But that in turn, will only happen if surplus countries expand demand faster than potential output. China is the most important single player in this game.

Fortunately, these adjustment are in the long-term interests of both sides, including China. As a recent report from the European Chamber points out, China's external surpluses have been a by-product of misguided policy.** Thus, capital was priced too cheaply in the 2000s, via cheap credit and low taxes on corporate profits, while foreign exchange was deliberately kept too expensive by currency interventions. In the process, income was transferred from households to industry. The result was an extraordinary surge in exports and capital-intensive heavy industry, with little job creation. Household disposable incomes fell to an extremely low share of GDP, while corporate investment, savings and the current account surplus soared. The short-term response to the crisis, with soaring credit and fixed investment, while successful in sustaining demand, reinforced these tendencies, rather than offset them. Another round of huge increases in excess capacity and current account surpluses seems inevitable.

China's exchange rate regime and structural policies are, indeed, of concern to the world. So, too, are the policies of other significant powers. What would happen if the deficit countries did slash spending relative to incomes while their trading partners were determined to sustain their own excess of output over incomes and export the difference? Answer: a depression. What would happen if deficit countries sustained domestic demand with massive and open-ended fiscal deficits? Answer: a wave of fiscal crises.

Neither answer is acceptable; we need co-operative adjustment. Without it, protectionism in deficit countries is inevitable. We are watching a slow-motion train wreck. We must stop it before it is too late.

* “The Evolution of the International Monetary System”, November 19 2009, www.bankofcanada.ca;

** “Overcapacity in China”, www.europeanchamber.com.cn.

一国的汇率不可能只是自己的问题，因为它必然也会影响其贸易伙伴国。对于大型经济体尤为如此。因此，不管中国喜欢与否，其严格管理的汇率机制都是贸易伙伴的一项合理担忧。中国的出口规模已超过其它任何一个国家。无关重要所带来的自由如今已荡然无存。

中国自然憎恨这种压力。11月30日，在中欧南京峰会的闭幕式上，中国国务院总理温家宝针对希望北京允许人民币升值的要求表达了不满。他表示：“现在一些国家一方面要求人民币升值，另一方面又对中国实行名目繁多的贸易保护主义。这是有失公允的，实际上是限制中国的发展。”温家宝重复了中国的传统说辞：“我们将保持人民币在合理、均衡水平上的基本稳定。”

我们可以向温家宝给出4种显而易见的答复。首先，不管中国有何感觉，鉴于此次危机的严重程度，针对中国出口的保护主义力度小的惊人。其次，压低汇率的政策相当于提供出口补贴和以统一的税率征收关税，换句话说，相当于保护主义。第三，截至今年9月，中国已积累了2.273万亿美元的外汇储备，由此压低人民币汇率，达到世界经济史上从未曾见的水平。最后，中国因此扭曲了本国以及全球其它地区的经济。例如，尽管中国的经济增长率和经常账户盈余居世界之首，但中国的实际汇率不高于1998年初的水平，过去7个月，人民币已累计贬值12%。

这些政策对于中国和世界是否要紧？答案是肯定的。加拿大央行行长马克•卡尼(Mark Carney)最近在讲话中指出，“主要经济地区不可持续的巨额经常账户失衡，是造成许多资产市场脆弱性上升的重要因素。最近几年，国际货币体系未能推动及时有序的经济调整。”*他说对了。

正如卡尼所指出的，我们现在看到的是未能针对全球竞争力的变化做出调整，这是有悲惨先例的，特别是在上世纪20年代和30年代美国崛起之时，以及60年代和70年代欧洲和日本崛起之时。他还指出：“上世纪末，仅是中国融入世界经济，给整个体系带来的冲击就比美国的崛起要大得多。中国在全球国内生产总值(GDP)中所占比重上升得更快，中国的经济也更为开放。”

此外，如今中国有管理的汇率制度明显不同于其它大型经济体，而在美国崛起时并非如此。因此，中国有管理的汇率正将调整压力转嫁给其它国家。在此次危机之前，这种做法具有破坏性，但在如今的后危机时期，其后果更为严重：一些发达国家（特别是加拿大、日本和欧元区）的货币已大幅升值。它们并不孤独。

不幸的是，正如我们长期以来所知道的，要求改变影响全球“失衡”政策的外部压力，不会对两类国家产生影响：一类是全球关键货币的发行国；另一类是盈余国家。因此，目前的僵局可能会持续一段时间。但这将带来的危险同样显而易见：例如，如果中国的经常账户盈余再次上升至GDP的10%，那么到2018年，以美元现价计算，中国的盈余可能会达到8000亿美元。谁来消化这么一大笔盈余呢？美国家庭已不堪债务的重负，其他大多数拥有巨额经常账户赤字的国家也是如此。这就是政府现在为何称为最后借款人的原因。

对于拥有对外赤字的国家，它们的担忧在于如何降低财政赤字，而不至让本国经济再次陷入衰退。如果它们不能让私人部门恢复以往的支出和借贷水平，或是让净出口出现迅速增长，这种结果就不可能出现。在这两种选择中，后者是恢复健康的更安全路线。但也只有盈余国家以比潜在产出更快的速度扩大需求，这才会变成现实。在这场游戏中，中国是最重要的单打选手。

幸运的是，这些调整符合双方的长期利益，包括中国在内。正如欧洲商会(European Chamber)最近在一份报告所指出的，中国的对外盈余是错误政策的副产品。**因此本世纪以来，通过廉价信贷以及对企业利润实施低税率，中国的资本定价过低，而外汇干预又造成外汇被人为地保持在过高水平。在此过程中，收入从家庭转移到了企业。结果是出口大幅飙升，资本密集型重工业大量出现，却几乎没有创造就业。家庭可支配收入占GDP的比例降至极低水平，而企业投资、储蓄和经常账户盈余飙升。应对危机的短期措施虽然成功维持了需求，却造成信贷和固定投资大幅增加，结果是巩固了这些趋势，而没有抵消它们。另一轮过剩产能和经常账户盈余的大幅增长已成必然。

实际上，中国的汇率机制和结构性政策事关全球。其它重要国家的政策也是如此。如果赤字国家确实削减了相对于收入的支出，而其贸易伙伴决心维持本国相对于收入的过剩，并将两者的差额出口，结果会怎样？答案是：萧条。如果赤字国家通过没有限制的大规模财政赤字维持国内需求，结果会怎样？答案是：一波财政危机浪潮。

这两个答案都是不可接受的：我们需要合作调整。没有这种调整，赤字国家的保护主义就不可避免。我们正目睹一场慢动作的火车失事。我们必须尽早阻止它。

*《国际货币体系的发展》(The Evolution of the International Monetary System)，2009年11月19日，www.bankofcanada.ca

**《中国的产能过剩》(Overcapacity in China)，www.europeanchamber.com.cn

译者/梁艳裳